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TOWARDS THE THEOLOGY OF PLACE 
STEPHEN GAVIN RADLEY 
This thesis seeks to give a theological account of the human 
experience of place, in the first part of the thesis three ways in which 
human beings relate to places are described. All human beings 
relate existentially to 'my place' with feelings of belonging or 
outsideness. Each human being relates to a place in a unique way 
which reflects personality, experience and socialisation; the mental 
map of each individual of any place is always a simplified version of 
reality Each human being observes and experiences places 
through learnt patterns; these patterns are preserved in institutional 
forms and are expressed in a socially organised structure within 
which all human beings are placed. 
In any relation a place can influence and constrain. It can 
function as an agent just as powerfully as a human being can. 'A 
place' can be of any scale. The people of a continental block may 
share features of history, culture, building style and world view 
which may be different to those of other parts of the world. However, 
those same categories can vary, in other ways, over very short 
distances of time and space. A place may be as small as 'my place'; 
that is, where I call home. 
A place is always a complex of interrelations between the 
past and the present; between human society and natural 
landscape and climate; and between this place and another place 
with which this place relates. Furthermore, competing scales of 
place coexist. I might feel at home in my country but out of place in a 
neighbouring village or suburb. 
In the second part of the thesis it is argued that a relational 
ontology will account for the way human beings operate in and with 
places. It is suggested that space and time present a four-
dimensional framework for describing the location of any object; 
that God is present in a place by virtue of his creative and life-
sustaining Spirit and no human agency is required to actualise this 
presence; and that McFadyen's model of Christian personhood may 
be applied more widely than to individual human beings. It 
describes how all things may be said to relate. 
In this theological anthropology it has not been possible to 
deal at any length with the way in which God is present in place. 
Nor has it been possible to consider questions of place in the Bible 
or in the Christian tradition. Clearly the land, the spiritualisation of 
the presence of God and territorial expressions of Christianity 
through time are important questions but they lie beyond the scope 
of this thesis. It is the concern of this thesis merely to describe how 
the relation between human beings and 'place' operates and to 
offer a theological account, based on a relational ontology, of the 
relationships described. 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation 
from it should be published without his prior written consent and 
information derived from it should be acknowledged. 
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tNTRODUCTlON: THE LOCATION OF THE PROBLEM 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Because I know that time is always time 
And place Is always and only place 
And what is actual is actual only for one time 
And only for one place 
I rejoice that things are as they are... 
T. S. Eliof 
The experience of place is common to all human beings. In 
this thesis we maintain that to be a human being is to be 'in place'. 
All human beings are necessarily located In space and time at a 
particular location on the surface of the earth. Therefore, all human 
beings are always in one particular place rather than in any other. 
All human beings are also placed In a social order which is usually 
characterised by a political distribution of responsibility. Therefore, 
all human beings are also necessarily placed on a social map at a 
particular location. This thesis Is an attempt to provide a theological 
account of what being 'In place' means. 
1.1.1 The Use of the Word 'Place' 
The English word 'place' Is used in a variety of ways in 
modern English. First, It Is widely held that a place Is a collection of 
houses in which human beings live. Scale is not important except In 
' J. S . Eliot. 'Ash Wednesday 1930', Lines 16-19, p. 83, Selected Poems, 
Faber and Faber, London, 1961. 
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so far as 'a place' must consist of a group of dwellings. Almost all 
human beings, it is thought, live in such a place. Places are named 
and their location can be described. Each place is unique, because 
no two places occupy exactly the same location. Places are 
therefore, particular phenomena. This place must be different from 
that place. The difference is a result of the particular characteristics 
of the space which each place occupies and of the unique history of 
each particular place. 
To talk simply of 'place' is to talk in the abstract, for place 
understood in this first way is always this-place-with-a-name-which-
is-here. In other words, places are differentiated from one another 
by two mechanisms. Firstly, by their name, and occasionally the 
addition of an administrative district in which they are located and 
secondly by reference to their particular location in the physical 
world. 
Secondly, a place can be modified by the addition of a 
personal pronoun. One no longer speaks of place or places (in 
general) or of a-place-with-a-name-which-is-here (in particular) but 
of 'her place' or 'my place'. In this modified usage an important 
change has occurred in the notion of place which is operating. A 
place is no longer defined as a point in space in which buildings 
are located and which is described by a name. It is now defined as 
belonging to a human being. The place is what it is because it is 
mine. Particularity is retained for only this place is also my place. 
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Where human beings own more than one place further 
modifiers are available as In the phrase 'his place In the country'. 
The locatlonal referent here need not be specific; the governing 
modification is not 'in the country' but 'his'. It Is no longer important 
that my place is here as opposed to there. The name of the place In 
which my place Is located is not important. The only significant 
description of this place is that it belongs to me. It is therefore 
possible to describe it as 'mine' and to make no reference beyond 
this to the physical world of space and time at all. Scale is even less 
important here and may refer to the smallest owned space 
imaginable. 
To use the language of 'my place' is to avoid abstractions. It 
is not any place but this place which is mine. It Is in this sense, a 
notion of place In which particularity is Important. It is however, a 
notion of place In which the physical aspect of a place is relatively 
unimportant. That Is to say, it Is not important to this notion of place 
that my place exists In space and time. It Is mine, and although it 
could be described in physical terms (It Is there, in that place, and is 
made up of physical material), this is not of primary Interest. It is to 
do with feelings, memories, nostalgia and experience. My place Is 
therefore treated as though It were out of space and time. 
In both of these examples of the use of the term 'place' 
particular places are denoted by naming. This naming takes two 
forms. In the latter example the place Is named 'my place'. In other 
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words, the naming occurs by reference not to the place but to the 
person who names. This is in contrast to the method of naming, and 
also to the notion of place operating in the first example. This notion 
is also concerned with particular place and the name ascribed to 
the particular place will usually be related to events which have 
occurred in or near the place or to distinguishing physical features 
of the place. Names which emerge through this process of 
denotation by attention to the history and topography of a place do 
not ensure that a place receives a unique name but they serve to 
locate places not just in the landscape but also in the collective 
consciousness of the social order. 
The use of a name is a simplifying technique which human 
beings use as a shorthand to speed communication or to remind 
one another of the important moments of the collective cultural 
memory. Place-names might describe the physical location of the 
place by referring to the shape of the location, the lie of the land. 
Before long the name becomes known and the need for directions 
based on the lie of the land has passed for all except the stranger. 
Alternatively, a place-name might record the founder of the 
settlement or an important battle in the history of the people. 
These two methods of naming a place differ in that one refers 
to the physical world and acknowledges that the place is located in, 
and is heavily shaped by, the nature of the physical world around it. 
For this reason and in this sense, an account of place must take 
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account of the possibility of the power of the land and its inanimate, 
physical forms to shape and Influence the nature of the place. The 
other refers to important events in the history of the society living In 
the place. The place-name Is used to bring to consciousness key 
events from the history of the society. In this way place-names 
function alongside myths, stories and songs as part of the collective 
cultural consciousness of a society. Therefore, although the process 
of naming places can follow widely different routes, one primarily 
physical and spatial and the other largely cultural, historical and 
therefore temporal, both are constructing a simplified world out of a 
complex and hostile material, historical and cultural context. 
There is however, a third and very Important way in which 
'place' Is used In contemporary English. When dealings have 
occurred In the past in British culture between sub-cultural groups it 
has been Important to 'know one's place'. That is to say, it is 
important to know where one is placed within society. A failure to 
understand one's social location would be likely to Involve 
behaving in an inappropriate manner and one would risk ostracism 
or humiliation. This way of using place to Indicate location not in a 
physical environment but in a social context is both widespread and 
of considerable importance for a complete account of place. 
This account needs to be aware of three ways in which 
'place' is most commonly used in modern English. A place Is that 
point in space where a group of human beings have chosen to 
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settle and to which great symbolic significance is attached. These 
places are often named and the names function as a way of taming 
or simplifying an often highly complex physical or cultural reality. In 
this way places are often one of the means through which power 
and influence over others can be exercised. The place or a named 
place is unique. No other place is quite like it. 
Places are personalised or reduced in scale by being given 
significance for only one person either through mechanisms such 
as memory or nostalgia or through direct political mechanisms such 
as ownership. 'My place' will either be the place for which I am the 
holder of the title deeds and for which I have paid or it will be a 
place for which I have a particularly strong attachment because of 
its significance for me. A place which has been collectively denoted 
by the ascription of a name will also be the locus of symbolic 
significance. 
Names are an example of the way in which symbols operate. 
A place might be named by an immigrant after the place which has 
been left behind. There are numerous examples of this in several 
former British colonies in North and South America, Australia and 
New Zealand and in pre-independence names in Africa. 
Alternatively, a place name in a minority language (such as Welsh 
or Gaelic in Britain) may be retained to try to prevent the dominant 
language from destroying the minority language completely. 
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In both these examples the place name operates as a 
symbol which embodies the meaning which it symbolises. To name 
one's new settlement after the place which one has left Is to attach 
to the new settlement the feelings of nostalgia and loss which one 
feels. To retain the use of a Gaelic or Welsh name for a settlement Is 
to embody the struggle for life which is being waged on behalf of 
the dying language. The act of naming externalises the feeling or 
mental activity. It gives the human emotion or struggle an external, 
physical dimension for a place now functions as a symbol and 
embodies the meaning which it has been given. It Is no longer 
separate from that meaning but offers that meaning as a part of Itself 
whenever anything comes into relation with it. 
The name of a place is part of what a place is. A place cannot 
be divorced from its name and the meaning which that name 
embodies. Consequently, whenever anyone Is in relation with that 
place they will be in relation with the content of the symbol of the 
name. Far from understanding a symbol as a signpost to something 
other than itself we maintain that a symbol will embody that which It 
symbolises. Thus the use of a Gaelic name not only points to the 
struggle for a minority language but it is also part of the struggle. To 
see the place name or to experience the place is not only to be 
reminded of the struggle, it is also to be caught up in its midst. The 
way in which places function as symbols is of considerable 
importance to us. 
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In every social grouping there is a social order. It is our 
contention that all human beings are part of a social order and that 
such social orders are constituted, in part, by a political structure in 
which human beings are placed. A group of domesticated hens will 
form themselves into a social order known as the pecking order. 
The pecking order is an expression of the status of each hen in 
relation to the other. When the pecking order is realised in 
behaviour the hens are often placed physically in a way which is 
related to the social pecking order. Thus, to be placed physically in 
relation to the other hens operates as a physical expression of 
social placing. Despite the fact that human society is rather more 
complicated and usually operates in a rather more sophisticated 
manner than that of the hens, nevertheless, human relations 
operate in a broadly similar way. Physical and social placing are 
both constitutive of human being and will either operate to influence 
being independently of one another or simultaneously and in such 
a way as to make the distinction unnecessary. So a place is the 
focus for existential relations, a simplified view of the world and a 
social order. 
1.2 ONTOLOGICAL PRESUPPOSITIONS 
1.2.1 A Case Study 
There is a small village in Co. Durham called 'No Place'. The 
absurdity of the name of this small village which consists of three 
rows of terraced houses serves as an illustration of the 
presuppositions upon which this thesis is based. It is not possible in 
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the context of this thesis to give a complete substantiation for these 
presuppositions but some attention is given to the need to conceive 
of being In the way described below. 
The residents of No Place do live in a place. Many of the 
residents will have never lived anywhere else and would say that 
they 'belonged' to No Place. They mean that this place and no other 
is the place where they have been brought up and where they have 
been shaped Into what they now are. This sense of belonging by 
birth to a particular place Is an expression of the importance that 
that place has had In changing what those residents would have 
been. In other words, If all other things had been equal and the 
same people had been born and brought up In a different place 
then what those people are would have been different. The village 
operates as an agent affecting those people who live In It. 
This simple statement makes several far reaching assertions. 
First, It concerns itself with a particular place. It is only this village 
which has affected that people in this way. It therefore maintains that 
they are not affected by general principles but by the specific events 
or phenomena of a particular place. It is these events or 
phenomena which might be used as the experimental data from 
which general principles are abstracted from particular reality. 
Reality we argue, Is constituted by specific events or phenomena 
and the interaction between human beings and the physical world 
occurs at the level of the particular. In other words, the people of No 
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Place know instinctively that it is No Place that has played an 
important part in making them what they are. 
Some of the influence of the village could be said to be due 
to the features which No Place shares with other settlements. It is, 
for example, very small; it is a former mining village; it is located in a 
particular region - North East England and in a particular part of the 
North East - Derwentside District; it is on an exposed hillside; it is 
socially uniform and so on. However, No Place is the only place 
which shares its particular range of shared characteristics. It is not, 
for example, a farming community in Devon even though, being 
small, it shares some characteristics with faming communities in 
Devon. No other place occupies the same physical location, 
No other place has the same people living in it. These 
people each have their own histories and will also share a 
collective No Place history to which no other place can lay claim. It 
is of primary importance to recognise that the first requirement of a 
theology of place is that it acknowledges that places are particular 
phenomena. Each place is unique. 
Second, it asserts that a place can exert an influence over 
those people who live in it, or indeed who come into contact with it 
in any way. There are some obvious ways in which a place will 
operate as a constraint on those who are in it. To live in a place 
means not living anywhere else. Thus all that happens to or in a 
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place will also happen to those people living in that place. Most 
housing In No Place is terraced and very few houses have gardens, 
the winter weather is severe and most houses are within a very 
short distance of farmed land. These are states of affairs which will 
affect the people of No Place. No Place acts as a constraint on 
those people who live In it because possibilities are denied or 
granted by the physical form of the village. It is simply impossible to 
do or to experience a variety of things in No Place because some 
things are not there to be done. Conversely, other possibilities are 
available. In this way a place can be understood as an agent 
affecting people. 
Third, it will have become clear in our discussion that a place 
Is also constrained by the activities of human beings. Consequently, 
what a place Is is partly a result of what human beings have done 
and partly due to natural, physical considerations. No Place Is 
located in the physical world at a particular point. Human beings 
cannot alter the geographical position of No Place. Once built it 
remains where it is until It is destroyed. (It will become clear that we 
would maintain that where a settlement has been relocated then, 
although the name has been retained, the settlement is a new 
settlement because it occupies a new geographical location. There 
are numerous examples of the dislocation caused by the rebuilding 
of slum areas.) However, the way in which human beings chose to 
build No Place, the reason for which it was built and the economic 
and political changes which have affected the village since, have all 
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been human influences which have made the village what it is 
today. In other words, the ontology of a place is a result of the 
interactions of the physical world and human agency at a particular 
point in space and through time. Furthermore, a place can become 
an agent in and of itself. It will carry with it the power to exert an 
Influence upon or to constrain events which affect it and other 
places. This can occur both in human affairs - for example, roads 
must usually be built to avoid settlements - and also In the physical 
world as local climate, for example, can be greatly altered by 
places. 
1.2.1 The Ontological framework 
It is clear that where one is affects the potential that one has 
for future action. However, we wish to argue for a more radical 
ontology of place in which it becomes possible to say that where 
one is will affect what one is. If a place can constrain the activity of a 
human being then the human being has been engaged by the 
place in a relationship. The place and the human being are in 
relation. Furthermore, it is a relation in which both parties are able 
to exert an influence over the other. It is our view that the influence 
which is exerted is such that it will change both the place and the 
human being. This statement is therefore an ontological statement. 
Being in relation is the only possible way of existing. Physical 
objects are In relation with other physical objects by being part of 
the same system of physical interaction. Similarly human beings 
are in relation with other human beings from the moment of birth 
Page 12 Introduction: The Location of the Problem 
and cannot avoid either relations with other human beings or the 
absence of relations with other human beings. 
It is our view that a relational ontology is the most effective 
way in which the ontology of human beings can be adequately 
described. The relations in which human being must be located are 
of a highly complex nature and must take account of three 
elements.^ First, a human being is constituted by those relations 
which have already occurred. The parents to whom a child is born 
not only affect the genetic make-up of the child but will usually also 
determine the nature of the physical, economic and emotional 
environment within which the child will spend its formative years. All 
relations from the past will to some extent, sometimes very little and 
sometimes to a very high degree, affect the being of all people. 
Second, a human being is constituted by those relations 
occurring in the present. The relations of the present will be present 
experience, they will help to shape the relations of the future and 
they will be substantially, though not completely, determined by the 
relations of the past. A human tjeing is a residue of past relations to 
which present relations are added thus shaping the nature and 
location of future relations. We can note here that the relations of 
the present are largely shaped from outside themselves, namely 
= A. McFadyen, in a recently published book The Call To Personhood, C. U. P., 
Cambridge, 1990, has developed a relational ontology to explain human sociality. 
There are limitations to his account but these lie only in the scope of the book and 
not in its content. We follow his understanding of human sociality and the non-
substantive ontology which he proposes. Such an ontology is used in this thesis to 
support the theology of place proposed. 
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from the past. Further to this, the residue of past relations is 
continually in flux as it is added to by the relations presently 
experienced. Thus the ontology of human being is not static and 
substantive but it is dynamic, fluid and non-substantive in nature. 
Third, the relations by which a human being is constituted 
are not only relations between people, past and present. Relations 
also occur between people and physical things. We have argued 
above in the context of the absurdly named No Place that where 
one is is just as significant a relation as who one is with. Therefore, 
where one is born is influential on what one is just as who one's 
parents are influences what one becomes. Clearly, the parents one 
has will open and close possibilities for a human being. In the same 
way where one is born will open and close possibilities for a human 
being. The same is true of present relations. A human being is by 
definition in relation with the people by whom he is surrounded, but 
relations also occur between the human being and those things by 
which he is surrounded. This external agency opens the possibility 
of a radically new future for, when an external agent is able to exert 
an influence then what the individual will become is not dependent 
solely upon what one is and what has been. Therefore the 
existence of relations between a human being and other people 
(including the inhabitants of places) and things (including places in 
themselves) makes the future of that human being an open-ended 
question and not simply a reworking of what that human being 
already is. 
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These relations are mutual. It is not simply that the human 
being engages with other people and things as though they were 
not there and taking only what is useful from the encounter. Both 
parties, whether both are human or not, are inevitably changed by 
virtue of the relation having taken place. To be in relation is to be 
changing. This changing takes place in the context of the residue of 
relations which can function to secure identity in two ways. First, it 
operates as a history such that any present relation does not occur 
in a vacuum but occurs in the context of a history of relations. 
Indeed, the nature of the human being engaging in the relation is 
largely determined by the relations of the past. Second, this context 
of relations serves to provide a sense of continuity. McFadyen 
argues convincingly that the notion of the self can be redefined as 
that sense of internal continuity which all human beings share. 
Places can also be said to have a sense of continuing existence in 
which the 'spirit' of the place remains unaltered through time.^ 
Throughout this thesis we will be arguing that a relational 
ontology is the most effective account for the way in which place 
operates in society, and therefore, a relational ontology is the most 
appropriate ontological framework for a theology of place. Such a 
theology must take account of the relational nature of the being of 
both human beings and of places. In order to do this it is necessary 
for a theology of place to be particular, to acknowledge the 
^ See for example the work of D. Pocock in: Humanistic Geography and 
Literature; The Novelist and the North; Place and the Novelist. 
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existence and agency of inanimate objects and to be non-
substantive. It is also important that it recognises the complex 
variety of ways in which places operate and in which human beings 
are placed. 
1.3 THE TERMS DEFINED 
1.3.1 Relational Ontology 
Most ontologies which have emerged in recent centuries in 
Western philosophy and theology have been based on the 
conviction that to exist is to be independent of other things which 
might also be said to exist. In any relation it is thought that the 
existents engaged in the relationship are independent of one 
another. It is therefore difficult for a substantive ontology to admit 
that anything other than the subject of a relation can act as an 
agent. Furthermore, because entities are given such a high degree 
of independence, it is hard for a substantive ontology to account for 
change. 
In a relational ontology nothing is independent of anything 
else. The degree of interpenetration is so high that, by definition, 
anything which can be said to exist is said to exist in relation. That is 
to say, it can only exist because it is some sort of relation with 
something else which exists. This relational manner of existing is 
not only necessary for this thing to exist, it is also a necessary part 
of the notion of existence. To be is to be in relation. Furthermore, 
anything which is is in relation with its own past, with other simitar 
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objects and with the physical world in which it finds itself. All these 
elements in the relation will change frequently and, therefore, so 
will the existent which is in relation. Thus not only is a relational 
ontology non-substantive but it is also highly fluid and very 
dynamic. 
It is non-substantive in the sense that all things and all 
human beings are not discrete objects which exist untouched by 
other objects. These objects are said to exist only in relation. 
However, despite existing in relation, some degree of discreteness 
is necessary if any sense of self-identity is to be retained. Following 
Mc Fadyen, we argue that self-identity is assumed in order to make 
functioning in such a complex and fluid environment as the 
relational world possible. Consequently the world looks as though 
it is constituted by discrete objects. The language of substantivity 
may therefore be appropriate but it must be remembered that the 
location of an object's existence is not in Itself but in its relations. 
1.3.2 Particularity 
At the beginning of this chapter we argued that human 
beings live in particular places. By this we mean that human beings 
do not live in generalised 'place' but in a particular place which can 
be distinguished from all other places in a variety of ways. Only by 
attending to the details of what this particular place is can a 
description be made of the place in which a human being finds 
himself. Despite this most theories which deal with the way human 
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beings operate in space assume a high degree of homogeneity in 
both the space in which human beings operate and in the way in 
which human beings respond to circumstances. These are false 
assumptions because human beings are unique creatures and the 
places in which they operate are also unique. Braudel, a French 
historian, has shown that failing to take due note of the particular 
circumstances of events, of human beings (and also therefore, of 
places), can lead to a limited or even a mistaken understanding of 
what is happening.'' When we speak of particularity we refer to the 
unique circumstances of the individual object in distinction to the 
generalised common circumstances of 'object-like-things'. 
Particularity is also the process of inquiry and decision making 
which begins with the individual and moves, if at all, to the common 
features of all individuals or to the needs of the universal 
organisation. 
' S e e for example, F. Braudel, Civilisation and Capitalism 15th-18th Century: 
The Structures of Everyday Life: The Limits of the Possible, trans. S. Reynolds, 
Collins, London, ET 1981, in which Braudel observes three different economic 
systems operating simultaneously within pre-industrial societies. There is the 
'market economy' which is visible, quantifiable and is used as the raw material upon 
which economic science can work. There is an invisible 'material life' operating 
below, and being non-quantifiable, invisible to the market economy in which 
transactions occur on the basis of self-sufficiency and bartering. Communication 
networks here are very small. There is also a third economy operating above the 
market economy in which a small hierarchy is able to manipulate the market 
economy to its benefit. A small group of individuals who control wealth are able to 
influence the economy from a great distance. Braudel argues that 
"... economists ... tend to see the economy as a homogeneous reality which 
can legitimately he taken out of context and which can, indeed must, be measured 
on its own, since nothing is intelligible until it has been put into statistics." p 23. 
He describes his own contrasting approach: "I... had intended to be guided by 
concrete observation and comparative history alone.""... concrete observation is 
still in the foreground. My purpose throughout has been to see and to let others 
see, by allowing what I show to speak for itself, in all the richness, complexity and 
heterogeneity of real life." p. 25. 
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1.3.3 Physical Objects or Things 
All things which exist and which are not purely mental acts 
are physical things (and it may be that all mental acts exist as 
physical phenomena). They occupy time and space and can be 
located in the spatio-temporal realm. We will argue that all things 
may constrain other things including human beings. They may 
therefore, act as agents in a relationship. Human beings and 
physical objects relate to one another. It is asserted that all things 
are created by God. This includes all physical things which are 
characterised by their being constituted by matter. It also includes 
all social relations, most notably those between human beings. In 
this case, it is the potential for society and the ability to create 
culture rather than the form in which the potentiality and the ability 
find expression which is said to be created by God. Consequently, 
and by virtue of their createdness, all things and all the relations 
between things are a symbol of the presence of God. That is to say, 
the existence of things and the relations between them embodies 
the presence of God. God is to be found within what he has created 
as well as beyond it. The natural is therefore, at one and the same 
time, a signpost to the supernatural (it points beyond itself to what it 
is not) and also a symbol of the supernatural (it points within itself to 
what it is). 
1.3.4 Realism 
We assert that physical objects, things, places and people 
exist in space and time. They exist in and of themselves and their 
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existence needs to be verified by my experience. My perception 
and my experience are simply ways in which I gain an insight on 
the reality of the external world by which I am surrounded. We use 
realism to refer to a position which is in opposition to William of 
Ockham and the long tradition of epistemological scepticism which 
has followed his redefinition of the nominalist argument. The 
physical universe and the events occurring within it are not seen as 
abstract or ideal but as real existents or occurrences. We are 
therefore, taking a contrary view to idealism which has dominated 
much theological thinking in recent centuries and which holds that 
thought, or the mind, is the only reality and that external objects 
have no existence in their own right. 
1.4 FROM AN UNDERSTANDING OF PLACE TO A 
THEOLOGY OF PLACE 
We have so far made clear that we wish to assert that human 
beings are defined as beings in relation. We have shown that we 
presuppose that these relations occur between human beings (they 
are placed within social systems which involve the organisation and 
distribution of political power and custom) and between human 
beings and physical things (they are in a particular physical place 
which can be located in the spatial and temporal realm). Relations 
also occur between human beings and God. It is taking adequate 
account of relations with God which will turn this thesis into a 
theology and prevent it being simply an account of a way of 
understanding the manner in which places and placing function in 
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human society. 
We presuppose that relations with God are part of what it is to 
be a human being. In the course of the thesis we will frequently offer 
a critique based upon the degree of realism which a position 
purports to uphold. It is our contention, as has been seen, that not 
only do physical objects and phenomena exist in and of themselves 
but that they exert an influence upon human beings because 
human beings are in relation with them. The same is true of God. It 
is not possible to defend this position in a thoroughgoing manner 
either in the introduction or in the body of this thesis. 
It is our position that human beings are in relation with God 
by virtue of their having been created by God. In other words, the 
normal state of a human being is to be in full and open relation with 
God. Such a relation occurs directly through the Spirit and also 
occurs indirectly through relations with other human beings and 
through relations with the created world. Thus, to be placed is a 
social reality (an inevitability if, as we argue, to be human is to be in 
relation with other human beings) that is, not only in relation with 
other human beings but also in relation with God. Similarly to be in 
relation with a place (also an inevitability if to be human is to be 
located at a particular point in the spatio-temporal realm and 
therefore, to be in relation with a particular place), however such a 
relation may be construed, is also to be in relation with God. 
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We are concerned primarily with a theological anthropology 
of place. Our aim is to offer a coherent theological account of how 
human beings operate in place. We are not therefore concerned to 
present a detailed defence of a relational ontology as applied to 
God or to account for the easy way in which we place God as a 
relational being within and beyond all things. Such defence can be 
made but our attention must be drawn towards human experience 
of placedness and to the agency of placed phenomena. To be 
strictly accurate our theology of place might more appropriately and 
less ambitiously be termed a 'theological anthropology of place'. 
Equally we do not aim to survey historical accounts of placedness 
in the Christian tradition nor will we describe place in the Christian 
scriptures. Such tasks may be required for a thorough-going 
theology of place but must lie beyond the limitations of a thesis 
which aims only to offer some suggestion for the route towards a 
theology of place.^ 
1.5 TOWARDS A THEOLOGY OF PLACE: THE 
ARGUMENT 
1.5.1 Introduction 
In the opening paragraphs we saw that it is possible to use 
the language of place in a wide variety of ways. Firstly, place refers 
to where one is either in space or in a social structure. Secondly, 
^ We are aware of the work of, for example, W. D. Davies in The Gospel and 
The Land, and W. Bruggemann in The Land. A treatment of the literature on place 
in the Bible and in the Christian tradition would take up more space than is available. 
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place is always particular, that is to say, when one speaks of place it 
is always of this or that place or of my place. When one speaks of 
this place one speaks as though it has real existence, as though it 
has a physical reality in space and time and as though it is able to 
function as an agent in a relationship. When one speaks of my 
place the existence of the place is not of primary concern. 
The task of this thesis is to investigate ways in which the 
philosophical and theological tradition enables us to give an 
account of the ways in which human beings operate in place. We 
will investigate how it is that human beings relate to places and 
what it is to be placed in a social context. The topic is complex for 
the following reason. It is our view that human beings are always at 
a place in time and space. Therefore, at one and the same time 
human beings are being changed by the physical place in which 
they find themselves, they are also changing the place by their 
presence in it and are also constructing an image of their place 
which only bears a partial resemblance to the reality of the place 
itself. Furthermore, these dynamics are not only operating in the 
present for there is a considerable history for both the place and the 
person relating to the place which will affect not only the place and 
person but also the way in which they interact with one another. 
In addition to this both the place and the person exist within a 
social structure. The place will relate to other places primarily, but 
not exclusively, through human activity. People also exist within a 
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social structure in which social placing acts as a considerable 
constraint on activity as it both gives and removes possibilities for 
behaviour. All these dynamics are operating at the same time. 
Consequently the compartmentalisation which is necessary to 
make each discussion manageable is dangerous because it can 
tend to give the impression that each section is a discrete unit. This 
is not the case for all the ways of being placed are operating 
simultaneously and feedback systems operating between the 
various ways of functioning serve to make the whole operation of 
place greater than its constituent parts. 
It will be clear that it is our view that it is a relational ontology 
which is best to provide the necessary condition for an adequate 
account of the way in which places and placing functions. 
Therefore, a theology of place must be grounded in a relational 
ontology However, it is not the only ontology that is able to deal with 
aspects of the ways in which place can be described; it is simply the 
approach most suited to bearing the weight required of an 
adequate account. 
1.5.2 Part One: How Human Beings Operate Within Places 
The first part of the thesis deals with how human beings 
relate to places and are constrained by places. In chapter two the 
existential expression of feelings about 'my place' or of feeling an 
outsider in a place are described and their origins traced. A popular 
strand of geography has adopted phenomenological and existential 
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solutions to questions of human experiences of place. It has proved 
to be a fruitful way of researching the meaning of place and 
placedness. It is concerned only with 'my experience' and illustrates 
universal experiences of attachment and unattachment to particular 
buildings, locations and places. 
In chapter three we illustrate the human need to construct a 
simplified picture of the world in which they live by describing 
Pannenberg's theological anthropology. This illustrates the ability of 
human beings to relate to the places which they experience by 
simplifying the enormously complex nature of those places. By 
constructing 'mental maps' human beings are able to filter out 
unimportant information but still function in the 'real' world. The 
'place' here includes the social structure of the locality as well as 
the physical form in which the society and its culture are located. 
The social nature of human beings and the institutional forms 
of socialisation and social organisation are described in chapter 
four Institutions are products of social organisation and can express 
themselves in physical forms and are a significant part of the way in 
which places constrain human behaviour. The development of 
culture is also an important product of human behaviour in a place 
and in turn goes on to constrain human activity. 
Each chapter in Part One illustrates one of the three major 
ways in which human beings operate in places. They experience a 
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place as 'mine' or as somewhere where I am an outsider. They 
construct a simplified picture of a complex reality in order to function 
more effectively and they develop a social structure and cultural 
form specific to the place. In all these the place itself will influence 
the nature of the experience, the content of the picture, the type of 
social structure and the way in which it is expressed in space. 
These will then constrain human activity or open it up to unexpected 
and unpredicted possibilities. 
An appendix to Part One contains a brief description of the 
work of Gottwald. He has suggested that the land allotment 
traditions of the Judges were compiled retrospectively and were 
used as a way of cementing the unity of Israel. The question of the 
accuracy of his analysis is not at issue. Gottwald presents a 
plausible account in which the potential and the power of place 
functioning as an agent by establishing social identity is shown. A 
particular place is seen to act upon social identity and to influence 
social placing both of human beings within the Israelite community 
and of the Israelite community itself within the order of kingdoms 
and other social groupings. It might be said therefore that the 
'natural' creation and society function together in a unified manner 
for Gottwald shows that the land can function as an agent for 
socialisation. By the end of Part One we have illustrated how 
human beings operate in places and have established that it is 
possible to conceive of places functioning as agents. 
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1.5.3 Part Two: Relational Ontology and God 
In the second part of the thesis we begin with a comparison 
of some of the work of Torrance and Boff. Both consider the place of 
theology within the body of all knowledge, both place the 
incarnation at the heart of their theology and both argue explicitly 
for the presence of God in the created order under certain 
circumstances. In Torrance we find an argument for a relational 
understanding of reality based on modern science and for the 
actualisation of the presence of God through the mental activity of 
human beings. Boff places theology within knowledge rather than at 
its crown and finds the presence of God in liberated social 
structures. Both grapple with the possibility of a relational ontology 
and with the presence of God in places. 
In the final chapter after a brief description of Dussel's third 
world relational ontology McFadyen and Moltmann are used to 
illustrate two routes to a relational ontology and it is Moltmann who 
shows that God is present in all things. Consequently, we can 
account for the human experience of being placed described in Part 
One, for the agency of places in relations and for the presence of 
God in places whether it be an existential experience of my place, 
the constraints of my perception of this place or the social and 
cultural order of this place. We will then have worked towards a 
theology of place via our theological anthropology 
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PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE THEOLOGY OF PLACE 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The experience that this Is or is not 'my place' is an 
experience common to all human beings. The sense that I am 'at 
home' here or conversely, that I am an outsider there, is a 
fundamental experience of human beings. It is not possible to be a 
human being without feeling related or unrelated to the location in 
space in which one finds oneself at any particular moment in time. 
These feelings are brought to consciousness in a variety of 
common experiences. The sense that this is 'my place' has already 
been alluded to in the first chapter as an example of the existential 
attachment to particular places shared by all human beings. Where 
little such attachment is felt then it is the absence of 'rootedness', a 
sense of dislocation which prevails. The widespread use of the 
phrase 'my place' to indicate 'my home' or 'my land' has been 
described. 
To leave my place for somewhere else, a common 
experience in a highly mobile culture where employment is in short 
supply, may be to induce two experiences with respect to the place 
which has been left behind. Nostalgia views one's home as an 
ideal place as memories of a sense of belonging to the old place 
and the experience of not belonging to the new give a positive 
gloss to the old and a negative feeling toward the new. One of the 
reasons that moving house is thought to be a highly stressful 
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experience is tliat all the familiar landmarks of life which made one 
feel 'inside' a place are replaced by unfamiliar landmarks where 
one is clearly 'outside'. There are a variety of reasons for this 
experience which will be discussed below, nevertheless nostalgia 
yearns for the feeling of 'insideness', of belonging to 'my place' 
while at the same time delaying the development of such feelings 
by heightening the sense of 'outsideness' felt toward the new place. 
Homesickness is a less positive feeling in the sense that it 
does not view one's previous place in such a positive manner but at 
the same time it is less damaging to the relation with the new place. 
It too is a conscious experience of the loss of a place. Fried went as 
far as to suggest that this experience should be understood as a 
form of grief. 
There are wide variations in the success of post-
relocation adjustment and considerable variability in the 
depth and quality of loss experience. But for the majority it 
seems quite precise to speak of their reactions as 
expressions of grief. These are manifest in the feelings of 
painful loss, the continued longing, the general 
depressive tone, frequent symptoms of psychological or 
social or somatic distress, the active work required in 
adapting to the altered situation, the sense of 
helplessness, the occasional expressions of both direct 
and displaced anger and tendencies to idealize the lost 
place.' 
These experiences have become of interest to geographers over 
the last thirty years and, in this second chapter, we will describe 
their accounts of these experiences. We will examine briefly the 
' M. Fried, Grieving for a Lost Home, p. 151, in The Urban Condition. L. J. 
Duhl, ecJ.,Basic Books, New York, 1963, pp 151-171. 
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sometimes confused use made of phenomenology and 
existentialism by the geographers interested in the human 
experience of place and we will assess this way of understanding 
that experience. 
2.2 THE 'PHENOMENOLOGICAL GEOGRAPHY' OF 
E. RELPH 
2.2.1 Introduction 
Relph begins the preface to his influential book Place and 
Placelessnes^ with a justification for the book. He writes: 
Much of the recent discussion on environmental issues I 
have found both unsatisfactory and disquieting. 
Unsatisfactory because the analyses of behaviour or of 
particular problems are so frequently mechanical and 
abstract, simplifying the world into easily represented 
structures or models that ignore much of the subtlety and 
significance of everyday experience. Disquieting 
because these simplified structures often serve as the 
basis for proposals for the design of environments and 
the manipulation of people and places into patterns that 
are supposed to t>e more efficient.^ 
Relph objects to the then dominant rationalist and empirical schools 
of geographical analysis. These traditions both tried to produce 
simplified models of geographical landscapes in order to construct 
models which would operate not simply to describe existing 
conditions but which could also be used to predict future 
developments. These models were constructed on the basis of 
generalised data collection using, usually, statistical data which, it 
was thought, could be described as 'objective'. It was considered 
^E. Relph, Place and Placelessness, Ron, London, 1976. 
' E. Relph, op. at, preface. 
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important to remove all possible traces of subjective analysis 
because this would limit the ability of the model produced to be 
applied in other contexts. 
If, for example, an analysis was to be made of the nature of 
village life in a settlement of, say 2,000 people then a variety of 
settlements of this size would be selected, probably at random, for 
analysis. These villages would constitute the data base from which 
extrapolations would be made to give indications about the nature 
of all settlements of about 2,000 people. Statistical data would be 
prepared and maps might be drawn illustrating the range of 
services available, the age, gender and occupations of the 
inhabitants, the distance each person travelled in order to achieve 
certain ends, how long the inhabitants had lived in the village and 
so on. But, in order to obtain objectivity, no value judgments about 
the desirability of the village as a place to live, to find work, to buy 
property to bring up children, to shop, to retire to and so on, would 
be sought. It was this phenomenological enquiry that Relph and 
other geographers wished to introduce into geographical enquiries 
about the nature of human beings and their relationships to places. 
Consequently he went on to write: 
This book ... is concerned not with abstract models and 
theories, but with the 'lived-world', with the settings and 
situations we live in, know and experience directly in 
going about our day to day activities.'* 
"E. Relph, op. c/f., preface. 
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2.2.2 Existential Insideness/Outsideness 
The phenomenological basis of geography for Relph is clear 
from the opening page of Place and Placelessness. He writes that: 
To be human is to live in a world that is filled with 
significant places: to be human is to have and to know 
your place.^ 
He is interested in giving an account of the phenomenon of place 
but is only interested in the experience of place which we 
characterised as 'my place' in the introduction. In developing an 
account of the human attachment to particular places he develops 
the twin concepts of outsideness and insideness. For Relph all 
experiences of place can be reduced to an experience of feeling 
inside or outside a place. 
He defines insideness by saying that: 
To be inside a place is to belong to it and to identify with 
it, and the more profoundly inside you are the stronger is 
this identity with the place.^ 
Insideness is feeling of identification with a place but it can take 
several forms and Relph identifies four. Vicarious insideness is an 
identification with a place not visited but experienced vicariously 
through the stories of others who have visited it. So, to read the 
diary of a traveller, to hear a place described by a poet or to watch a 
film set in a particular place are all media through which an 
experience of vicarious insideness may be induced. The extent to 
which one feels inside will depend upon the quality of the 
•E. Relph, op. cit, p. 1. 
'E. Relph, op. cit, p.49. 
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description, the imagination of the reader/viewer and the extent to 
which one's own place corresponds to the place described. 
Behavioural insideness involves a sub-conscious manner of 
behaving in a place which relates one to where one is. It is possible 
to visit a place but pay very little attention to the details of its 
location, structure and atmosphere. Behavioural insideness is a 
description of a pattern of behaviour which notices where one is. If 
one is behaving in such a way as to respond to the place then it is 
the physical location of the place, the architecture and the building 
materials employed, the availability of functions other than those 
which brought the individual to the place and the ambiance of the 
place which will be noticed and value judgments will be made 
about the place based on these observations. 
It is possible that a sense of what the place is like will 
gradually merge into a concern for the place. It may be manifest first 
as a concern for the appearance of the place but may become a 
concern for all aspects of the life of the place. This is what Relph 
calls empathetic insideness. He argues that this is a much richer 
experience of a place than behavioural insideness for a relation is 
developed between the symbols and meanings of the place and 
those which originate from one's own experience. There is here, an 
interplay between the identity of the place, which one must respect 
and one's own identity through which one is experiencing the 
place. Only by being willing to be changed oneself can one fully 
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experience the place as it really is. One might question whether it is 
ever possible to 'experience the place as it really is' but 
nevertheless, Relph clearly argues that in certain sorts of relations 
place can function as an agent changing the identity of a human 
being. 
The most complete sense of insideness is existential 
insideness. This is the sense of belonging to a place. It is the sense 
that this place and no other is where I belong. In all other places 
one will feel an existential outsider regardless of the extent to which 
one might feel an empathetic insideness. One is existentially inside 
the place where one is subconsciously aware of a wide range of 
meanings which are attached to the place and places within it. It is 
the place where one is accepted as belonging. In other words, to be 
existentially inside a place is not only to be in a particular sort of 
relation with a place but it is also to be in a particular type of 
relation with the people of that place. And, by extension, to be in the 
opposite relation with other places and with the people of other 
places. Where one is not existentially inside one is inevitably 
existentially outside. 
To be existentially outside a place is both the most complete 
form of outsideness and the most universal for ail human beings 
have to learn from a very early age to be existentially outside most 
places. The consequences of feelings of outsideness can however, 
be considerable. To be outside Is to sense, selfconsciously, an 
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alienation from the symbols and rituals of a place and its 
community. There is a sense of not belonging and of being a 
stranger. This may lead to feelings of rootlessness and 
homelessness and of insecurity. We have suggested above that 
moving from one place to another will always lead one to feel 
existentially outside the new place even if one is determined to 'fit 
in' and even if one is anxious to develop a sense of empathetic 
insideness as quickly as possible. It is just such feelings that 
rational and empirical geographies did not discover; indeed they 
were not looking for 'subjective' experiences of place. However, as 
Russell makes clear in his analysis of life in rural areas these 
feelings can be very powerful and shape the experience of being in 
a place: 
... among some of the unhappiest newcomers are those 
young wives whose husbands take the one car to the 
station or to work; the young wife is left with young 
children, 'trapped' in a house on a new development on 
the edge of the village, aware that there is a community 
life to which she does not relate.^ 
This is a classic description of the experience of existential 
outsideness. 
Relph identifies two other types of outsideness. Both involve 
the development of an attitude towards the place which imagines 
that it is not there or that it is entirely irrelevant to one's existence. 
Objective outsideness is a conscious decision to distance oneself 
from the reality of the place and to treat it only as a functional object 
present in the world for certain ends. Relph criticises geographers 
'A. Russell, A Country Parish, SPCK, London, 1986, p. 173. 
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and planners harshly for believing that places can be "changed 
from facts of immediate experience into things having certain 
attr ibutes,"^ It is possible that the recent trend to involve 
communities in decision making arises out of the realisation that 
places are not just things with certain attributes but are also 
locations within which powerful feelings are experienced. 
Finally incidental outsideness is an unconscious experience 
of an absence of a place. Travelling by train involves passing 
through stations in places but the places themselves are hardly 
experienced. The only tangible evidence of being in a particular 
place is a change of scenery and a group of passengers with a 
different accent joining the train. The only impact of incidental 
outsideness arises because of the speed of travel; the greater the 
distance, socially and culturally as well as geographically, the 
greater the impact of the fleeting experiences of the places one 
travelled through. Had one travelled slowly it is possible that the 
dislocation experienced upon arrival in a place very different from 
one's own would have been reduced, but the rapid change from 
one to the other can make any sense of insideness hard to develop. 
So, for Relph the human experience of a place is rather more 
complex than the simple question 'do I feel that this place is 'my 
place'?'. He has shown that to identify with a place as 'my place' is 
only the most complete and positive example of a variety of ways in 
which it is possible to relate to a place. 
°E. Relph, op.cit., p.51. 
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... there exists a full range of possible awareness, from 
simple recognition for orientation, through the capacity to 
respond empathetically to the identities of different 
places, to a profound association with places as 
cornerstones of human existence and individual identity.^ 
But the question of the experience of a place remains an existential 
question. It is about my experience of this place. After a brief 
description of Relph's enthusiastic use of the phenomenological 
notions of authenticity and inauthenticity we will offer a critique of 
the use to which he puts his analysis using the example he uses. 
2.2.3 Authentic and Inauthentic Places 
Relph argues, following Heidegger, that to be 'authentic' is to 
be open to one's potential and to one's experiences and to be 
honest and responsible in the analysis of how one has faced the 
open question of one's existence. Consequently, the individual 
faces a place and is willing to experience the place in a genuine 
and open manner without relying on the traditions and customs of 
others which might limit his experience of the place. 
Inauthenticity with respect to place is to rely on the prevailing 
stereotypes when experiencing a place. If an individual was 
temporarily seconded to work in another part of his country an 
inauthentic attitude might, for example, prevent an enriching 
experience with another subculture by encouraging an incidental 
outsideness to develop thus insulating the individual from what was 
thought to be a disturbing, damaging or threatening experience. 
' E. Relph, op. c/f., p. 63. 
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Immunity to the living conditions of others can be quickly acquired 
regardless of whether these others are seen through the lens of a 
television camera or through a commuter train window. 
Authenticity on the other hand, takes a place as it sees it and 
is not willing to use the value judgments of others about a place 
before it has experienced it for itself. 
An authentic attitude to place is thus understood to be a 
direct and genuine experience of the entire complex of 
the identity of places - not mediated and distorted through 
a series of quite arbitrary social and intellectual fashions 
about how that experience should be, nor following 
stereotyped conventions. It comes from a full awareness 
of places for what they are as products of man's 
Intentions and the meaningful settings for human 
activities, or from a profound and unselfconscious identity 
with place.'" 
An individual employing an authentic attitude will watch the 
television or look out of the window and allow first a behavioural 
insideness and then an empathetic insideness to develop. This may 
occur unselfconsciously, when any division between the individual 
and the place will become blurred, or it may occur selfconsciously, 
when the distinction remains but insideness develops as a result of 
observation, reaction and reflection. 
This use of the notions of authenticity and inauthenticity 
requires a considerable ability from the individual to decide for 
himself, albeit unconsciously, without regard to the place how he is 
going to experience it. Even if we allow for the powerful effect of 
'"E. Relph, op oil, p. 64. 
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culture and prevailing stereotypical attitudes no reference is given 
to the power of a place to shape the way in which it is viewed. The 
examples Relph uses show that a place is never more than either 
the product of human energy or the object of my experiences. 
2.2.4 The Principle Applied 
Relph sees a selfconscious authenticity in the building of a 
number of monuments or in several cities at particular moments in 
their histories. He argues that in Athens in the Hellenic period the 
city itself was an embodiment of a universal belief system. Similarly, 
the construction of Gothic cathedrals is an example of 'authentic 
place-making'. 
... but the results at Chartres and elsewhere were 
cathedrals and abbeys which were an expression of a 
total faith, a manifestation of an l-Thou relationship 
between man and God, and between man and the earth 
as the home of God.'' 
The last significant attempt to create a place in an authentic manner 
is said to have occurred in the early Renaissance when humanism 
provided the principles on which city construction was based. It is 
hard to imagine that Relph's criticism of the modern period when 
such authentic and selfconscious place-making seems to 
be reserved largely for inspired individuals; most of us 
are condemned to live in other people's houses and 
machine-made places.'^ 
was not equally applicable then. The assumption of a universalised 
world view is without substantiation and the decisions to create 
large buildings were taken by only a few powerful individuals, 
E. Relph, op. oil, p. 73 
^^E. Reiph, op. c/f., p. 77. 
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sometimes at the expense of some less powerful people and 
usually not purely as the selfconscious expression of a corporate 
belief but with also in the hope of self-aggrandizement. 
At the same time as applauding the structure of Hellenic 
Athens or the beauty of Chartres cathedral, products, Relph argues, 
of places where "intentions, activities, and physical form were 
completely bound together"'^ he criticises the building of places in 
the modern era as being part of the trend in which "Uniform 
products and places are created for people of supposedly uniform 
needs and tastes,"'" He may be right to argue that modern planning 
methods do not take adequate account of the experiences of the 
people on whose behalf the planning is taking place. But it is not 
reasonable to suppose that when planning lay in the hands of the 
electorate in Athens, with the Church and wealthy people of 
Chartres or with the Medici family and their contemporaries in Italy 
that things were any different for the majority of people living in a 
place where planning decisions of the wealthy few were enacted. 
It is hard to see why Relph views the past in such a positive 
manner. It is unlikely that the 'pace of change' was felt to be much 
slower in times when scales and technological abilities were both 
less than they are today. It would also seem likely that an authentic 
response to one's own place may have been more widespread in 
the past as reduced mobility reduced one's horizon's and 
" E . Relph, op. cit., p. 71. 
'"E. Relph, op. cit., p. 92. 
Page 40 Phenomenology and the Theology of Place 
increased the proportion of one's horizon within which one felt 
existentially inside. However, at the same time, with limited 
experience of the area beyond one's immediate home it is more 
likely that people relied on the stereotyped image of distant 
marshes, forests, towns and cities and of the people who lived 
there. 
2.2.5 The Principle Assessed 
Relph recognises the complex nature of places, and has 
done much to add to the understanding of the way in which places 
are understood and he does not wish to provide an absolute 
category for the description of the experience of place. 
Nevertheless there is an underlying assumption behind the use of 
the notions of authenticity and inauthenticity. It is assumed that the 
judgments of others are to be avoided. One must base one's 
judgments purely on the evidence of one's own experience. He 
suggests that it is not the case that inauthenticity is 'worse' than 
authenticity but this is clearly not maintained in the polemic of the 
book. 
To transfer "responsibility [for one's existence] to large, 
nebulous, unchangeable forces, for which he cannot be blamed 
and about which he can do nothing.'"^ is a necessary part of human 
existence. It is a form of constructionism as those parts of one's 
experience of the world which cannot be understood or controlled 
are made 'safe' by being treated in a stereotypical manner or by 
' 'E . Relph, op. oil, p. 64. 
Page 41 Phenomenology and the Theology of Place 
transferring responsibility for them from oneself to forces both 
distant and uncontrollable such as God, fate, or government. We 
will discuss the human need for simplified view of the world in the 
next chapter but here we note that Relph sees the tendency to limit 
one's horizon as an expression of inauthenticity. 
This stems from a conviction that it is possible to know a 
place in all its complexity. As we have seen above" an authentic 
attitude to place is an "experience of the entire complex of the 
identity of places". Such an experience cannot occur and the "quite 
arbitrary social and intellectual fashions about how that experience 
should be" are not so much preventing an experience of the place 
in itself as part of the experience of the place. For Relph it is the way 
in which the complex identity of places and the arbitrary fashions 
are experienced which is important not the places or the fashions in 
and of themselves. 
Although Relph suggests that the experience of a place 
should involve an interplay between the individual and the symbols 
and traditions of the place (experienced in an authentic manner) 
there is no further reference to the possibility that a place might act 
as an agent and affect the individual. For this reason the attitudes 
adopted towards a place by an individual or group of individuals 
are not considered part of the place. They are not to be experienced 
but to be filtered out. All that is of concern to phenomenological 
geography is 'my' experience. And this experience should not be 
^^See note 10 on page 38 
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prescribed by the experience of others. We might ask if it is 
possible to approach a place in such an isolated manner. When we 
relate to a place we not only relate to a highly complex 
phenomenon but we also relate to it in the context of our other 
relations and these will inevitable prescribe, to some degree, the 
nature of our relation to the place. 
Relph rightly argues that my experience of a place will be an 
important component of the nature of a place for me. He shows that 
places are experienced in a variety of ways. He suggests that 
places can be approached in either a broadly open or a basically 
closed way and that this will affect the way in which I will relate to 
the place. His greatest contribution to the understanding of the way 
in which places operate is in arguing for a more sympathetic 
approach to a phenomenological analysis of place by planners and 
architects. However, at the same time, he is reluctant to illustrate the 
role of a place as an agent affecting me and the people who are 
part of it. He does not take account of the necessity of limiting one's 
horizons in order to make sense of them and by reducing the 
analysis of a place to my experience he reduces what is significant 
in a place to my experience of it. Given the phenomenological 
origins of his geography it is not surprising that he should do this. 
We will examine those origins in the next section. 
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2.3 THE PHENOMENOLOGiCAL TRADITION 
2.3.1 Introduction 
Geographers, such as Relph, anxious to broaden the scope 
of geography to take account of the experience of the individual, 
have used the the tradition of philosophy beginning with Husserl. 
The tradition is highly complex and geographers have used 
different strands of phenomenology without making clear how these 
philosophies differ. We will describe the most influential 
philosophies, those of Husserl, at some length, and Heidegger, 
rather more briefly, in order to offer a more complete critique of the 
existential geography of Relph described above. 
2.3.2 Husserl 
2.3.2.1 Introduction 
Husserl stands within the tradition of philosophy which tries 
to establish foundations upon which accounts of the way things are 
can be built. Taught by Brentano, he was a key thinker in the 
development of the phenomenological tradition which has been of 
enormous influence in the twentieth century. Phenomenology is, 
selfconsciously, a methodology and not a system or doctrine. It was 
an attempt to validate philosophy in an age of great scientific 
development and consists of a distinctive but genuine method of 
inquiry which was neither scientific nor speculative in the sense that 
philosophy was understood to be. Husserl made the bold claim, 
which others have since made, that he had described a new and 
wholly appropriate way of doing philosophy 
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The phenomenology tradition is not a clearly defined and 
discrete body of philosophical thought. Other thinkers, also 
interested in a methodology rather than a system have developed, 
changed and disagreed with Husserl. However, Pivcevic, while 
admitting that even the definition of phenomenology has not been 
shared suggests that agreement has been reached on the correct 
object of philosophical inquiry 
The disconcerting fact is that philosophers who regard 
themselves as 'phenomenologists' often radically differ in 
their handling of key philosophical issues. What unites 
them - and I am thinking here primarily of the 
'phenomenological school' initiated by Brentano and 
Husserl - is their acceptance of the general principle that 
philosophical priority should be given to an analysis of 
experiences from the point of view of those who have the 
experiences or are able to have them.'' 
2.3.2.2 The natural attitude 
Husserl's concern was to investigate the everyday common 
sense world of experience in which all human beings find 
themselves at all times. Following Brentano, he saw all experience 
as an experience of an object, for all mental acts must have an 
objective, though unlike Brentano, not necessarily an existent, 
content. From this understanding came Husserl's most fundamental 
observation that consciousness is always irreducibly 
consciousness of something. Relph observed in turn that 
The essence of place lies in the largely unselfconscious 
intentionality that defines places as profound centres of 
human existence. 
' 'E . Pivcevic, Phenomenology and Philosophical Understanding, CUP, 
London, 1975, p. xii. 
'"E. Relph, op.cit, p. 43. 
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In other words, consciousness is not merely consciousness of 
something but of something in its place. This basic attitude to the 
world in which it is assumed that 
there is a real, external, existent world which persists in 
time and space and which is much the same for all men.'* 
is termed by Husserl the 'natural attitude'. In his view, all human 
beings make an 'implicit metaphysical commitment' in order to 
function and it is the nature of this commitment rather than the 
objects of the commitment which interested him. 
Phenomenology is directed towards the experience that all 
human beings share, namely, that there is an experience, or a 
consciousness of an external existent world which serves as an 
arena for the entirety of human life. The question of the validity of 
this experience is, for Husserl, not a question at all. What is 
important, indeed all that is important is the natural attitude in which 
one assumes universal experience of the external existent called 
the 'world'. Methodologically, Husserl makes no comment on the 
question of the existence of those things which the natural attitude 
claims to exist for, being interested only in what is presented to 
perception as it is presented, he refuses to allow the validity of any 
further ontological question. Indeed, the natural attitude, although it 
is the starting point for phenomenology, is suspended because, in 
Husserl's view, the universal common-sense assumption of an 
external, existent world is a presupposition which renders the 
^'M. Natanson, 'Introduction', in M. Natanson, ed., Essays in Phenomenology, 
Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1966, p.4. 
Page 46 Phenomenology and the Theology of Place 
analysis of the presentation of phenomena to consciousness 
problematic. The problem is located in the tendency to search for 
explanations rather than to investigate the presentations of 
phenomena to consciousness which must be rendered free from 
the orientations which, in the case of the natural attitude, occur in a 
metaphysical form. The wish to avoid the need to give an account of 
the relation between the object of the mental acts and the mental 
acts themselves is deliberate. 
Husserl's phenomenon is simply that which is given to 
consciousness. It does not carry the Kantian implication of an 
appearance which points beyond itself to a 'noumenal reality'. For 
Kant, 
a phenomenon is an articulated system of appearances, 
unified by the categories in the form of an object.'" 
But for Husserl, there is simply the self-giving of objects in acts of 
consciousness which Involves no comment on the assertion that 
appearances form part of an "articulated system" or can be 
considered by any thing, such as the notion of the category, into any 
particular form such as the object. 
2.3.2.3 Transcendental Phenomenology 
Husserl's refusal to comment on the source and origin of his 
presentations is an attempt tjoth to utilise a Cartesian approach and 
to go beyond it. He rejected the techniques of scientific inquiry and 
^°A. Quinton, 'The Concept of a Phenomenon', p.3, in E. Pivcecic, ed., op. 
cit, pp. 1-16. 
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of philosophies which utilise the natural attitude because he 
demands an inquiry into what is presented immediately in 
experience. Like Descartes, Husserl is attempting to establish the 
foundations of inquiry on certain grounds. 
Schacht begins his summary of Husserlian phenomenology 
with the assertion, supported from Husserl's own Cartesian 
Meditations that: 
Husserlian phenomenology is first of all an 
epistemological enterprise. Husserl's Cartesian 
Meditations is an explicit attempt to renew Descartes's 
program of a systematic reconstruction of knowledge 
which would render it immune to skeptical doubt. 
Descartes's aim, which Husserl characterizes as "a 
complete reforming of philosophy into a science 
grounded on an absolute foundation" [Cartesian 
Meditations, p. 1) is also Husserl's own:... the first order 
of business for the Husserlian phenomenologist is to 
identify "those cognitions that are first in themselves and 
can support the whole storied edifice of universal 
knowledge", with a view to "constructing on their basis a 
science governed by the idea of a definitive system of 
knowledge" {Cartesian Meditations, p. 14).'^  
In other words, the decision to investigate only what is presented to 
consciousness is an attempt to establish what cannot be refuted 
under any circumstances. This process mirrors Descartes' threefold 
reduction of the methods of doubt which establishes that the act of 
doubting can never be doubted for, in Husserl's view, the fact of an 
act of presentation to consciousness can never be doubted. The 
direct awareness of a presentation in consciousness remains a 
direct awareness regardless of the ontological status of the content 
R. Schacht, Hegel and After: Studies in Continental Philosophy between 
Kant and Sartre, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 1975, p. 211. 
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of the presentation. One simply cannot go beyond pure 
consciousness in order to establish the 'real' existence of the 
content of a presentation, and in a sense it does not matter. It is this 
that leads to Husserl 'bracketing out' the world. Thus, one cannot 
ask where the experience came from, one can only state that it 
happened. This has the merit of treating all consciousness whether 
derived from the 'real' or the 'imagined' equally However, although 
not Husserl's intention, it has the effect of denying that the world has 
any real existence in any meaningful sense. It is not possible to 
describe the world in terms which would accord it agency 
Husserl's process of 'bracketing out' the world occurs within 
a two-fold reduction which renders the world subordinate to 
consciousness. The complexity of experience is made accessible to 
description and these two reductions are common to all 
experiences. The first reduction, eidetic in nature, is concerned to 
look beyond the actuality of the presentation to the essence of the 
actuality. The particular instance, is, for Husserl, merely an example 
of an essence which resides transcendentally elsewhere. It is this 
reduction which makes possible the description of essences, and 
through eidetic reflection the description of the relationships 
between essences. 
To become uniquely phenomenological however, a second 
transcendental reduction is necessary. It is this reduction which, 
technically involves the bracketing out process. The first reduction 
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looks beyond the instance to essence while the second looks 
toward the act of presentation of the essence in consciousness. The 
focus of attention becomes located in the mind of the conscious 
subject for one is only concerned to understand the essence as it is 
presented for me, because 
phenomenology ... presupposes a peculiar shift of 
attitude [from natural to phenomenological] and arrives at 
the immanent sphere of consciousness as the source of 
all certainty.^ 
At this point phenomenological enquiry becomes possible for the 
precise description of the experiences can now be achieved. 
2.3.2.4 'My Experience' as Geographical Data 
It is a method of enquiry which some geographers have 
adopted in an attempt to make the understanding of the way in 
which communities function and the way in which planning theory is 
developed more closely related to human experience. In a study of 
the experience on living in Towcester, EyIes uses individual 
recollections and accounts of present experience to build up a 
picture of what it is to live in Towcester at a particular moment in 
time.^ ^ Godkin argues that alcoholism can be linked to feelings of 
being uprooted and of not belonging in a particular place. 
Similarly Fried, studying the effects of enforced dislocation 
J. S. Fulton, The Cartesianism of Phenomenology', p. 62, in M. Natanson, 
op.cit., pp.58-78. 
" J . EyIes, Senses of Place, Silverbrook Press, Warrington, 1985. 
" M. A. Godkin, 'Identity and place: Clinical Applications Based on Notions of 
Rootedness and Uprootedness', pp. 73-85, in A. Buttimer and D. Seamon, ed., 
The Human Experience of Space and Place, Croom Helm, London, 1980. 
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following slum clearance in the West End of Boston (USA), simply 
asked a cross-section of individuals to relate their experience of 
dislocation as they remembered it. This highly subjective form of 
analysis yielded the unsurprising result that: 
... the loss of an important place represents a change in a 
potentially significant component of the experience of 
continuity. "... In studying the reasons for satisfaction that 
the majority of slum residents experience, two major 
components have emerged. On the one hand, the 
residential area is the region in which a vast and 
interlocking set of social networks is localized. And, on 
the other, the physical area has considerable meaning as 
an extension of home, in which various parts are 
delineated and structured on the basis of a sense of 
belonging. These two components provide the context in 
which the residential area may so easily be invested with 
considerable, multiply-determined meaning." ... Nor is the 
intensive investment of a residential area, both as an 
important physical space and as the locus for meaningful 
interpersonal ties, limited to the West End. What is 
common to a host of studies is the evidence for the 
integrity of the urban, working class, slum community as a 
social and spatial unit. It is the sense of belonging some-
place, in a particular place which is quite familiar and 
easily delineated, in a wide area in which one feels "at 
home".'' 
Rather than using the disembodied, and in that sense, sterile 
statistical data of rational and empirical geographical enquiry 
phenomenological geographers use individual records of 
experience as the raw material for study. Indeed Seamon defined 
geography's subject matter as 
everyday environmental experience - the sum total of a 
person's first-hand involvement with the geographical 
world in which he or she typically lives. ^ 
M. Fried, 'Grieving for a Lost Home', p. 153-4, in The Urban Condition, L. J. 
Duhl, ed., Basic Books, New York, 1963, pp. 151-171. 
D. Seamon, A Geography of the Lifeworld: Movement, Rest and Encounter, 
Croom Helm, London, 1979, p.15-16. 
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The "everyday environmental experience" is an experience 
of a partial world and is particular to the individual. However, in 
using the "everyday environmental experience" of a large number 
of individuals Seamon 
search[es] ... for certain basic patterns which epitomise 
human behavioural and experiential relationships with 
the everyday geographical world." 
Therefore, phenomenological geography shares with both 
cognitive and behavioural geography a tendency to denigrate the 
particular in the search for the general pattern. In the search for 
"basic characteristics which extend beyond the particular person, 
place and time"^*, Seamon follows the wider methodology which he 
seeks to avoid. The aim moves quickly from the particular story to 
the general pattern which all stories exhibit. This does not negate 
the methodology of phenomenological geography for it introduces a 
new category of subject matter - subjective personal story - into any 
geographical enquiry; but the claims made on behalf of 
phenomenological geography must be kept in context. 
The apparent particularity of phenomenology becomes a 
generalisation because of the tendency to look beyond the actuality 
and towards the essence of a thing. The eidetic reduction, paving 
the way for the transcendental reduction, renders the objective 
particularity impossible, establishing instead the potentiality of 
" D . Seamon, op. cit, p. 15. 
^'D. Seamon, op. cit.. p. 16. 
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subjective particularity. In other words, by making the eidetic 
reduction, phenomenology refuses to allow the possibility of the 
question of the actual instance of the object of intention. The 
particular thing intended is removed from view in favour of the 
essence of the type of thing intended. Objective particularity is 
rendered impossible. In its place however, subjective particularity is 
established by the transcendental reduction as a possibility. By 
focusing attention on the consciousness of the individual '1', 
phenomenology makes possible the acknowledgement of the 
particularity of the meanings felt and projected by the experiencing 
subject. 
Phenomenological geography begins by understanding the 
importance of the transcendental reduction. Phenomenological 
psychologist Giogi writes 
Phenomenology is the study of phenomena as 
experienced by man. The primary emphasis is on the 
phenomenon itself exactly as it reveals itself to the 
experiencing subject in all its concreteness and 
particularity."* 
That Seamon should quote this sentence would suggest that his 
starting point is self-consciously Husserlian. Indeed, he dismisses 
the alternatives with Husserlian terminology and wit: 
On the one hand, I bracket the assumption that movement 
depends upon the cognitive map; on the other, that 
movement is a process of stimulus response.^" 
A Giorgi ef a/, Duquesne Studies in Phenomenological Psychology Vol. 1, 
Duquesne University Press, Pittsburgh, 1971, p. 9, quoted in D. Seamon, op. cit, 
p. 16. 
°^ D. Seamon, op. cit., p. 35. 
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However, as we have suggested, the search for"'basic 
characteristics which extend beyond the particular person, place 
and time" is not a methodology which preserves the transcendental 
reduction. This failure has occurred because individual stories have 
become empirical data. The consequence of this is that the 
phenomenological approach becomes a rigid framework obscuring 
the experience of phenomena and revealing only the bland and the 
general. 
Not all phenomenological methodologies rely on the 
transcendental reduction. Seamon himself argues that 
In contrast to the view of the cognitive theorists, I argue 
that cognition plays only a partial role in everyday spatial 
behaviour; that a sizable portion of our everyday 
movements at all varieties of the environmental scale is 
pre-cognitive and involves a prereflective knowledge of 
ttie body. In contrast to the behaviourist perspective, I 
argue that this prereflective knowledge is not a chain of 
discrete, passive responses to external stimuli; rather, that 
the body holds within itself an active, intentional capacity 
which intimately 'knows' in its own special fashion the 
everyday spaces in which the person lives his typical day. 
Further, I argue that this bodily knowledge is not a 
structure separate from the cognitive stratum of spatial 
behaviour but works in frequent reciprocity with it.^' 
This is not a statement of an Husserlian phenomenologist for whom 
the retention of a Cartesian dualism and the restrictions of the 
transcendental reduction remove considerations of the body from 
the discussion except in any form which denies the possibility of a 
"pre-reflective knowledge of the body". Seamon alludes to the 
Heideggerian criticism of Husserl's position. 
D. Seamon, op. cit., p. 35. 
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2.3.3 Heidegger 
2.3.3.1 The Relation Between Husserl and Heidegger 
The relationship between Heidegger and his teacher Husserl 
is complex and few commentators agree in their assessments of the 
influence of teacher over pupil. There is undoubtedly a marked 
similarity between them for both seek a new point of philosophical 
orientation from which the accepted 'scientific' world-view can be 
challenged. Thiselton summarises McGinley's assessment of the 
differences between them. Firstly, for McGinley Husserl's work is 
epistemological: his fundamental problem is certitude whereas 
Heidegger begins with the question of ontology. Secondly, as we 
have implied, Husserl maintains the Cartesian distinction between 
mind and body while a major part of Heidegger's criticism of 
Husserl is precisely against this dualism. Thirdly, and consequently, 
Husserl engages in a transcendental reduction which abstracts 
consciousness from the world. For Heidegger however, 
involvement with the environment is an indispensable 
characteristic of human subjectivity For Heidegger, the 
intentionality of 'consciousness' is made possible only 
because Dasein discovers itself (becomes conscious of 
itself) as already factually involved with its environment.^' 
For Husserl, discussion occurs at the level of reflective 
consciousness because, being interested primarily in epistemology, 
knowledge is a reflective consciousness of something. 
^^J. McGinley, 'Heidegger's Concern for the Lived-World in his Dasein-Analysis' 
in Philosophy Today xvi (1972), pp. 92-116, quoted in A. Thiselton, The Two 
Horizons, Paternoster Press, Exeter, 1980, p. 145. 
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2.3.3.2 Heidegger's Phenomenon 
Heidegger observed, that a common object (a phenomenon) 
is known not as a thing but as a function. In grammatical terms this 
is replicated when a noun is the same word as a verb. Heidegger's 
example, the hammer, is not a particular thing but that which is 
ready-at-hand for hammering. Here, function is no longer distinct 
from ontology but is subsumed within it. We noted that with Husserl 
the particularity of the object is lost but the particularity of the subject 
is enhanced. We find the same process occurring with Heidegger. 
The thing 'hammer' is known only in its functionality, this being 
defined as its being. This necessarily reduces the importance of the 
type of hammer the thing may be. The size, constitution and mode 
of construction of the hammer are all less important than the fact 
that it is a hammering sort of thing, that is, that it is, available for 
hammering. If attention is drawn to the hammer's description, it is 
because it may be too small for the job at hand or that a wooden-
headed hammer should not be used for hammering metal objects. 
In other words, reference to the hammer's ontology as more 
traditionally understood serves only its functionality, for this is what 
Heidegger means by ontology. Existence has, in Heidegger 
become use and to exist is to be ready-at-hand for something. 
Heidegger does not reduce all things to "equipment ready-to-
hand or Nature present-at-hand"^^ in an encounter with a ready-to-
hand hammer we will also encounter, indirectly, an Other, the 
^^M. Heidegger, Being and Time, Trans. J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson, 
Blackweils, Oxford, ET 1962, p. 154. 
Page 56 Phenomenology and the Theology of Place 
individual who made the hammer and the Other for whom the thing 
being made with the hammer is being made. Being with Others is to 
know Others as they are ready-to-hand for us and they are not just 
present-at-hand to us. 
... Dasein's world frees entities which not only are quite 
distinct from equipment and Things, but which also - in 
accordance with their kind of Being as Dasein 
themselves - are 'in' the world in which they are at the 
same time encountered within-the-world, and are 'in' it by 
way of Being-in-the-world. These entities are neither 
present-at-hand nor ready-to-hand; on the contrary, they 
are like the very Dasein which frees them, in that they 
are there too, and there with it.^ 
Others are not those who stand over and against me but those with 
whom one feels a sense of unity; Heidegger terms this 'Being-
present-at-hand-along-with'. Others are encountered not as the 
hammer, present-at-hand for use but in their own Dasein, that is, 
within-the-world for themselves. In this sense 
they are not encountered as person-Things present-at-
hand: we meet them 'at work', that is, primarily in their 
Being-in-the-world. 
Husserl wishes to analyse phenomena which are 
'appearances in the consciousness of the observer'; Heidegger 
however, denies that phenomena are ever appearances and 
argues that what is observed is located outside the consciousness 
of the observer. Phenomena are 'already-there' in the world and 
what is seen is 'what thus shows itself in itself. Schacht describes 
the contrast: 
" M . Heidegger, op. cit., p. 154. 
''^ IVI. Heidegger, op. oil, p. 156. 
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Nothing could be less Husserlian than to speak of entities 
in this way; for doing so commits one to some form of 
realism, in the modern sense of the term - a position 
which Husserl holds to be "in principle absurd" (Ideas p. 
12). Yet it is precisely with its investigation of the nature of 
entities so conceived that Heideggerian phenomenology 
is concerned.^^ 
Husserl denied the validity of any question about the world beyond 
the consciousness of the observer which may have given rise to the 
appearance. Heidegger, by contrast is interested in just what gave 
rise to the appearance, in the nature of the Being experienced and 
the effect on one's own Being (Dasein). 
2.3.3.3 Heidegger and Place 
This means that a place is encountered not as a fixed and 
inanimate object but as a something 'within-the-world-for-itself. It is 
encountered as an object 'being a place' in space and time. This 
has led geographers to argue that it is the responsibility of planners 
to ensure that the experience of place is positive and not negative. 
They argue that, if living means living in a place, then all human 
beings must experience their place as an 'other'. But it is clear that 
for many people the experience of their place is not an experience 
of an 'other' with which they feel a sense of unity but an experience 
of an object with which there is a sense of dislocation, of being out 
of place and of not belonging. Following Heideggerian 
phenomenology geographers are freed to suggest that my 
experience of place will affect my sense of well-being. The origin of 
this experience lies in the place which I am experiencing. 
==R. Schacht, op. cit., p.221-2. 
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However, it has not proved possible for geographers to go 
beyond this observation. They have made considerable progress in 
refining techniques for discovering and evaluating the experience 
of human beings in particular places and in developing responses 
to dislocation. But most of the contribution from these studies has 
been channelled into the search for a way of ensuring that a place 
is an 'other' for which one feels a 'sense of unity' and not disunity. 
Such a search is of great importance for it highlights the effects that 
political and planning decisions can have on human beings. But it 
is impractical in the sense that the Utopia of a universal experience 
that this is 'my place' cannot exist. As we have seen even the 
experience of travel will lead to complex emotions about the places 
through which one is travelling and these emotions will vary from 
one individual to another. What these emotions are will depend 
upon the psychological history of the individual, and this in turn may 
depend upon individual experiences of places. A well travelled 
individual may find the dislocation of travel an excitement, the 
insecure person may try to avoid all experiences which remove 
what is familiar 
Phenomenological geography is able to highlight and 
account for fundamental experiences of place as 'my place' but little 
attempt is made to account for other ways of being in place such as 
one's location in a social structure or the cultural projections put on 
a place by a social group. 
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2.4 SUMMARY 
We began this chapter by showing that the experience of 'my 
place" is both universal and of considerable importance. We argued 
that all human beings share a sense of belonging or not belonging 
in a place and used Relph's development of the twin concepts of 
insideness and outsideness to illustrate ways in which belonging or 
not belonging may t>e expressed by individuals in western cultures. 
The roots of phenomenological and existential geography were 
traced and a summary and critique offered of the benefits and 
limitations which have accrued since geographers started to use 
Husserl, Heidegger and others to provide a philosophical 
framework for their geography. 
We have argued that geographers have not always been 
clear when they have used the phenomenological tradition and, 
further, while attempting to discover 'my unique experience' have 
been forced to generalise from the particular in order to make 
specific planning conclusions. However, they have been very 
successful at showing that my experience of a place is an important 
part of what it is to be me. They have been less successful at 
avoiding isolating the individual from the complex network of 
relations in which any individual is to be found. This problem 
becomes most noticeable when the possibility that human beings 
might be in relation with places is raised. 
Although a meaningless suggestion for Husserl, for 
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Heidegger to encounter an object is to meet more than a 'functional 
thing'. A relationship Is struck between object and Individual which 
takes the individual beyond the object and its use to its maker, to its 
location in space and time, that is, to its location In a complex set of 
relations. Relph acknowledges this by suggesting that places can 
function as agents in their own right. However, having made this 
suggestion, at no time in the subsequent discussion are examples 
given of places operating in this way. This reluctance to proceed to 
a relational ontology in which an individual is part of a network of 
relationships is shown in two areas. 
Firstly by treating a place as though it is always the recipient 
of human agency is to remove any element of relation between 
human beings and places. To be in relation is to be exposed to the 
possibility of change by the other party in the relation, in this case a 
place. Relph, despite an early suggestion to the contrary does not 
treat place as an agent in any practical sense. Secondly, his use of 
the notion of authenticity requires an individual to be isolated from 
all other human beings in order to act upon a place without regard 
to prevailing social codes. 
Such an isolation may require a two stage movement by the 
individual. The Individual must move towards the social order within 
the place in order to understand the prevailing customs and 
unspoken rules of behaviour which every existential insider knows 
intuitively Then the individual must become distanced from those 
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socialised customs in order to act in an 'authentic' manner. 
Alternatively the individual may choose to not to conform to social 
patterns which she has made no effort to understand. This will be a 
more deliberate and more successful form of existential 
outsideness but will result in 'authentic' behaviour towards the 
place. 
The contradiction here is that, in order to be sufficiently 
distanced from the place to act in an authentic manner one must 
inevitably cease to be, or to never become, existentially inside the 
place. To be existentially inside is to know, by nature, the customs 
and values of the place but it is precisely these customs and values 
which authenticity seeks to avoid. Consequently, the ideal 
behaviour of the individual is an isolated individual, one who is not 
part of the community to such an extent that prevailing social rules 
are not obeyed. There is clearly some value in such a lifestyle for 
many unspoken customs oppress rather than liberate. However, as 
Relph makes very clear, there is also some value in living within the 
security of being existentially inside a place. He cannot argue for 
planning policies which encourage existential insideness and for 
an individual response to patterns of social behaviour which 
discourages existential insideness. 
Here place is separated from the society which is located in 
the place. The two cannot be separated. Both influence and change 
the other. When one is existentially inside a place it is partly 
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because one is at home in the society of the place. Being at home 
in the social order of a place will encourage and accelerate the 
pace at which an outsider becomes existentially inside a place. In 
the next chapter we will describe the processes by which social 
groupings impose a view of a place and the world on individuals 
thus encouraging existential insideness or outsideness, enveloping 
the individual in a very complicated set of relations and locating the 
individual in a social structure. 
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PANNENBERG'S THEOLOGICAL HERMENEUTIC 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the second chapter we showed that human beings are 
always part of an existential relationship with places. It is impossible 
to be a human being without relating to the place in which one finds 
oneself at any one time. The existential relationship occurs through 
the mechanisms of existential insideness and outsideness and their 
variants and is often experienced as feeling at home, or as 
homesickness. 
We saw that in the philosophical tradition which is used by 
the existential geographers and others who first drew attention to 
the existential experience of place, and in the geography which 
they developed, very little attention if any is given to the place which 
gives rise to feelings of at-homeness or homesickness. It was this 
lack of attention which led us to suggest that the relational nature of 
the existential experience is insufficiently emphasised. 
In this third chapter we will look more closely at the place 
which human beings experience. Existential (and 
phenomenological) geography is not concerned about the place 
which gives rise to the experience. It is not therefore possible to ask 
questions about the relationship between the experience of a place 
by an individual and the place itself. For Husserl, for example, to 
ask how far the experience of a place accurately reflected the reality 
of the place itself would be to ask a nonsensical question. 
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However, such a pessimistic view about the ability of human beings 
to distance themselves from their experience is not shared by 
everyone. 
When human beings exist in a place, as all must, they are 
part of a complex web of relationships between other human beings 
who also live in the place and between themselves and the place 
and its location within a wider locality. This world of relationships Is 
highly complex for each individual stands in a unique location 
within the web of relations and views that part of the web which can 
be seen from their unique perspective. It is not possible to see the 
whole place in all its complexity and so, in order to function in such 
a complicated social and physical environment, details are 
simplified and a less complicated map of the web in constructed, 
subconsciously in the mind of the individual. The individual then 
relates to the place through the simplified map which has been 
acquired. The map is subject to constant revision and modification. 
It is the tension between the importance of belonging, and 
thus accepting the map given to an individual by a social hierarchy 
and the need for an individual to act in an 'authentic' manner by 
questioning features drawn on the map which was highlighted in 
the last chapter as an unresolved paradox In a solely existential 
approach to the human experience of place. 
In this chapter we shall describe Pannenberg's theological 
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anthropology which seeks to explain the relationship between 
human beings and their environment and culture and we shall use 
examples from particular places to show that the processes 
described operate in everyday human experience. 
3.2 PANNENBERG'S ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEOLOGY 
3.2.1 Introduction 
In Anthropology in Theological Perspective Pannenberg 
continues and develops a long-running attempt to understand what 
constitutes the uniqueness of the human being. It is consistent with 
Pannenberg's understanding of the role of theology with respect to 
philosophy and science, especially the social sciences, that his 
theology should rely heavily on the German tradition of 
anthropology and sociology.' He suggests that a distinction may be 
made between dogmatic anthropology in which the existence of 
God and the image of God in human beings is presupposed, and a 
'fundamental-theological anthropology' in which attention is 
directed towards the human sciences and in which one's intention 
' S e e Theology and Philosophy of Science, p. 422, DLT, London, ET 1976, 
where he writes 
The most general foundations of systematic theology will therefore 
have to come from anthropology. Moreover, theology broaches the 
anthropological phenomena with a view to their religious and 
theological implications. anthropology itself is concerned with the 
relationship of the more abstract, and for that very reason more 
fundamental, questions of biological anthropology and sociological 
analysis of the social forms of human behaviour to the historical 
concreteness of the living-out of human life into which the philosophy 
and theology of history translates the abstradt levels of anthropological 
enquiry. 
For Pannenberg science is Wissenschaft, that is to say, it is to do with the 
acquirement and achievement of wisdom by human beings. However, he makes it 
clear in Theology and Philosophy of Science that he prefers to see disciplines 
separated in the modern manner rather than unified and integrated as they are in 
the traditional conception of wisdom. 
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is to draw out relevant implications for theology.^ The attempt to 
understand the human being began with a series of popular radio 
broadcasts in 1959/60. The broadcasts were later published in 
English in 1970 under the title What is Man?. 
3.2.2 'Open to the world' 
Pannenberg's understanding of human beings is that they 
are 'open to the world'. By this, he means that human beings can 
stand apart from the world which confronts them and they can 
respond to the world in a creative manner. Human beings are not 
tied to their environment in the way animals are because of their 
imaginative potential and their propensity for a meeting with, or at 
least asking about, God. The human potential for infinite openness 
to the world is, for Pannenberg, evidence of the existence of, or the 
potential for, a relation with God. This is because an infinite 
openness to the world will take one beyond the world. The 
propensity to ask questions of the world when extrapolated infinitely 
in a context of openness will take one beyond the world and 
towards God. 
All animals have an environment to which they are limited 
and, for all animals except human beings, this environment is less 
than the world. While this means that animals do not perceive what 
is beyond their environment, (environment is understood as a 
geographically defined and limited area of space), the interesting 
= See W. Pannenberg, Anthropology in Theological Perspective, T & T Clark, 
Edinburgh, 1985, p. 21ff. 
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point is that that environment, as perceived by an animal is less 
than the world of that unit of space. The first distinction then, 
between animals and human beings which Pannenberg draws out 
from the notion of openness to the world is that "Animals notice only 
that part of their environment which is instinctively important for their 
species."^ whereas 
Man is not bound to an environment, but is open to the 
world. That means he can always have new experiences 
that are different in kind, and his possibilities for 
responding to the reality perceived can vary almost 
without limit." 
Human beings have the freedom and the responsibility to respond 
to the world. However, the manner in which they respond is of the 
greatest importance. 
Pannenberg's view could be described as another way of 
saying that human beings transcend the world. By virtue of the way 
human beings are they are able to go beyond the limited and 
enclosed material environments of all other living things and, in so 
doing, raise questions about the status of themselves, the world and 
the future. If human beings are able to question the world in this 
way then they are able to go beyond the world to something greater 
than the world or which at least contextualises the world. In this 
process the world is treated as a 'something' which is placed within 
an historical context and, ultimately within a universal horizon. 
' W, Pannenberg, What is Man?, Fortress Press. Philadelphia, ET 1972. p. 4. 
" W Pannenberg. What is Man?, ibid., p. 5. 
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Pannenberg's hermeneutical method is, therefore, a two-fold 
hermeneutical technique of interpreting the world both as a thing 
and as a thing in its wider context. He shows a methodological 
similarity to Polanyi who develops an account of knowledge which 
incorporates this sort of double understanding. For Polanyi there is 
a body of knowledge which is known tacitly, the status of which, 
despite its tacit character, is the same as more traditionally valid 
ways of understanding what constitutes knowledge.* Pannenberg's 
'beyond-the-world' of human beings is of the same type as 
Polanyi's tacit knowledge. 
3.2.3 Openness to God-beyond-the-world 
Pannenberg, as we have seen, maintains that that which is 
beyond the world is God. Human beings, led to ask the question 
about beyond-the-world, are necessarily asking the question about 
God because human potentiality is infinite and infinitude is divine. 
Here Pannenberg is drawing upon Schleiermacher's use of 
dialectic. Schleiermacher argues that religion characterizes human 
beings neither as finite beings, as in 'metaphysics', nor as striving 
after the infinite, as in 'morals', but as participants in the infinite in 
and through finitude." It is in the finite that the infinite is seen and in 
the temporal that the eternal is to be found. This makes possible 
Pannenberg's claim that, by being infinitely open to the world, 
human beings become open to God. To see the world is, for human 
^ See chapter five where Torrance's use of Polanyi is also described. 
^See F. Schleiermacher, On Religion, CUP, Cambridge, 1988, especially The 
Second Speech: On the Essence of Religion, pp 96-140. 
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beings, to see the universal horizon of the world and, in so doing, to 
see God. However, we might ask; are the world and God 
necessarily linked in such a way? To say that God must be found by 
a creature able to be open to the finite nature of the world solely on 
the basis of a dialectical argument need not, as we shall see in 
chapter six, be the only account of the activity and presence of God 
in the history (and geography) of the world. 
We will argue below that it is possible to move from an 
immanent understanding of God in the world to the transcendence 
of God. It will be argued that God is present in the world, in idealist 
language^ as an active subject. Pannenberg however, does not talk 
of the presence of God here but of the legitimacy of moving from the 
finitude of the world to the infinitude of what is beyond the world. 
There is therefore no grounding of God in the world, but only an 
ability by the world to reach beyond itself and an equation of what is 
beyond the world with God. 
3.2.4 God in History 
It is not surprising that Pannenberg should place the 
understanding of history at the centre of his theological system for it 
Is in the unfolding of the universal history of the world that the world 
is seen in its context, and the infinite, and therefore God-revealing 
nature, of that context is made apparent. History not only points to 
the infinite however; it also points to the finitude of human existence 
in the world wherein, for Pannenberg, daily life is experienced and 
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the question of God begins. Pannenberg's interest in history as the 
category for understanding the concreteness of human life' leads 
him to treat the present in a way which Moltmann appears to echo 
in his Theology of Hope. For Pannenberg, human beings construct 
a succession of cultures each arising out of the failings of the last in 
a never ending progression towards an imagined goal. 
Thus man finds no final satisfaction even through his own 
creations, but immediately leaves them behind again as 
mere transitional points in his striving.' 
We find an apparently similar dissatisfaction with the present 
and a striving after the future and the new in Moltmann. In Moltmann 
the arrival of the future, in dialectical tension with the present, 
renders the present 'God-forsaken'. Only the qualitatively new 
action of God in the future can make Christian hope genuinely 
Christian and genuinely hopeful. 
From the first to the last, and not merely in the epilogue, 
Christianity is eschatology is hope, forward looking and 
forward moving, and therefore also revolutionizing and 
transforming the present.* 
Christian hope ... thereby brands the visible realm of 
present experience as a god-forsaken, transient reality 
that is to be left behind.'" 
Moltmann writes here -with a strong element of rhetoric for, whilst 
dialectic plays a major role in his understanding of the way in -which 
God and human history interact (it should be noted that the 
qualitatively new of the future is an act of God which comes 
• vV Fannenberg, Anihropoiogy in Theological Perspective, ibid., p. 465ff. 
°W. Pannenbsrg, What is Man?, ibid., p. 9. 
' J . Mcltmann, Theology of Hope, SCM, London, ET 1957, p. 16. 
' " J . .Moltmann, op. cit., p IS. 
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unexpectedly to human beings), analogy too is important as it is 
only through analogy that the new is intelligible to human beings. 
Pannenberg does not understand the course of history in a 
dialectical fashion - it is the hermeneutic of history which, in his 
view, functions dialectically. For Pannenberg following Troelstch, 
history functions analogically; the past and the future are 
understood from the present. It Is this understanding which lies 
behind his disagreement with Schleiermacher over the relative 
importance of history and hermeneutics.'' The present is for him an 
essential part of the experience and understanding of human 
beings which, by its inadequacies, points beyond itself to God and 
to the future. Human beings, whose destiny lies in fulfilment, find 
themselves dependent upon more than the world in all its richness, 
and this dependence upon what is beyond the world, God, 
becomes infinite because it lies out of reach. 
Man is dependent not just on particular conditions of his 
surroundings but, beyond that, on something that 
escapes him as often as he reaches for fulfilment.'^ 
Men's dependence upon God is infinite precisely 
because they never possess this destiny of theirs but 
must search for it.'^ 
Thus, cultural inadequacy is interpreted as an expression of 
" s e e W. Pannenberg. 'Hermeneuticsand Universal History', p. 122-152, in 
History and Hermeneutics, W. Pannenberg ed.. Trans. P Achtemeier. Harper and 
Row, New York, 1967. 
'^W Pannenberg. What is Man?, ibid., p. 10 
''W. Pannenberg. What is Man?, ibid., p. 11 
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the failure of human beings to reach their destiny, but it is also 
interpreted as an expression of the essential nature of human 
beings which is seen to be open to the world, and therefore to 
beyond the world. The natural home of human beings is located 
beyond the world and not merely in the world as it is for animals. 
Thus the world is not so much godforsaken (as in the common 
dualist legacy), but rather the world is only part of the 'natural 
habitat' of human beings who are also created to live in the 
environment of the question about God. Similarly, human beings 
are capable of living beyond the present, by their imagination, and 
by understanding the future as future. Pannenberg suggests that 
The animal's bondage to its environment corresponds, 
not to man's relation to the world of nature or to his 
familiarity with his cultural world, but to his infinite 
dependence on God. What the environment is for 
animals, God is for man. God is the goal in which alone 
his striving can find rest and his destiny be fulfilled.'* 
3.2.5 Making the World a Simpler Place 
Pannenberg makes it clear that he understands human 
interaction with the world to be active rather than passive. In other 
words, the human response to the world is not so much a response 
which allows the world primacy and takes the world as it comes. It is 
more that the human being interprets what it meets in a highly 
active way which ensures that autonomy remains with the human 
being. The complexity of the world is simplified by 'imaginative 
constructs' which permit access to the reality of the world. We can 
'"W. Pannenberg, What is h/lan?, ibid., p. 13. 
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see that this activity does Indeed occur when human beings 
encounter places. Places are complexes of interactions between 
people, the artificial creations of human beings and natural 
landscapes. Human beings choose to simplify their world which is 
constituted by a variety of places, by making places which are more 
simple that the partially perceived reality around them. It is this 
partial perception and a subconscious process of simplification 
which makes up the 'imaginative construct' of the world. 
These simplified places can take one of two forms. It Is 
possible for human beings only to acknowledge the existence of 
part of the complex which constitutes a place, and thus to simplify 
the world by ignoring those parts of it which are considered 
unimportant or undesirable. Alternatively, human beings can take a 
place as they understand it and make It safer and by thus acting, 
make it more accessible to greater numt)ers of people. 
Firstly the world is not perceived in its totality by human 
beings at a conscious level; It is only selectively grasped. The 
subconscious activity here is linked to the hermeneutical debate In 
which Pannenberg argues, against Schleiermacher, that history 
and context are more Important than the text itself. The point is that 
the conscious mind deals only with a limited picture of place (or any 
other phenomena) because the subconscious mind filters out those 
elements of a place which it does not understand, perceives as 
unimportant or which It is simply unable to locate. The ability of the 
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mind to understand or even recognise the symbols, codes and 
language of places is as limited as it is in any other sphere. 
Secondly, even that which is perceived by the conscious 
mind is not always integrated into an understanding of a place 
because to do so would result in an unwieldy picture of such 
complexity that the human subject would not be able to cope with 
the range of decisions and choices made available. In other words, 
the construction of imaginary pictures of places is a necessary 
activity partly because it is impossible to have a complete 
knowledge of a place even if one were to exclude the very 
important historical element to place, and partly because it is 
necessary to understand a place in such a way that one will be able 
to function effectively within it. To do this a certain limited distance is 
necessary from oneself and one's object in order to facilitate the 
establishment of imaginary constructs. The role of the imagination 
and the ability of human beings to stand outside of themselves is of 
fundamental importance to Pannenberg's understanding of the 
process operating within human beings, society and culture. In 
What is Man?Pannenberg characterises imagination as: 
the ability to detach oneself from one's own situation and 
to transpose oneself into any other position one might 
choose ... the element of newness [and] ... [the] 
experience of future as future, that is, as something not 
yet present.'' 
' 'W Pannenberg, What is Man?, ibid, p. 25-26. 
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3.2.6 'Present to What is Other' 
Anthropology in Theological Perspective provides 
Pannenberg with an opportunity to systematise this understanding 
of human uniqueness and place it within the context of an 
anthropological and psychological understanding of human self-
consciousness. The ability of human beings to be 'present to what 
is other' becomes the foundational condition of humanity (as an 
expression of the notion of openness to the world) which allows 
human beings access to their distinctness, through the process of 
seeing themselves as other to someone or something who is other 
to them.^ ^ Access to the world is made possible by placing oneself to 
the world as other 
It is a major problem in this approach that the process of 
becoming other to one's other, either in relation to consciousness of 
oneself or of the world, is a process in which the '1' appears the 
dominant, and indeed perhaps the only active, partner. While the '1' 
appears to be placed in a wider context by being defined in 
relational terms, the '1' is the only element in the relationship which 
can be defined because it is the only element in the relationship 
which can be subject. It is only given a transient objectivity in order 
to define its subjectivity more completely 
In his material culture man produces a system for the 
arrangement of things in nature so that they become 
submissive to his needs.'' 
Access to reality is opened up precisely through 
' 'W Pannenberg, Anthropology in Theological Perspective, ibid, p. 62. 
W. Pannenberg, What is Man?, ibid, p. 22. 
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imaginative constructs, 
However, the construction of a simplified but dynamic map of 
the world, a dominant theme in Anthropology in Theological 
Perspective which can be traced back to an underlying emphasis in 
What is Man?, is a major process in human relations with places. 
3.3.7 The Unity of a Culture 
The most important part of Pannenberg's understanding of 
anthropology from a theological perspective lies in Chapter Seven 
of his book. He begins the chapter with the uncompromising 
statement that "The world human beings share has never been a 
natural world'"^ and the chapter explains and supports this assertion 
by answering the self-posed question -
What is it that grounds the unity of a culture, a unity that 
manifests itself in the specific "style" of its various forms of 
life and distinguishes this culture from others?^" 
The interest in this question lies in the posited relativity of a culture 
and its simultaneous power over those who live within it. It is 
assumed, following Portmann^\ that culture is a common and 
shared experience experienced by all human beings. Pannenberg 
is willing to assert that it is this universal experience of, and 
participation in, culture, that is the feature of the lives of human 
beings which sets them apart from other animals: 
'°W. Pannenberg, What is l\/lan?, ibid, p. 24. 
^'W. Pannenberg, Anthropology in Theological Perspective, ibid., p.315. 
^°W. Pannenberg, Anthropology in Theological Perspective, ibid., p. 316. 
^'W. Pannenberg, Anthropology in Theological Perspective, p. 429, quoting 
A. Portmann who wrote that human beings are "by their nature cultural beings". 
Source not given. 
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A social way of life and the formation of groups are not 
specifically human realities but are widespread among 
the higher animals. The specifically human form of 
common life is constituted by the concept of a shared 
world, which we call "culture". 
3.2.8 Symbols in Culture 
Culture, understood symbolically is a system of codes and symbols 
which are used to establish meaningful communication between 
individuals. A shared understanding of the meaning or the 
signification of symbols, which is culture, is necessary, although the 
awareness that the medium of communication and knowledge is 
symbolic is not. Language, myth and the arts are examples of the 
symbolic systems which are mutually established and utilised to 
facilitate the functioning of society. Without such constructs society 
would be impossible and communication meaningless. The role of 
a name becomes important because, it is argued, a name is a 
symbolic representation of what is named. To be named is to be 
known. Indexical terms such as 'this' or 'here' and pronouns such 
as T merely 
have as their function to make clear to the hearer or 
reader the precise thing, person, episode, place, or 
movement of which there is a question.^' 
Pannenberg recognises the obvious question which is raised 
by this understanding of the internal operation of society. Symbolic 
creation is primarily an individual act. The corporate acceptance 
^^\N. Pannenberg, Anthropology in Theological Perspective, ibid., p. 315. 
Pannenberg, Anthropology in Theological Perspective, ibid., p. 207. 
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and use of common symbols is dependent upon individuals within 
the community accepting the symbolic reference and agreeing to 
use it, although not necessarily in a premeditated, reasoned and 
conscious manner. However, the cultural world which only exists in 
society is essentially a corporate world. It is shared and experience 
is often prior to individual behaviour. The tension between the two is 
made even more sharp by the awareness of the feedback which 
operates within the mechanics of a society. It is clear that corporate 
symbols are individual creations, the corporate world is prior to 
conscious behavioural decisions and, despite this, the corporate is 
nevertheless influenced by individual acts. 
Pannenberg goes on to suggest that a concept of culture 
must attempt to combine the twin poles of individuality and 
corporateness. This concept must cater adequately for the fact that 
only through cultural forms can human social formation be said to 
acquire its special character; and yet, cultures must always take 
shape within a socially organised reality. Pannenberg argues that it 
is necessary to locate a "third level which is distinct from individual 
and society and on which the symbolising activity of the individual is 
related to the foundations of social life"^^ He locates the third level 
in 'play'. 
3.2.9 Socialisation Through Play 
In play, he argues, individuals are introduced to a shared 
world and lose their egocentric desire to define their identity over 
^"W Pannenberg, Anthropology in Theological Perspective, ibid., p. 319. 
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against the world; they learn to cultivate their exocentric desire to 
shape their destiny within the world and the wider question about 
God. It is through play that exocentricity is discovered, experience, 
perceived for what it is and allowed to become the governing 
principle in life-decisions. It is here that we see that the emphasis 
placed on the self and the ego for methodological reasons earlier in 
the book has, despite an expectation to the contrary:"... the goal is 
the restoration of community, the reintegration of the individual into 
the community,"^ led to the supremacy of the individual over society. 
Part II of Anthropology in Theological Perspective ends with 
the promise that a high place will be accorded to the 'shared world' 
even if, so far, the interests of the individual have been paramount. 
Individuals recover their identity through reintegration 
into the community; they recover a freedom which they 
neither possess nor can exercise for themselves in 
isolation, but which they possess only as recognised 
members of the shared world. 
In other words, the shared world is a sine qua non for individual 
freedom and identity; and it is this pattern which is maintained. For 
Pannenberg, however important society may be, the individual 
remains at the centre of attention. Such interest in society as society 
can command lies in its role in permitting freedom and expression 
for the individual. 
Thus the theme of play links together the question of the 
identity of the individual, which provided the guiding 
thread for the second part of the present book, with the 
further question, arising out of the previous one, 
regarding the shared world in which individuals are given 
W Pannenberg, Anthropology in Theological Perspective, ibid., p. 311. 
W, Pannenberg, Anthropology in Theological Perspective, ibid., p. 312. 
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the opportunity for achieving their personal identity.^ 
3.2.10 Summary 
Pannenberg argues that all human beings are able to see 
beyond an horizon limited by the instincts necessary for mere 
survival. Consequently, human beings are able to reflect on their 
environment, to place it and themselves in a wider context and to 
wonder what lies beyond the limits of both understanding and 
perception. This inquisitiveness leads human beings both to 
discover what lies unknown within the perceived horizon and what 
lies metaphysically beyond it. Thus human beings are also 
responsive to the possibility of God. 
It is because human beings are able to see beyond what is 
instinctively necessary for survival that they also, paradoxically, find 
it necessary artificially to simplify the world in which they live. This 
happens automatically in animals for whom instinct removes all 
confusing and complicating information leaving only what is 
needed for the survival of the animal. Human beings however, 
quickly discover that the world is a highly complex place and that 
much of the information received does not appear to be necessary 
for living. 
In order to function more effectively in such a complex world 
many of the details of the world are subconsciously filtered out or 
adapted so that they fit a preconceived world view. The ability of 
W Pannenberg, Anthropology in Theological Perspective, ibid., p. 322. 
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human beings to reflect and to use imagination enables them to 
construct a picture of the world which is less complicated than the 
world really is but which enables them to operate successfully in it. 
It seems likely that any horizon is so complex that it could never be 
known by an individual or a group of human beings, the very 
existence of relationships makes this inevitable, and therefore the 
construction of simplified maps of the world are essential for human 
being. 
It is clear that these simplified maps are shared by 
individuals who have things in common. Pannenberg accepts that 
common cultures promote shared symbols which are understood by 
everyone who is at home in the culture. These symbols not only 
serve to include or exclude individuals within or from the culture but 
they also function as major landmarks on the constructed map. It is 
through the shared cultural symbols that each individual, who must, 
necessarily have a slightly different map from everyone else 
because everyone views the world from their own unique 
perspective, recognises locations in the shared construction of the 
world. 
Pannenberg argues that this shared perception of what the 
world is like is learnt through play. Play involves enacting what will 
become the things of adult life in a safe environment which 
promotes both understanding and experience and also encourages 
the development of a common way of interpreting the world. It is this 
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common hermeneutic which leads to the individual both possessing 
the ability to reflect on more than the immediate horizon but which 
also tends to limit the individual to interpreting what is perceived in 
particular ways. 
Consequently while the shared process of simplifying the 
world is necessary for human being, the shared hermeneutic limits 
the ability of the individual to step outside the dominant culture and 
challenge the common map of the world. It is precisely the same 
tension which we saw in chapter two. Being part of the dominant 
culture is to be existentially inside one's environment. However, 
each human being is the unique meeting point of a wide variety of 
relationships and in order to express one's uniqueness it may be 
necessary to step outside one's environment and thus becoming 
existentially outside where one formally belonged. 
This is not to deny the need for a simplified construction of 
what the world is like which is shared through the common 
understanding of the ways in which culturally determined symbols 
work. It is simply to recognise that there are a wide variety of 
culturally mediated maps of the world which overlap with one 
another to varying degrees. Furthermore, each time an individual 
step outside a common world view and considers another then the 
commonality of the shared symbols is reduced for as each 
individual become less at home in a place so the understanding of 
the way in which that place understands its environment is also 
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reduced. 
3.3 EXAMPLES OF CONSTRUCTIONS IN PLACES 
3.3.1 Introduction 
If the view described in this chapter is correct it ought to be 
possible to point to ways in which human beings construct a 
simplified picture of the world which enables them to function more 
effectively within their own environment. The environment of 
human being is present in two forms. Firstly, it is present as the 
physical form of the place; the buildings, the shape and nature of 
the land and the climate. Secondly, it is present as the people who 
live in the place; the way in which the society is organised, the 
cultural values of the society and the extent to which It varies within 
itself and to which it relates to other places outside of itself. A place, 
in both senses, can vary enormously in scale for nations and entire 
continents share things in common which other peoples beyond the 
limits of the nation or continental block do not share, and yet even a 
few streets can show significant variations of class, cultural values 
and physical properties. 
3.3.2 Interpretations in Social and Physical Form 
All places consist of natural or man made forms which are 
understood by the people who live in those place in particular ways. 
In many older cities, towns and villages the largest building, at least 
until the nineteenth century, was a cathedral or a church. The 
building functioned as a physical form of the presence of God, and 
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in many cases of the wealthy benefactor or local landowning family 
who paid for the building. Since the nineteenth century townscapes 
have been dominated not by religious buildings but first by factories 
and then by financial institutions. While this was partly of necessity 
as technological advancement and economic forces made such 
buildings first possible and then necessary it also reflected changes 
in the way in which society operated and in the dominant values of 
the society. There is therefore, a circularity in the relationship 
between the physical form of a place and the dominant social and 
cultural values held by the people who live in it. As values change 
and influence building types and styles so new buildings reinforce 
those values which led to their creation. This mirrors the circularity 
in the relationship between social structures and cultural forms and 
between individual and corporate priority in society and culture. 
The shape of settlements will usually reflect the nature of 
both the land upon which the settlement is built and the way in 
which the settlement operates. Settlements built in valleys where 
dry flat land is in short supply will have a high density and the lack 
of easy communications and the inward-looking shape of the 
settlement may contribute to the closed nature of such communities 
even today 
The knowledge an individual possesses of 'their place' will 
be based on those parts of the place which have special meaning 
and which they frequent regularly. Consequently the route to work. 
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to school, to the shops or to the station will form part of the simplified 
'mental map' of the place. Areas not needed by the individual will 
not feature on the map in such detail. 
During the late middle ages distinctive styles of farmhouse 
developed in which houses in highland areas of England and 
Wales were of the longhouse type. These houses were rectangular 
in shape and the dwelling area and the livestock area were both 
located under the same roof separated only by a wall. In lowland 
areas houses were more substantial, often included three separate 
rooms and animals were kept in separate buildings. 
Studies have shown that variations in architecture and 
technology in mediaeval Wales were due to the proximity of parts of 
eastern Wales to the wealth and new ideas available in the West 
Midlands. Western Wales without easy access to either the markets 
or the new technology and ideas continued with less complex 
buildings for longer 
The eastern borderland [of Wales], characterised by 
storeyed houses, had very high standards of material 
culture on account of ease of access to the markets of the 
west Midlands and exposure to new ideas of 
construction. West Wales, in contrast, has been 
associated with the single-storeyed cottage, with earth or 
stone walls, in contrast to the timber-building of the east.^' 
Here the physical location of a settlement has influenced the way it 
"*R. A. Butlln, The Late Middle Ages, c. 1350-1500, pp 119-150, in R. A. 
Dodgshon & R. A. Butlin, An Historical geography of England and Wales, 
Academic Press, London, 1978, p. 141, referring to P. Smith, Houses of the 
Welsh Countryside, London, 1975, pp 14-15. 
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is constructed, the experience and technological capabilities of its 
inhabitants and the extent to which the prevailing views of the world 
held by the inhabitants of any particular settlement have been 
influenced or challenged by meeting alternative world views. 
It is therefore, possible to conceive of ways in which the 
natural use of imagination by human beings to simplify the world in 
which they live in order to function in it more effectively is influenced 
by the place in which they live. This is because the shared cultural 
values of a place, the dominant hermeneutic through which all 
things are interpreted is influenced by the physical form of the 
settlement and by the degree to which the villagers come under the 
influence of other values which modify their own. Furthermore, the 
forces which operate in the mediaeval village in eastern Wales also 
operate at every scale of place from the street to the continental. 
3.4 CONCLUSION 
It seems likely therefore, that Pannenberg's description of the 
way in which human beings simplify their world through the use of 
imagination, shared cultural and physical maps and symbolic 
landmarks is an accurate way of describing how human beings 
operate in places, both in terms of a place's physical form and in 
terms of the cultural and social content of the society located in a 
particular place. All human beings construct a simplified mental 
map of part of their piace, its geography its history and its culture. 
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It is important for Pannenberg that it is not assumed that the 
acquired map is what is real over against the reality which inspired 
the map. Both in their different ways can be said to be real. But the 
assertion of their reality can be made because both the place and 
the constructed image of the place can function as agents in a 
relationship. This aspect of the reality of both the construct and the 
world which gave rise to the construct receives little attention from 
Pannenberg. It is however, of great importance to us. 
Rykwert observes, in a study of classical towns in a variety of 
ancient cultures, that 
I have been concerned to show the town as a total 
mnemonic symbol, or at any rate a structured complex of 
symbols; in which the citizen, through a number of bodily 
exercises, such as procession, seasonal festivals, 
sacrifices, identifies himself with his town, with its past 
and its founders.^* 
There is no significant acknowledgement here that the citizen and 
the town are engaged in a relationship in which the town is 
operating as an agent influencing and changing the citizen. The 
citizen does not change himself into a being who feels at home with 
the history of the town in which he would like to belong. He agrees 
to allow the town to influence him through a wide variety of subtle 
and mostly subconscious processes in which the symbols of the 
community in that place are quietly absorbed. This way of 
understanding the relationship between a person and a place is 
'^J. Rykwert, The Idea of a Town, Faber and Faber, London, 1976, p. 189. 
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reflected in the perception of Psalm 103:15-16; a short passage 
which receives little attention from the commentators. 
As for man, his days are like grass; 
he flourishes like a flower of the field; 
for the wind passes over it, and it is gone, 
and its place knows it no more. 
It is the place which knows here, not man. 
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SOCIAL PLACING 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter we saw that human beings construct 
a simplified view of the real world in order to function in it. This view 
is learned and then modified through life. Places are treated in the 
same way as all other phenomena with which human beings relate. 
Any particular physical space is unique because it is different in a 
wide range of physical properties to any other physical space. It will 
occupy different geographical coordinates to any other physical 
space. The space is rendered a place because of the relations 
occurring in it. These relations will be between physical 
phenomena and living things, plants and animals and, in some 
cases, human beings. The complexity of any place makes the use 
of simplified pictures of a place essential. 
All places, but especially human places are characterised 
not only by a physical structure but also by a social structure. 
Human beings, characteristically, will 'know their place' within the 
community in which they live. They will know that the way they 
behave, the vocabulary they use, the place where they live and a 
wide variety of other variables will reveal where they are located 
within the social hierarchy of the place. This social placing is the 
subject of this chapter. However, the complexity of the interactions 
operating within places is such that examples which show how 
places can function as 'subject' because their unique physical 
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nature may also illustrate the constraining effect of social placing on 
human activity. Each is mediated in part through the other. 
Human places are characterised by high levels of 
organisation. Institutionality is a feature of all cultures and 
contributes to their form and their historical character. Institutions 
function as a constraint upon the individual or group in a way very 
similar to physical paces. It would be possible to construct a co-
ordinate geometry illustrating the relational nature of social 
'placedness'. Such cultural, social and historical notions of place 
are not new and continue to provide a useful way of understanding 
the way in which places operate. 
Institutionality will be explored through the work of 
sociologist, Peter Berger, and social anthropologist, Mary Douglas, 
both of whom have sought to suggest that society and culture, and 
therefore place, function in a interactive feedback system and that 
this dynamic operates partly though the operation of institutions. 
In his study on The Social Reality of Religion, to which more 
attention will be paid later, Berger reveals where he stands in the 
sociological tradition. He states that "Society is a product of man. ... 
Yet it may also be stated that man is a product of society.'" Berger 
wants to explore the notion of society understood dialectically. The 
second footnote of the book makes clear that he is trying to 
^ P. Berger, The Social Reality of Religion, Faberand Faber, London, 1969, 
p.3. 
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establish, on the basis of a dialectical understanding of man and 
society, a synthesis between the sociological approaches of Weber 
and Durkheim. Weber saw "social reality as ongoingly constituted 
by human signification" while Durkheim emphasises the objectivity 
of society. Spelling out the dangers of each approach if pursued in 
isolation, Berger argues that both are correct and that "the two 
understandings are only correct together."^ Thus Berger is eager to 
stress that institutions function symbolically and are constructed by 
the individual operating within society; but he is also eager to stress 
the historical nature of institutional symbols. In other words, 
institutions predate the individual and function because of this, as 
regulatory subjects in the dynamic relationships within society. 
Mary Douglas also follows this approach and has coined the 
apparently contradictory phrase 'natural symbols'. Arguing along 
Durkheimian lines she suggests that society precedes the 
individual and, because of this fact, correlations between symbolic 
systems and social systems can be located. In Purity and Danger 
she tries to show how the organic system can function as an 
analogy of the social system and, as such, provide a pan-cultural 
means of understanding. Like Berger, Douglas sees the 'body 
social' as preceding the individual and as the origin of the variety of 
constraints operative within society. She goes so far as to describe 
attempts to escape these constraints, which include the constraints 
of institutionality, as illusory. For Douglas the symbols of society, and 
indeed society itself, are not simply awkward systems of control 
'P. Berger, op. cit, note2, p. 189. 
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upon the key loci of reality, in other words, upon individuals, but 
they are the given, the primary, and in that very narrow sense, the 
real. 
4.2 PETER BERGER - INSTITUTIONALITY AND SOCIAL 
PLACING 
4.2.1 Introduction: The Possibility of Social Control 
Berger understands institutions as one of a variety of 
phenomena operative within society at a level which is above and 
beyond the individual. Forces of social control operate in which the 
free activity of the symbolising individual is limited, and indeed 
shaped by broad coercive systems shared by all members of a 
society such as legal and political systems and codes of morality, 
customs and manners, and by less extensive circles of control 
shared by only a few, such as the controls imposed following the 
choice of an employer, local folk traditions of dress, language and 
religious affiliation and those of one's family and friends. 
In opposition to the suggestion that individual human activity 
is free in any pure sense Berger writes,"... location in society means 
to locate oneself with regard to many forces that constrain and 
coerce one.'" The active voice of Berger's verb is misleading here. 
In understanding one's location in society, and in making attempts 
to change one's location one could be said to be 'locating oneself. 
However, more frequently one is located by forces beyond one's 
control and a passive voice would be more appropriate. 
' p. Berger, Invitation to Society, Doubleday, New York, 1963, p. 93-94. 
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In addition to social control, social stratification represents a 
major restrictive force on individual activity; the class system is a 
widely recognised British example. We can find both these 
phenomena operating in place. For example, it is clear that social 
stratification is partly expressed in localities. One geographical area 
is considered more desirable than another and is able to command 
a higher market value. This has the effect of reducing the ability of 
poorer members of a society to relocate in that place at will. The 
wide awareness of locality ranking by those who 'know their place' 
also acts as a constraint upon the free movement of individuals 
because, apart from economic factors, behavioural and minor 
cultural differences will discourage even those who have the 
economic power from choosing to relocate in a particular district 
where they do not belong." The choice only appears to be free; it is 
in fact seriously limited by the institutional features of place 
stratification, the economic circumstances created by this 
stratification and the consequent local subcultural differences. This 
is a subtle but very powerful example of how institutionality can 
operate in a constraining manner Similar variations also occur 
between places. 
Physically differentiated zones in a town mediate social 
stratification and this stratification prevents human beings from 
exercising their 'free will'. Berger's analysis appears to recognise 
" Not belonging here can be seen both in terms of existential outsideness and 
in terms of failing to understand the symbols of the local subculture. 
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the 'subjectivity of the institution' and the 'objectivity' of the so-called 
free human agent. 
Berger follows Durkheim and Gehlen in his understanding of 
institutionality For Durkheim, a realist, social facts are 'things', that 
is to say, they have an objective existence outside of the individual 
in the same way as the phenomena of nature have an objective 
existence outside of the individual. In other words, "We are in 
society located in specific sectors of the social system.'" Gehlen 
argues that institutions function in a regulatory manner, turning the 
complex world met by individuals into a coherent set of patterns and 
norms in which life is made easier* Thus, we are located in society 
in a pattern of institutional forms and rules which contribute to the 
social system and which, being 'things' with an 'objective 
existence', have an effect upon us. 
Berger uses language as an example of an institution to 
illustrate his point because language, the fundamental institution, 
functions by objectifying reality, organising the world, regulating and 
limiting interaction and possessing an historical and objective 
existence beyond the abstract individual, but also by facilitating 
common interaction because of the power it possesses by virtue of 
its existence beyond that individual. He argues that an institution 
possesses five essential characteristics: externality, objectivity, 
= p. Berger, Invitation to Society, op. cit, p. 108. 
*See the discussion of Pannenberg's understanding of institutions, also 
dependent upon Gehlen, in the previous chapter 
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coerciveness, moral authority and historicity. We have seen each of 
these characteristics at work in our discussion so far. Central to 
Berger's understanding of the way in which institutions operate are 
the concepts of externalization, objectification and internalization. 
4.2.2 The Establishment of Social Order 
It is argued that humans being are unique among the higher 
mammals in that they do not possess an instinctively restricted 
environment. Rather than existing within a particular species-
specific environment human beings view the world intuitively and in 
an open manner. A much wider range of phenomena is available to 
human beings with the inevitable corollary that the world of human 
beings, unlike that of the higher mammals is very poorly organised. 
Order must be established out of relative chaos and institutionality 
is one response to the need to construct a pattern of organization to 
simplify the environment in which the individual lives. 
However, it is important to remember that the human being is 
not fully developed at birth and the process of humanization occurs 
in the context of an environment, which is both natural and human, 
and with which extensive interaction occurs; indeed it is such 
interaction that is a central element in the definition of what it is to 
be human. To illustrate this point and to show that the institutional 
organisation created by human beings precedes the individual, 
Berger writes: 
... the developing human being not only interrelates with 
a particular natural environment, but with a specific 
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cultural and social order, which is mediated to him by the 
significant others who have charge of him.^ 
He argues that human beings construct themselves during the post-
birth period and, crucially, at this time they are in relationship with 
their environment. This relationship can neither be finished nor 
ended and because of the environmental context of human self-
production, self-production is necessarily a social enterprise. 
Men together produce a human environment, with the 
totality of its socio-cultural and psychological formations. 
As soon as one observes phenomena that are 
specifically human, one enters the realm of the social. 
Man's specific humanity and his sociality are inextricably 
intertwined. Homo sapiens is always, and in the same 
measure, homo socius.^ 
The social order is here seen to be the product of the continuous 
process of human externalization. The process of externalization, 
like that of objectification, is a continuing dialectical process in 
which human beings are constantly formed and reformed by forces 
within themselves and without, and these external forces include 
those of place. The process of objectification is the process by 
which the social order becomes established as a 'thing' with an 
external, objective existence. The crucial elements in objectification 
are the processes of habitualization and the phenomenon of 
historicity 
in the process of habitualization, Berger maintains, action is 
' P. Berger & T. Luckmann, Tlie Social Construction of Reality, Penguin, 
Harmondsworth, 1966, p.66 
^ P. Berger & T. Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, ibid p. 69. 
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solidified into a pattern which can be repeated without the necessity 
for the solidification process to be repeated. The individual begins 
to perceive the pattern rather than the action. The environment is 
simplified because the complex variety of information received is 
itself received in a simplified form. The range of choices open to the 
individual becomes limited and, crucially, the elements of the 
environment are perceived objectively They are not open to a 
variety of interpretations or to incorporation into a variety of 
meaning systems because they have already been fixed into a 
pattern. In other words, in certain circumstances, a degree of 
objectification has taken place because the basic unit of the 
environment is the pattern. This pattern cannot be tampered with 
and therefore the environment gains some defence against the 
autonomous 'free' individual. More importantly however, 
habitualization has important ramifications for institutionality. 
Habitualization can lead to institutionalism when the patterns 
typified become typified by types of individuals. Berger comments 
on the implications of this observation: 
What must be stressed is the reciprocity of institutional 
typifications and the typicality of not only the actions but 
also of the actors in institutions. The typifications of 
habitualized actions that constitute institutions are always 
shared ones. They are available to all members of the 
particular social group in question, and the institution 
itself typifies individual actors as well as individual 
actions.' 
4.2.3 The Historical Context of Institutionality 
Institutions which are objective in the sense that they are 
' p. Berger & T. Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, ibid., p. 72. 
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external to the individual and part of society limit the range of 
options presented to the individual. Institutions limit the free action 
of and the power to symbolize by individuals in a more profound 
way Institutions in particular and society in general do not exist in a 
timeless context but are part of history The society of today is a 
society formed yesterday and the society of tomorrow is the society 
formed yesterday and modified, but only modified, today. Thus, the 
social world is received objectively, as an external, existent thing, 
already shaped and formed and exercising control on the one who 
receives it. 
The change in language used from a passive society which 
is perceived to an active and dynamic society which is received is 
important. The receiver begins in a passive manner during the 
childhood phase of socialisation and becomes more active through 
life. It would be more appropriate to talk of an active adult 
confronting an active society. Because society, and therefore 
institutionality, is historical, it is to a large extent shared. A common 
history is received even if not in an identical manner. Berger 
comments: 
Institutions further imply historicity and control. Reciprocal 
typifications of actions are built up in the course of a 
shared history. They cannot be created instantaneously 
Institutions always have a history, of which they are the 
products. It is impossible to understand an institution 
adequately without an understanding of the historical 
process in which it was produced. Institutions also, by the 
very fact of their existence, control human conduct by 
setting up pre-defined patterns of conduct, which channel 
it in one direction as against the many other directions 
Page 99 Institutionality and Place 
that would theoretically be possible.'" 
An institutional world, then, is experienced as an 
objective reality It has a history that antedates the 
individual's birth and is not accessible to his biographical 
recollection. 
If we apply this thinking to the operation of place we can see 
that, in a way analogous to the function of institutions, place also 
functions as a regulatory force within a historical context over 
human beings. Human beings are unable to take 'free decisions' 
because they are part of a place. Human beings always find 
themselves operating within the context of a place. The place in 
which they are located constrains behaviour by virtue of a number 
of the simple constituent parts of a place. In the second chapter we 
gave examples of place operating through a sense of belonging; in 
the last chapter we showed that the physical shape and lie of a 
place can affect human behaviour, potential and becoming. It will 
also mediate social placing. The social hierarchy within the place 
and the social hierarchy between places will be reflected in an 
institutionalised system of cultural, economic and political values 
and forces. Political power, for example, may be restricted to certain 
physical locations because of the social placing of the people who 
are able to live in them because of their economic power 
The location and architecture of Gothic cathedrals or 
Victorian town halls for example, gives a particular message to the 
'° p. Berger & T Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, ibid., p. 72. 
" P. Berger & T. Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, ibid., p. 77. 
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inhabitants of the town in which such buildings are located. The 
cathedral may speak of the power, majesty and presence of a 
monarchical God and of the wealth, temporal power, generosity and 
holiness of the benefactor. The town hall may convey messages 
about the success, wealth and generosity of the leading industrial 
families of the town, but also of the importance of the town in 
relation to its rivals. In the latter case therefore, the building 
encourages town dwellers to feel both gratitude and inferiority to 
their benefactor but also pride in 'their' town and, therefore, 
superiority over the inhabitants of other towns nearby. This would 
help to foster the sense of rivalry and competition necessary for the 
further success of both town and business in the future. 
The physical expressions of social placing are historical in 
nature. Any place is yesterday's place which human beings today 
can only modify The rapid removal of the physical expressions of 
yesterday's dominant social group will not remove the powerful 
collective memory of the period when that group was dominant. The 
Victorian town hall speaks of an order and ethic of the nineteenth 
century The Gothic cathedral reflects a mediaeval theology. The 
architecture of Le Corbusier and others is the architecture of a 
particular philosophy whose influence is beginning to wane. 
However, the buildings and places remain. Some of the meaning 
and message also remains. Even while places have existential 
meaning and are simplified by us through socialization they still 
exert an influence upon individuals and society as a whole. Each 
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age will add to and change the 'collective meaning' of a place, that 
meaning which is absorbed by the existentially inside, but each 
generation must begin with what the context of yesterday's place, 
human beings, buildings and geography together, gives to the 
succeeding time. 
4.2.4 Berger's Analysis Assessed 
We have so far presented Berger's argument for 
understanding society as a product of human beings and for a 
degree of objective reality to be accorded to society. However, in the 
description of the process of internalization he argues that human 
beings are themselves the products of society. We have already 
shown how this is possible. The process of socialization involves 
an individual being confronted by a society which is already formed 
and already exists as an objective external reality at a time when 
the human being is not yet fully formed. Therefore, because of the 
external and historical nature of society the decisions made, 
consciously and subconsciously, by the individual are made in the 
context of a particular society. The decisions which are made are 
from a range of options already limited by that society, or that part of 
it within which the individual is socialized. Only as the individual 
develops sufficiently to perceive the relativity of the position held 
can the human emerge from the constraints of the process of 
socialisation. 
However, one can never achieve 'freedom' from the legacy of 
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having been socialized into a particular sub-society and one's 
understanding of the world will be one which experiences a series 
of modifications as greater refinement is achieved. Ultimately, the 
individual can contribute to the building of a new society but only in 
historical continuity with the old into which the individual was 
socialised. 
... the same body of knowledge is transmitted to the next 
generation. It is learned as objective truth in the course of 
socialization and thus internalized as subjective reality. 
This reality in turn has the power to shape the individual.'^ 
So far, we have given the impression that the reality which is 
a property of institutionality is for Berger the reality of an external 
object with the power to operate independently of a cognitive, 
rational subject. This is certainly our view but despite some 
indications to this effect even some material quoted above shows 
that this is not in fact the case. For example, Berger states quite 
simply that: 
An institutional world, then, is experienced as an 
objective reality. ... the objectivity of the institutional 
world, however massive it may appear to the individual, is 
a humanly produced, constructed objectivity.'^ 
Berger indicates here the extent to which he understands 
institutions as possessing the objective, external existence of a 
thing. The institutional world only appears as an objective reality 
because that is the manner in which it functions. Berger follows the 
Kantian conviction that one cannot know things-in-themselves but 
only things-as-they-appear-to-be. 
p. Berger & T. Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, ibid, p. 84. 
'^P. Berger &T. Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, ibid., p. 77-78. 
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Berger does not appear to permit the 'qualitatively new' in 
the history of a society. In the history of a group all development 
must appear out of the historical context of the group. In other 
words, modification and change proceed out of the intellectual 
resources of the context of the group. All new ideas are not so much 
new ideas as modifications of previously accepted concepts. Thus 
history proceeds in a way which Pannenberg describes as 'by 
analogy'.'" There is therefore, no dialectical component to the 
history of culture and no suggestion that the culture can produce a 
new idea of its own or, more seriously, be affected by ideas from 
other sources. The 'other' here, be it an original thinker, a different 
culture or God is unable to influence the history of a culture in a 
radical and qualitatively new way. We do not wish to overstress our 
case however, for it is more the possibility of such influences for 
which we argue rather than the expectation that such influences 
abound. 
4.3 MARY DOUGLAS: INSTITUTIONALITY AND 
NATURAL SYMBOLS' 
4.3.1 Introduction: The Unity of The Whole 
Mary Douglas, a leading English social anthropologist, has, 
for many years, been addressing the question of what constitutes 
the cohesiveness of societies and cultures in which human beings 
are, or in many cases, have been located. Like Berger, she has 
followed Durkheim and maintains that individuals are in some 
'"See the discussion on page 43-46. 
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senses secondary to and constrained by institutions. She has 
devoted much time and attention to the phenomenon of 
institutionality recognising that institutions are both cohesive 
mechanisms and systems of control. We will attempt a summary of 
important aspects of her work which have bearing on our subject, 
and we will draw out some of the implications both of her work and 
of the presuppositions behind her work. 
On the opening preliminary pages of Purity and Danger 
Douglas acknowledges two important contributions which lie in the 
background of her work on pollution. They reveal much about the 
social and anthropological concerns which have informed her 
writing. Firstly, she refers to Evans-Pritchard to whom she attributes 
the insight that social and political institutions are to be considered 
by social anthropologists together and not separately, as had been 
the practice hitherto. Thus at an early age, she was introduced to 
the understanding that an institution functions as part of a larger 
and wider whole and that institutionality is but one part of a larger 
and wider system of perceiving the world. 
Secondly however, she comments that differences between 
herself and her husband introduced her to the 'relativity of dirt'. This 
is a crucial observation for anyone who wishes to comment on the 
manner in which a society or culture functions must take into 
account the relativity of perceptions and the differing function of 
apparently similar institutional, symbolic or ritual features of a 
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society, culture or, we can add, place. Recognition of this 
phenomenon is at the heart of Douglas' social anthropology and 
forms part of the criticism of the work of the nineteenth century 
anthropologist Frazer. 
4.3.2 The Critique of Nineteenth Century Dichotomies 
The opening chapter of Purity and Danger is a summary of 
some late nineteenth century analyses of ritual uncleanness. 
Douglas' critique of the major protagonists whom she discusses, 
Robertson Smith, Frazer and Durkheim again gives us insight into 
the heart of her thinking. Robertson Smith, although an Old 
Testament scholar, was a convinced evolutionist and his 
anthropological theories reflect this. Douglas summarises his 
position thus: 
Primitive rules of uncleanness pay attention to the 
material circumstances of an act and judge it good or bad 
accordingly 
Christian rules of holiness, by contrast, disregard the 
material circumstances and judge accordingly to the 
motives and disposition of the agent. 
The less uncleanness was concerned with physical 
conditions and the more it signified a spiritual state of 
unworthiness, so much more decisively could the religion 
in question be recognised as advanced.'' 
For Robertson Smith the hallmark of primitive religion is that 
its rules of purity are closely concerned with physical things. That is 
to say, one can understand the cleanliness rules of primitive society 
'^IVI Douglas, Purity and Danger, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1966, p. 
11. 
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by looking to explanations such as hygiene or the concerns of 
social stability. More advanced religions, and the most advanced 
was of course, his own Calvinistic Protestantism, are able to 
disassociate themselves from materiality and, consequently, 
explanations for taboos about dirt must be sought in typology, 
analogy and similar forms of spiritualised account. 
The origins of Robertson Smith's views are both complex 
and varied and we are not able to pursue his analysis further. 
However, it is a position which has important similarities with a 
significant strand of early Christian theology as well as a strong 
philosophical heritage and it is immensely influential in the popular 
anthropology and popular theologies of today 
Robertson Smith is of particular interest to Douglas because 
of the influence of his distinction between magical practice and the 
practices of evolved religion. For Robertson Smith, and in some 
anthropology and contemporary popular Protestant theology, magic 
involves practices of the cult and expects an immediate response to 
its demands. Evolved religion however, is ethical in its emphasis 
and, consequently expects to find results not in the material of the 
cult but in the ethical conduct of the religion and the religious. His 
'spiritualising' of ritual activity is part of the de-materialising 
tendency of a belief in the efficacy of ritual activity which dominated 
Robertson Smith's intellectual context. Douglas is quick to point to 
the mistaken assumptions which this context made. 
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Douglas suggests that 'automatically effective rites' do not 
necessarily imply a primitive religion and, similarly, a highly 
developed ethical content in a religion does not necessarily imply 
that that religion is highly evolved. The effect of Robertson Smith's 
dualism is to make a distinction between magic and religion on the 
basis of a distinction between ritual and ethics. This was the aspect 
of Robertson Smith's anthropology that Frazer developed. It is 
through Frazer and his threefold evolutionary sequence, magic -
religion - science, that much which is least attractive and culturally 
blinkered in Robertson Smith has been distilled. Durkheim 
however, emphasised a distinction between the sacred and the 
profane. Robertson Smith had denied that this distinction was valid 
but it is not in conflict with the non-material emphasis of Robertson 
Smith's anthropology as seen from a sociological point of view. 
4.3.3 The Unity of the External and the Internal 
Douglas, as we shall see, accepts neither distinction for she 
has a higher view of 'primitive religion' than Robertson Smith and a 
more complex and sympathetic understanding of the place of the 
symbol in society. Consequently, she appears to view physical 
things, those things which have physical form and shape, in a 
positive light. For Douglas, the vigorous anti-ritualist tradition, which 
we also interpret as an anti-physical tradition, is the result of a 
mistaken view of the way in which symbolic activity functions in 
society 
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All social interaction must have a symbolic element in order 
to be interaction. The ritual activities of the social animal 'human 
being' give form to the internal substance of the social activity, 
interaction and even religion of human beings. Social rituals, 
according to Douglas, can precede and even create social realities. 
For example, the ritualised handshake between two former 
protagonists can precede the reality of the reconciliation and even 
speed the arrival of it. Indeed, the symbol of the handshake is not to 
be separated from the reality of the reconciliation because symbol 
and reality can merge imperceptibly into one another. The ritualised 
courtesies of the fencing match or martial arts fight function in a 
similar manner. The symbol of courtesy before a contest reminds 
the fighters of the humanity of their foe. 
Douglas argues that to participate in symbolic activity is to 
allow oneself to be subjected to three processes. That is to say, 
participation in symbolic activity permits the processes to be subject 
while the human being is object. Firstly it can focus attention on a 
particular object. To shake hands is to be forced to dwell on the fact 
that reconciliation is inevitable or desirable. Secondly, symbolic 
enactment is a device which simply reminds one of something. To 
shake hands is to be reminded of the desirability or inevitability of 
reconciliation. Thirdly, one's experiences are controlled, limited and 
even created by enacting the symbol. If one shakes hands then part 
of the external process of reconciliation has occurred and one 
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because of the external event. In other words, in certain 
circumstances, an external event can precede a corresponding 
internal event. In our example, reconciliation was enacted 
symbolically and externally and this enactment both preceded and 
made more likely internal reconciliation. 
We have continued to operate with the language of 
internality and externality here while implying that it would be 
desirable to compress the duality into the single phenomenon of 
reality. Douglas' 'natural symbols' are not the constructs of the 
human mind, because they not only precede the mind but also act 
as a very powerful constraint upon the mind. Douglas has distanced 
herself from the evolutionary method of interpreting 'primitive 
religion' of Robertson Smith and proposed her own explanation for 
the ritual activity of 'primitive religions' and, of course, of modern 
societies and religions. 
This explanation appears to conflate the common duality 
between external ritual, which is supposedly empty, and internal 
religion, which is supposedly genuine. The example of the 
handshake can be used to show how we would wish to explain 
human being. Rather than using idealist categories of subject and 
object, the conflation of symbol and intention in the handshake can 
be understood in terms of a physical act affecting the nature of the 
relationship between the two individuals. The symbol embodies the 
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reality it symbolises - reconciliation between two individuals. By 
engaging in a physical act of reconciliation which precedes the 
mental acknowledgement of reconciliation, a change in the 
relationship between the individuals is nevertheless brought about. 
The two individuals, despite the lack of a change in their mental 
attitude to one another have changed because of the physical 
movement. This example summarises our philosophical thesis. 
Being is located in relations and physical and particular 
phenomena are as important as mental phenomena. Place is 
important because it can function as a focus for the issue and 
because of the scale of the influence which place has on what 
things are. 
4.3.4 Implications of the Analysis for Place 
Douglas' comments are of interest to us for two reasons. 
Firstly, she appears to provide us with an example of the primary 
activity of an object. Place, in either its physical or sociological form 
could be said to operate in the same manner as external ritual, 
namely as a powerful constraint upon the activity of human beings. 
Furthermore, this constraint would operate before human beings 
are able to act. Thus the subjectivity of place would be preserved. 
Following Douglas, place might also operate in three ways. 
Firstly, it might act as a focussing agent. It might direct the 
attention of an individual human being to both the particular place 
in which he is located and to the human being himself. The human 
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being would be alerted to his context as being placed in this place 
at this particular time, with ail the particularity that this would entail. 
For example, it could be said that to notice a prominent statue in a 
market square will focus one's attention on the uniqueness of the 
particular place in which the statue stands and in the unique social 
place one occupies . 
Secondly place might act as a mnemonic symbol enabling 
the human being to link his past with his present by observing the 
particularity of the place in which he finds himself. This will alert him 
to his past because differences between places will be recognised. 
Dislocation between past and present will be mediated through the 
perception of different places because the particularity of those 
places, and the differences between them, will become apparent. 
For example, a human being who now lives in a different place will 
see a different statue, or perhaps no statue at all, in the square. 
Similarly the same geographical place will change through time so 
that, perhaps, the surroundings of the statue will have altered a 
great deal and, as a result, dislocation will be felt. It is entirely 
possible of course, that with respect to the place, very little 
dislocation will be felt because the place will have remained similar 
over a long period of time. 
Thirdly however, place would control, limit and even create 
human being. Place acts as a constraint upon the activity of human 
beings simply because attention is focussed upon the particularity 
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of their location in space and time. This necessarily limits the activity 
of human beings. Certain things will be impossible in particular 
places while they will be, or will have been possible in another 
place or time. We have already seen that location and social 
placing are often very closely related and both may limit human 
freedom because human activity is limited; it is, to a certain extent, 
controlled. As we discovered above, Douglas has shown that when 
something such as a place functions symbolically it can also give 
rise to new responses in human beings. The statue for example, 
might inspire, encourage or disturb. 
It is an important feature of these observations that places 
can be used by the powerful to control or influence those over 
whom they have power. The most substantial, awe-inspiring 
buildings have been cathedrals or palaces and, in modern cities, 
the offices of multi-national corporations, banks and other financial 
institutions. In the 'English village' the church is a powerful symbol 
of both God and an idealised social structure marked by order, 
stability and rootedness. Part of the power possessed by the church 
is due to its size; being the dominant building in the village it will 
function in a symbolic manner as Douglas suggests. 
As we have seen, the Victorian town hall, by its location, 
architecture and sheer size communicated the message which the 
benefactors of the building and powerful men of the town wished to 
pass on to the less powerful in the community. To observe the place 
Page 113 Institutionality and Place 
is to observe the skyscraper, the timeless church and the massive 
symbol of order, thrift and philanthropy It is to be reminded of, and 
to focus upon, a way of perceiving the world, in all its complexity, 
and to internalise the external symbols. Part of what it is to be a 
human being is to be affected by the physical elements and the 
sociological make-up of a place in the same way as we suggested, 
following Douglas, that one would be closer to reconciliation simply 
by shaking hands with one's protagonist. 
4.3.5 The Primacy of Culture 
For Douglas all phenomena are interpreted by criteria which 
are heavily prescribed by the social grouping to which an individual 
belongs. She writes: 
It is not impossible for an individual to revise his own 
personal scheme of classification. But no individual lives 
in isolation and his scheme will have been partly 
received from others. 
A private person may revise his pattern of assumptions or 
not. It is a private matter But cultural categories are public 
matters. They cannot so easily be subject to revision.'' 
Culture is part of the dynamic of place construction. Shared ideas 
not only form the lens through which a place is interpreted but they 
also prescribe what is viewed and help to construct the very object 
which is being viewed. In other words, the institutions and history of 
a culture are a part of the complex forces which operate to produce 
the place for society. In this sense a place is a product of society 
constructed historically, institutionally and symbolically by the 
'"M. Douglas, Purity and Danger, ibid, p. 38-39. 
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culture located at a specific set of spatio-temporal co-ordinates. 
Individuals are organised into groups and classes within a place by 
the culture and the institutionalised power of politics and 
economics. 
Economic power is used to segregate the classes. It is used 
to preserve the political position of those who hold power by 
providing the resources for the construction of buildings which 
become symbols of the desirability and inevitability of maintaining 
the status quo. It is an important part of the account of how people 
operate in places. People themselves are active agents in a society 
which they help shape through the mediation of a culture which 
they help to form. Place is one of those elements of both culture and 
society which are a product of culture and society. However, as we 
have suggested above place also acts as a constraint upon culture 
and society and thus, through feedback mechanisms, place is both 
produced by society and culture and helps to produce them. This is 
as Berger and Douglas, seeking to conflate the observations of 
Durkheim and Weber, maintain with respect to human beings and 
society. 
Douglas maintains that symbol and 'reality' are closer 
together than is usually suggested and that symbols are necessary 
elements of all cultures. Thus, it is inevitable that all societies will 
contain a symbolic element. The attempt to dispose of a set of 
symbols is simply to remove one set of symbols which are 
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recognised and to replace them with another set which are not. 
Furthermore, Douglas argues that symbols will often use bodily 
imagery or activity as vehicles for meaning. In doing so the body 
takes the meaning of the symbol. It was this process that was at 
work in the handshake example given above. 
However, as early as the introduction of Natural Symbols 
Douglas writes "... each person's religion has to do with himself 
and his own autonomous needs.'"' This indication of a notion of an 
autonomous individual who is free to make decisions unaffected by 
constraints is more an indication of Douglas' intention to avoid the 
full implications of a determinist position in sociological explanation. 
In doing so however, she often finds it difficult to admit of any 
objective agency. Her criticisms are often valid but the solutions are 
not necessarily the only reasonable ones available which will 
account for the relationships between human beings located in 
particular places and between those places and the human beings 
in them. An example of this from Douglas' sympathies with 
phenomenology will serve as both explanation and criticism. 
Addressing the appropriateness of phenomenological 
analysis Douglas makes some predictable and valid criticisms of 
" Wolff has investigated at lengtii the body imagery of the Old Testament. In 
the Old Testament such imagery would appear to function as an illustration of the 
text, as an illustration of what it means to be a human being and as a coded 
description of Hebrew culture. Bodily imagery is therefore functioning as a natural 
symbol and is related to the social system. See H. W. Wolff, Anthropology of the 
Old Testament, SCM, London, 1973, ET 1974. 
'°M. Douglas, Natural Symbols, ibid.,p. 26. 
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the way in science operates. She comments that such scientific 
techniques which are popularly conceived as true science do not 
take account of subjective experience. It was this observation which 
inspired phenomenological geography. She remains primarily 
concerned to avoid implying that constraints determine individual 
behaviour when she argues that: 
For the sake of living together in peace, each society will 
combine the active voice and the passive voice in 
different measures, to make harsh judgments acceptable 
to unfortunate persons ...'^ 
This mutuality is a device of individuals who, in a Hobbesian 
manner, choose to cooperate for their own benefit. In defining a 'full 
programme for a sociology of religion' she writes: 
... the interaction of human agents must be its subject; 
and in so far as they choose beliefs, they choose their 
institutional forms and try to make sense of them, 
justifying their choices at the same time.^ 
Here it is admitted that the choice of belief may not be free but that, 
at the same time, judgments about the nature of belief are made by 
individuals. 
The delicate balance between the uniqueness of human 
beings for 
Among all living beings, humans are the only ones who 
actively make their own environment, the only ones 
whose environment is a cultural construct.^' 
'°M. IDouglas, 'Passive Voice Theories in Religious Sociology', in In The 
Active Voice, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1982, p. 10. 
^ M. Douglas, "Passive Voices Theories in Religious Society', in In The Active 
Voice, ibid., pp. 11-12. 
M. Douglas, In The Active Voice, ibid., p. 189. 
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and the constraining activity of physical forms, institutions, and 
unconscious existential experience is clearly difficult to strike. The 
primary criticism of Douglas is that her system does not permit her 
to strike the balance in the most convincing manner As we shall 
see in the final chapter, a notion of being based in relationships and 
not in discrete subjects and objects would unify Durkheim and 
Weber in a way which both Berger and Douglas desire and would 
also make it possible to speak of a socially placed human being 
who both influences the social place occupied while being shaped 
by that place. 
4.4 CONCLUSION 
We have shown that a place is the locus of social formation, 
organisation and stratification. In any place human society is 
organised and the rules and patterns of this organisation are learnt 
by young people as they develop into adults. The variations 
between individuals and groups of people are reflected in a spatial 
pattern which both reflects and strengthens the social structure of 
the place. Places are therefore integral to social structure. 
Institutions regulate human behaviour, mediate social structure and 
influence the physical form of the place. In turn they too are 
modified by human behaviour, social structure and the constraints 
or opportunities afforded by the physical form of the place. 
The relation between place and society usually occurs in 
symbolic forms. The buildings, layout and organisation of the place. 
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its physical form, contains cultural statements about the nature of 
the society which built them. The existential insider will read these 
symbolic statements correctly and will consequently, 'know his 
place'. The outsider will not always understand the language being 
used. So places both result from and help form the social 
organisation of human beings. The social structure which human 
beings create creates for itself the physical structure which reflects 
itself but which goes on to influence and even change it. 
The so-called free autonomous individual would have to be 
free of any social structure as well as to remain placeless if he was 
to remain free. But, any socialised individual acquires a social 
structure and a place in it, and any social structure is necessarily 
acquired in a place. And this place with its social structure then acts 
as an agent restricting the freedom and autonomy of the individual. 
All people have a place in society and a place in the world in which 
they either belong or to which they are an outsider. 
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APPENDIX 
N. K. GOTTWALD: PLACE AS SOCIAL AGENT - THE 
EXPERIENCE OF THE ISRAELITES 
Gottwald is interested in forms taken by Israelite society and 
the effect these had on the religious beliefs adopted by the society.^^ 
Gottwald's study lies in a field where gaining access to 'what 
actually occurred' is highly problematic. The nature of the evidence 
is such that schools of thought are likely to wax and wane through 
time and they will be as much an expression of their time as they 
are likely to approach the truth. Fortunately, however, our case does 
not stand or fall upon the accuracy of Gottwald's work. Even if it 
were to become unfashionable - and Mayes, for example, raise 
some major questions" - we would not need to change our 
argument. 
He maintains that the land allotment traditions of Judges 
probably emerged in the rise of the monarchical period. He cites 
three major reasons: firstly, because the tribal holdings represent 
the natural socio-economic division of premonarchical Israel which 
were simply transformed into administrative districts under the 
monarchy; secondly because the new 'tribal' areas helped 
assimilate previously Canaanite and Philistine areas into the 
Kingdom of Israel; and thirdly because 
The "boundaries," which had once existed between tribes 
simply as the points where the people of one tribe lived 
contiguously with the people of another tribe, now 
became political dividers for designating the internal 
^*N. K. Goflwald, The Tribes of Yahweh, SCM, London, 1980. 
^^See A. D.H. Mayes, Judges, TSOT Press, Sheffield, 1985, pp. 69ff., 
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articulation of the centralised state apparatus.^'' 
Gottwald's three reasons, which he uses to support his 
suggestion that the compiling of the land allotment traditions was 
retrospective, raises three interesting features of place when it 
functions as an agent or an instrument for socialization. Firstly, 
Gottwald suggests that the sociological (tribal) grouping acquired a 
physical expression as well as a communal expression. The third 
point below makes a similar suggestion. Indeed, one might argue 
that the nature of the sociological grouping required a physical 
expression as well as a sociological one. In other words tribal 
groupings, and perhaps other sociological units as well, must have 
or must acquire for themselves, units of space, their place, which 
they make and which makes them. Failure to possess land, or roots, 
that is, to be without a sense of place in this sense, will leave the 
tribe rootless in every sense because it will have no positive means 
by which it can enter into the relational nature of reality - both the 
created physical world and the created sociality of human beings. 
This is one of the most important functions of territoriality. 
Secondly, when any force, internal or external, leads to a 
conscious concretization and expression in physical place or 
territory, then, by its very delineation, the power of the governing or 
guiding force grows dramatically. The territory can function as a 
magnet or gravitational pull by focusing identity inwards upon itself. 
='N. K. Gottwald, op. cit, p. 182. 
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The establishment of a territory has then the effect of heightening 
the sense of group identity, self-consciousness and idiosyncracy. 
The territory here can be seen, in a relational understanding of 
reality as the point in space and time in which the created world 
and the society which human beings must, by definition, form, 
become united in a single entity. The territory "the place' is occupied 
by 'placed' human beings. 
Having a territory will encourage the group to defend its 
territory against external attack and against internal minorities; 
racism, for example, can be described as a defence by the group 
against a perceived threat which is increased by the presence of an 
apparently distinct grouping within the territory, because 'their 
territory' becomes an expression of themselves. In other words, 
having a territory governs choices and actions which the group 
makes. The group will be more likely to provide for itself foci for 
political, religious or cultic activity because they function as an 
expression of self-identity. The territory becomes an identifiable 
possession of one group and not only leads to the oppression of 
minority groups both within and without the land. It can also 
encourage the oppression of the territory for a group may feel that it 
'owns' the land and may therefore act towards it in any way which it 
chooses. This tendency is seen in the exploitation of the land in 
modern societies. 
Thirdly as we have seen, the power associated with place is 
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an important theme. Gottwald suggests that the monarchy was able 
to control its empire by creating sub-territories each of which was 
jealously guarded by sub-tribes. Nationalistic or tribal identity can 
be fostered by a strong sense of identity with the land and with a 
particular social tradition and cultural idiosyncracies. Such an 
identity can also lead to the emergence of local rivalries and 
tensions which are due to the uniqueness of physical place and 
social and cultural history which each nationality or tribe enjoys. 
The land functioned for the tribes as a means by which their 
identity as a single theo-political unit was enhanced, their control 
over the physical space was consolidated and their internal political 
structure was developed. Here place is defined in relation to 
particular spatial and temporal coordinates, to a particular group of 
people who are considered insiders and in distinction (that is, in a 
negative relationship) from other particular groups of people who 
are considered outsiders. We may also observe that, in turn, the 
particular group of people are also defined in relation to a particular 
area of land. To describe either the land or the people without the 
other would be nonsense. 
Gottwald unwittingly gives an example in which the 
interaction between an area of land - a place - and a social group -
in which all members are placed - define one another. Neither could 
be said to be described fully without reference to the other. The 
being of each exists in the relation which exists between them (and 
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many other things) and not discretely 'inside' either. In this way a 
change in the land or in the society will result in a change in the 
other. The land and the society, in so far as they can be said to exist 
independently of one another, both operate as agents. This can 
help to explain the devastating nature of the exile for the Israelites. 
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PART TWO 
Place in Theological Perspective 125 
A Relational Ontology for theTheology of Place 163 
PLACE IN THEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
!n the second part of this thesis we will turn our attention to 
specifically theological ways in which the issue of place may be 
addressed. In the first part of the thesis we have considered three 
ways in which human beings relate to and with place and 
understandings of the operation of human beings which, in part at 
least, reflect one or more of these ways. In this part of the thesis we 
will deal with specifically theological ways of considering issues 
which the issue of place focuses. Through this discussion we will 
evolve a framev/ork within which our previous discussions can be 
placed. 
We are required to continue to work with a number of 
distinctions simultaneously. First, there is a distinction between a 
physical place, the geographical environment of shape, form and 
space, and a social space, the location occupied by an individual in 
a socially and politically organised community. Second, there is a 
distinction between the general and the particular. The particularity 
of a location in space or in a community must be acknowledged if 
any account of what it is to be placed or of the operation of place is 
to be complete. Third, we continue to work with the ontological 
distinction between a philosophy in which all existent objects are 
discrete and in which being is located deep within the object, and a 
philosophy in which all existent objects are related to one another 
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in such a way that being is located in the relations between existent 
objects. 
These distinctions are addressed in a discussion of the way 
in which God and the created order, physical and social, interrelate. 
A full discussion is impossible but a distinction is made for 
convenience and brevity between a sacramental and a non-
sacramental understanding of the manner in which God is present 
and reveals himself in the created order. This distinction is 
addressed through a critique of the work of Torrance and Boff. 
Torrance and Boff are discussed in this chapter because, in 
their very different ways, they both give theology a place within 
knowledge. The incarnation is at the heart of both theologies and it 
is human activity which makes possible the presence of God. 
Furthermore, Torrance discusses space as well as time and 
develops the notion of a single spatio-temporal realm for the 
description of the location of ail physical objects. This enables us to 
explain the uniqueness of each placed object more clearly. With 
other exponents of liberation theology Boff is anxious to develop a 
regional theology which is valid only because it is an expression of 
the People of God in a particular locality. He has been criticised by 
other Roman Catholic Theologians, especially orthodox thinkers 
because this aspect of liberation theology is perceived as a threat to 
the universality of the teaching of the Church. 
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The role accorded to theology can only be a backdrop to the 
discussion of this chapter. For Torrance theology is the pinnacle of 
all knowledge offering the hermeneutic by which the rationality of 
the universe can be observed. Boff, by contrast, is willing only to 
grant theology an equal status with other academic disciplines 
because it shares with them an interest in the human condition. The 
manner in which theology is contextualised either by offering the 
crucial hermeneutic 'from above' or by sharing similar concerns 
'from alongside', is a symbol of the debate with which we are 
engaging in this chapter. The dominance of theology, and more 
particularly the incarnation, is like the centralising tendencies in 
Roman Catholicism which have challenged Boff's regional 
theology; this is illustrated by his placing theology alongside other 
academic disciplines. 
5.2 S PATIO-TEMPORALITY: THE WORK OF T. F. 
TORRANCE 
5.2.1 Introduction 
Much of Torrance's work is directed at the question of the 
nature of knowledge both in terms of its constitution and the manner 
in which it is to be apprehended. He is concerned to unite 
theological and 'natural' science and to present all knowledge as a 
unified and interdependent whole. The key to understanding this 
whole lies in a correct response to what is revealed. For Torrance, 
such a response requires the interpretation of what is revealed in 
the light of the fact of the resurrection. There are a number of 
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important themes in Torrance's work which are of interest to us and 
which inform his attempts to integrate natural science and theology. 
These attempts give us a relational category - the four dimensional 
and highly dynamic spatio-temporal realm - which is of 
considerable interest.' 
At the outset we should mention Torrance's desire for an 
open and respectful attitude to the created order which is of the 
same kind as that accorded to God. Following Polanyi's work on the 
"multi-levelled structure of human knowledge'^ and the demise of 
the deterministic, Newtonian understanding of reality, Torrance 
argued that it is necessary to adopt an open attitude to the 
contingent order. Such an attitude does not view the contingent 
order in a fixed, static or closed manner but, rather, understands 
explanations of the contingent order to be provisional, partial and to 
some degree relative. It is only then, when operating in an a 
posteriori fashion that the human ability to formulate patterns which 
interpret the self-revealing reality is able to formulate patterns in an 
accurate manner. The intuitive development of integrated 
explanations depends upon theoretical elements which belong at a 
'higher level' than the phenomenon for which an explanation is 
sought. Ultimately one is led from a humble obsen/ation of what the 
intelligible universe reveals to a dependency upon the self-
' We have drawn here on the following books by Torrance: Theology in 
Reconstruction; Space, Time and Incarnation; Theological Science; Theology in 
Reconciliation; Space, Time and Resurrection; Divine and Contingent Order 
^ See T F. Torrance, Space, Time and Resurrection, Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, 
Michigan, 1976, p. 188-191. 
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revelation of the Creator God.^ 
Torrance suggests that scientific thought has developed in a 
number of ways which are highly significant. He argues that 
theology should take note of these developments for two reasons. 
Firstly, knowledge is a single integrated whole and, therefore, 
theology must take account of developments in other fields of 
knowledge. Secondly important developments in scientific thought 
offer theology new categories for its own thought, offering 
resolutions to long-standing tensions between science and 
theology and contributing to the development of a new cosmology. 
We may sketch out three of these developments before devoting 
some time to a fourth - the four dimensional space-time continuum. 
5.2.2 Paradigm Changes in Science 
Firstly then, Torrance suggests that science is a contribution 
to a new 'concept of reality'. In this new concept there has been a 
move away from deterministic Newtonian science based upon 
causality Torrance characterises this move writing that the old 
distinction between "real, mathematical time and space" and "the 
apparent and relative time and space" of our "ordinary experience" 
is replaced by 
a new concept of reality in which that kind of dichotomy is 
transcended and in which structure and matter, or the 
^ It is possible to begin to argue here that the transcendent nature of the being 
of God is closely related to the Immanence of God in creation. We might argue that 
It is possible to move from an observation of the immanence of God to the 
realisation of the transcendence of God. This move could be made on the basis of 
the hierarchical basis of knowledge which Torrance takes up from Polanyi. In 
Chapter Six we will attempt a similar exercise based on a different argument. 
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theoretical and empirical components of knowledge, are 
inseparably one.'' 
There are two important consequences of this revolution in 
scientific philosophy which are of interest to us here. Firstly, a 
particular thing or event must be considered on its merit rather than 
being analysed in terms of its accordance with the prevailing 
systems. The result of this is that things or events which are 
unusual, or indeed completely new, such as - and this is Torrance's 
concern here - the resurrection, are not rejected as 
misinterpretations simply by virtue of their novelty.^ This is an 
example of the 'open' attitude to the contingent order at work. 
Secondly and closely related to the proposed methodology 
of particularity, things and events are not so much discrete objects 
occupying particular volumes of space and lengths of time as 
discrete bodies which must by their nature possess a variety of 
relationships. The crucial philosophical development is that these 
relationships are no longer a matter of cause and effect; 
relationship has become an ontological category. In other words, all 
things and events are partly defined by relationship. Thus 
relationship is no longer a way of explaining how something came 
"T. F.Torrance, Space, Time and Resurrection, ibid., p. 184. 
^ There is a tension in Torrance here between his desire to incorporate the 
qualitatively new into scientific knowledge without the need to integrate it into the 
dominant causality-based system, and his suggestion that interpretations of reality 
while open to what reality has to say must be related to the theories of truth of 
earlier generations. For each generation to produce theories which function as 
"disclosure models' must limit the degree to which the genuinely qualitatively new 
can emerge. This debate is, in essence, very similar to that on pages 70ff in 
Chapter Three between the analogical thought of Pannenberg and the primarily 
dialectical thought of Moltmann. 
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to be the way it is but rather, it is a way of describing what 
something is. It is therefore, altogether more dynamic, fluid and 
elusive. This notion of non-substantive being is highly particular for 
only one set of relations can constitute any particular being by 
definition, because any particular being is defined by the particular 
set of relationships by which it is constituted. 
Torrance describes the new 'concept of reality' thus 
... and since the emergence of relativity theory [this - the 
old concept of causal reality] has had to give way to a 
profounder and more differential view of reality in which 
energy and matter, intelligible structure and material 
content, exist in mutual interaction and 
interdetermination. This is a dynamic view of the world as 
a continuous integrated manifold of fields of force in 
which relations between bodies are just as ontologically 
real as the bodies themselves, for it is in their 
interrelations and transformations that things are found to 
be what and as and when [and, we might add, where] 
they are. They are to be investigated and understood not 
by reference to a uniformity of causal patterns abstracted 
from the actual fields of force in which they exist, but in 
accordance with their immanent relatedness in the 
universe and in terms of their own inherent dynamic 
order.® 
Torrance discusses the "multi-levelled structure of human 
knowledge", a major theme in the work of both Einstein and 
Polanyi. Here it is suggested that scientific knowledge, which 
includes theological science, operates at least three levels: the 
physical, the theoretical and the meta-theoretical.^ These levels are 
*T. F. Torrance, Space, Time and Resurrection, ibid., p. 185. 
^ Such distinctions are misleading for these levels are not discrete and separate 
but are highly dependent upon each other and are difficult to distinguish from each 
other. 
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hierarchical and a higher level of analysis will often bring meaning 
and coherence to otherwise confusing and incoherent 
circumstances. For Torrance, God, understood through Christ and 
the resurrection, forms the ultimate level for all knowledge. 
Thirdly however, Torrance does not understand knowledge in 
a constructionist sense. For him the multi-levelled structure of 
knowledge reflects a multi-levelled structure of reality itself. Here 
Torrance reveals a preoccupation with understanding the Vr/hole. 
Despite indications discussed above to the contrary, he argues that, 
as scientific understanding advances, an intelligible rationality 
within the universe is revealed which points towards a transcendent 
and awe-inspiring reality which meets us as subjects. He writes 
All created things have a significance of their own which 
invites inquiry, but this is a significance which we find to 
intensify the higher up the scale of existence we move. As 
the universe becomes progressively disclosed to our 
scientific inquiries it is found to be characterised by an 
intrinsic intelligibility of an ever deepening dimension 
which far outranges our powers of comprehension, 
invoking from us awe and wonder Moreover, we become 
aware of being confronted in and behind it all with a 
transcendent reality over which we have no control but 
which, while utterly independent of our minds, has an 
infinite capacity for revealing itself to them in quite 
unanticipated ways.' 
We see an explicit attempt to return to a re-expressed notion 
of the hierarchy of being. This acknowledged, it is not surprising that 
the particularity which appeared to be dominant in the new concept 
of reality is hardly present at all. There is a move away from the 
*T F. Torrance, Space, Time and Resun-ection, ibid., p. 191. 
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particularity of the thing or the event, through the integrating system 
of knowledge towards the self-revealing Creator God. What we find 
here is not a developed notion of creation but an understanding of 
the rationality of the incarnation. Consequently, science is not an 
outworking of a theology of creation in which the rich variety of 
creative provision, in which the inherent rationality of the created 
order can be discerned and in which, through the presence of the 
Spirit of God, the particularity of each thing or event is affirmed and 
celebrated, but a preparation for a theology of the incarnation into 
which the totality of scientific knowledge is integrated. We will see 
below that this notion of science, and the theology of creation and 
the understanding of the way in which God is present in creation 
which underpins it, is too narrow. 
We have seen that major changes in the scientific 
understanding of the ways in which knowledge functions and the 
way in which reality is to be perceived have occurred during the 
middle part of the twentieth century. In summary, these changes 
have been concerned with the interrelated nature of both reality and 
knowledge. For Einstein, Polanyi and Torrance, reality and 
knowledge function with a series of three levels arranged 
hierarchically but, and this is the most important point, 
interdependently. No one level can do without the others. Similarly, 
the new concept of reality maintains that all things and events are 
related at an ontological level with a variety of other things and 
events in a highly complex but dynamic continuum of interactions 
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and interdependencies. It is therefore, impossible to speak of any 
thing or event without also speaking of the relationships that the 
particular things or events have with other things and events. This is 
so because these relationships are ontological descriptions not 
causal explanations. The fourth development in science concerns 
the application of this relational concept of reality to the spatio-
temporal realm. 
5.2.3 Greek Notions of Space 
in the preface to Space, Time and Incarnation Torrance 
states that his purpose in publishing the book is threefold: 
(i) to lay bare the ground on which modern Protestant 
theology has attempted to detach the message of the 
Christian Gospel from any essential relation to the 
structure of space and time; (ii) to examine the place of 
spatial and temporal ingredients in basic theological 
concepts and statements and to clarify the 
epistemological questions they involve; (iii) to offer a 
positive account of the relation of the incarnation to space 
and time, by penetrating into the inner rational structure of 
theological knowledge and letting it come to articulation 
within the context of modern scientific thought.^ 
This aim is pursued through a critique of the receptacle notion of 
space in Christian thought. Such a critique is rare for theologians 
have traditionally been much more interested in time than in space. 
Torrance suggests that there are three main ways in which 
the receptacle notion of space, and by implication also of time, was 
developed by Greek thought. The simplest solution to the questions 
posed by the problem of space was proposed by Plato. For Plato, 
^T F.Torrance, Space, Time and Incarnation, OUR London, 1969, p. v. 
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Torrance argues, space is a receptacle of the most rudimentary 
kind, having existence only in the sense that space must be said to 
exist if physical objects can be said to exist. Physical objects must 
exist somewhere or in something - and the somewhere or the 
something in which they exist is space. Clearly however, one 
cannot ascribe materiality to space because space itself would 
then become a physical object itself and would have nowhere in 
which to exist. The receptacle which is space is therefore entirely 
passive; it has no limits of any kind and it does not contribute to 
objects in any way at all. 
Space is the servant of the object and cannot act as a 
constraint upon it. Space is also necessarily cosmological because 
it is through the medium of space that an object is related to its 
archetype. It is because an object is 'in space' that it can be said to 
point to the reality beyond itself. Torrance describes this as bridging 
the separation or chasm (x(apio\ioo) between the realms 
of the intelligible and the sensible (the vorixa and the 
a'toStiTa).'° 
The implications of this position are clear. Space is nothing more 
than a medium for the material manifestation of the real. The 
extreme position of early Christian aesthetes in which the body was 
seen simply as a container for the mind is closely related to this 
Platonic cosmology. A tradition of Platonic dualism, regularly 
represented in new forms, remains in the Christian, and especially 
in the Protestant, tradition. 
^°T. F. Torrance, Space, Time and Incarnation, ibid., p. 5. 
Page 135 Place in Theological Perspective 
In the early part of the thirteenth century more of the writings 
of Aristotle became available in Latin translation. They greatly 
influenced the young Aquinas and, following his massive 
contribution to the theological tradition, it is Aristotle, rather than his 
teacher Plato, who has been the greater influence upon Roman 
Catholic theology. Aristotle understood the "chasm between the 
realms of the intelligible and the sensible" not as a qualitative 
distinction but as a quantitative separation. Therefore the 
separation between the 'intelligible and sensible' was to be 
understood only in spatial terms. The result of this change is 
dramatic for the intelligible and the sensible, which in Plato were 
radically dissimilar, are now in Aristotle of the same kind. Both exist 
in the spatio-temporal realm. They are related in a material sense 
and therefore also in an ontological sense. Aristotle went further 
than this. He maintained that the receptacle itself was also related 
ontologically to the material of the intelligible and the sensible and, 
indeed, it was the origin of all materiality. The consequence of this is 
that there can, by definition, be no 'empty space' and, therefore, 
space is limited and finite. 
The Aristotelian legacy, Torrance argues, has been to 
establish distinctions which arise out of the static nature of finite 
space. A static space makes anything genuinely new impossible 
because all material must merge out of the common pool of 
materiality which is already incorporated into what exists. The 
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notion of plenitude is essentially Aristotelian. Consequently, there is 
a gulf between the natural and the supernatural in Aristotelian 
cosmology which is just as great as that which results from a 
Platonic cosmology. However, the point and mode of linkage 
between the natural and supernatural realms in the Christian 
developments of these Greek traditions have proved very different. 
Torrance sees Stoic thought on space and time as a more 
fruitful resource for the modern thinker He draws attention to its 
distinction between that which is, that is space, and that which is 
not, namely nothingness or void. He summarises Chrysippus who, 
following the pattern later adopted by the ontological argument 
suggested that 
what is 'somatic' is limited or determinate and therefore 
capable of being thought, but what is 'not somatic' is 
indeterminate or unlimited and incapable of being 
thought.'' 
Attention is focussed by the Stoics on "what is somatic", and 
consequently the universe finds its unity in the material of which it is 
made. A more dynamic 'placeness' is now a possibility because the 
physical is not rejected (Platonic cosmology) or treated in a timeless 
and static fashion (Aristotelian cosmology), but is positively affirmed 
as the locus of activity and agency, and therefore of the inherent 
rationality of the universe in Stoic cosmology 
We must however, be more negative about the Stoic position 
that Torrance and point to some significant problems with the 
" T F Torrance, Space, Time and Incarnation, ibid., p. 9. 
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account and its implication. Torrance writes that for the Stoics 
The material universe is not held together, as Aristotle 
thought, by an exterior continent or an upper sphere 
which forces the parts to stay together, but by an interior 
cohesion or tension ( 'E | ia or xovoa) or by an immanent 
reason (Xoyoo), which manifests itself in the laws of 
nature as the determinate and rational structure of the 
universe.'^ 
Stoicism is therefore very close to immanentism. An immanentalist 
position will stress the immanence of God rather than or in 
preference to the transcendence of God. A variety of modern 
theologies attempt to do just this; and we will be devoting some 
attention to Moltmann's form of panentheistic immanentism in 
chapter six. However, it can also argue that explanation for 
phenomena are to be found in the world. An immanentist position 
will therefore, discount any explanation which includes God, or any 
other supernatural agent. This clearly is not Torrance's intention but 
there must be a concern that the rigidity of Stoic immanentism is 
incorporated into his understanding. Such a thorough-going 
immanentism is not a necessary position for, as we shall see in 
Chapter Six, by understanding transcendence and immanence as a 
single phenomena then it is possible to retain an immanental 
location for a transcendent God. In other words it is not nonsense to 
say that God is both transcendent and present in this place. If 
transcendence and immanence are considered terms to describe 
opposite sides of a single boundary it will be seen that 
transcendence and immanence can be located together. Each is 
not therefore the absence of the other but the locus of potential for 
'^T F. Torrance, Space, Time and Incarnation, ibid., p. 9 
Page 138 Place in Theological Perspective 
the other to exist. 
The wider implications of this incorporation are that, in a 
manner similar to that of naturalism, scientific understandings are 
used to interpret the events and phenomena of the universe when, 
as Torrance makes clear in his work on theological science, a wider 
hermeneutic which will include the agency of God, is needed. 
Newtonian science, with its emphasis on laws and causality, is a 
result of this sort of cosmology. The eighteenth century interest in a 
dualism between God and nature is closely related to the dualism 
between revelation and natural theology which has been common 
in theology. Such naturalistic scientific understandings are entirely 
legitimate but their role must be restricted to that of their place within 
the wider sphere. 
5.2.4 Torrance's Notion of the Spatio-temporal Realm 
Torrance is, as we have shown anxious to present a way in 
which theology can appropriate the contemporary natural scientific 
manner of understanding space and time. We have seen that he 
wishes to bring together natural science and theological science as, 
in his view, both are concerned with the same rational structure of 
divinely created and sustained reality. It is ultimately through God 
that all knowledge is made both rational and comprehensible. 
He begins by suggesting that 
... space and time therefore ... [is] the determinate and 
intelligible medium within which God makes Himself 
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present and known to us and within which our knowledge 
of Him may be formed and grounded objectively in God's 
own transcendent rationality'^ 
This statement gives us important indications of his argument. 
Firstly, it must be made clear that it is not, despite appearances, a 
retreat into the receptacle notion of space. Space and time are part 
of creation because spatio-temporality is relative and mediatory. It is 
not two absolute existents which encompass creation but it is, as a 
single event, part of creation. Secondly, as indicated, spatio-
temporality is a single four-dimensional realm. This is the reason for 
the awkward use of the singular when referring to space and time. 
The key to understanding spatio-temporality lies in the 
incarnation because it is the key to understanding God. For 
Torrance, it is in and through the incarnation that God has chosen to 
interact with the world and to establish a relationship between it 
himself. 
... the Incarnation together with the creation forms the 
great axis in God's relation with the world of space and 
time, apart from which our understanding of God and the 
world can only lose meaning.'" 
This position is rooted in Einstein's thought in which the Newtonian 
and Kantian view of absolute space and time are both rejected in 
favour of a relational notion of space-time. Space is defined in 
terms of material objects which act in their own agency and which 
are not dependent upon human operation. The concept of space-
time is therefore organic, dynamic and powerful and, by its ability to 
F. Torrance, Space, Time and Incarnation, ibid, p. 61. 
'"T. F.Torrance, Space, Time and Incarnation, ibid., p. 68. 
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link the abstract with the concrete, it also provides a link between 
natural and revealed theology Space-time is the medium of the 
incarnation and it is therefore through the space-time that God can 
be perceived not only as revealing himself but revealing himself in 
a physical form. 
According to Torrance, creation is held together by the 
relation structure of the events of spatio-temporality. These form the 
locus for God's activity with creation and, more particularly, with 
human beings. The 
... organised structure of space-time [is] ... kept open for 
a transcendent rationality that preserves its creatureliness 
and gives it meaning. 
In other words, spatio-temporality as relative event is the manner in 
which relations within creation are given reference. Furthermore 
however, and more importantly, it is also the manner in which 
relations between God and creation are given reference. The 
horizontal dimension of the spatio-temporal realm is intersected by 
the vertical dimension of relationship to God through the mediation 
of the Spirit. Creation keeps its dynamic, its history and its future 
because it is related in this dynamic manner to a dynamic Creator 
who takes on the limitations of space and time in his relation with 
his creatures. 
Our discussion above shows that this limitation does not 
imply the necessity of conforming to a strictly regular notion of 
'^T F. Torrance, Space, Time and Incarnation, ibid., p. 73. 
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space and time conceived in an absolute and unchanging manner 
because the "organised structure of space-time" is a structure of 
relational co-ordinates that occur within creation; and it is not a 
measure of an absolute reality It is this mistake which has, in part, 
led to the abstract division placed between the natural and the 
supernatural in which, for example, miracles are placed in the latter 
category - usually to their detriment. Perceiving the spatio-temporal 
realm in relational terms makes the previously clear-cut distinction 
between what can be considered 'natural' and what can be 
considered 'supernatural' much harder to make because the spatio-
temporal realm must be understood in a dynamic and open manner 
Central to Torrance's argument is that it is in the event of the 
incarnation that the intersection of the horizontal and vertical 
occurs. He writes that 
This relation established between God and man in Jesus 
Christ constitutes Him as the place in all space and time 
where God meets man in the actualities of his human 
existence, and man meets with God and knows Him in 
His own divine Being. 
In Jesus Christ, and because of the intersection of the horizontal 
and the vertical (the agent here is God), the futile meaninglessness 
of total relativity is prevented and contact is made with the 
ontological ground of human existence. 
The language of the horizontal and the vertical dimension 
avoids an existential interpretation because of the reality of the 
' 'T. R Torrance, Space, Time and Incarnation, ibid., p. 75. 
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event, but Torrance acknowledges that problems exist in providing 
a modern expression of the dynamic operative in the incarnation. 
He seeks to 
express the space-time of the Incarnation as a coordinate 
system of real relations." 
Through a critique of the application of his notion of space-time we 
will see both the richness of the notion of the relational four-
dimensional spatio-temporal realm and some of the problems 
which accompany Torrance's position. 
Torrance draws on the understanding of the Church Fathers. 
The Fathers understood 
... Jesus Christ in space and time as God's place in this 
world where He is present in our place. This is not to be 
treated as merely a metaphorical way of speaking, for this 
place is not a vacuum but location in the context of real 
being, divine and human. Jesus Christ is the place of 
contact and communication between God and man in a 
real movement within physical existence, involving 
interaction between God and nature, divine and human 
agency** 
Torrance, as we have seen, is optimistic that Stoic thought, which, it 
must be remembered, was also utilised by the second century 
apologists, can provide categories for the rehabilitation of 
theological science, at least in the area of space-time. His adoption 
of the analogy of two intersecting lines - the horizontal and the 
vertical - reveals the difficulty which he faces. We have seen that the 
implied naturalism of the Stoic position, despite Torrance's work in 
' 'T. F.Torrance, Space, Time and Incarnation, ibid., p. 77. 
'°T. F. Torrance, Space, Time and Incarnation, ibid., p. 78. 
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theological science, is a system which consists of rigid laws and 
causalities which are perceived to be accurate representations of 
'the way things are'. Torrance creates a series of rigid laws which 
concern the nature of the intersection between the horizontal and 
the vertical and which are incompatible with the relative nature of 
space-time. It is not possible to underpin the way in which 
knowledge works, as Torrance does, in a fixed and highly restrictive 
manner. It is necessary to see the activity of God in terms of a union 
of transcendence and immanence which occurs on a far wider and 
more open basis than Torrance is able to. 
We wish to locate such a wider basis in terms of the 
sacramental presence of God who, in such an understanding, is 
present, immanent in all things. As we shall see in Chapter Six, it is 
through such immanence that God's transcendence become 
possible. Furthermore, by understanding the interrelation of all 
things in a more fluid and dynamic manner not only are the laws 
which concern the nature of the intersection less rigid but also what 
constitutes God's activity becomes less easy to define. Torrance, 
however retains a non-sacramental noetic understanding of the 
presence of God which cannot locate the transcendence of God in 
things because it does not locate God in things at all. The 
consequence of this is that the presence of God is de-materialised 
because it is located in physical things only in terms of noetic 
possibility and, therefore, the rigid structure of knowledge which he 
proposes does not help to locate God. 
Page 144 Place in Theological Perspective 
For Torrance, the transcendent God becomes immanent in 
the event of the incarnation in all the richness of what this implies. 
He uses this event as the ontological basis for all scientific 
knowledge but does not acknowledge that science is the 
outworking of creation. It is for Torrance simply the preparation for 
understanding the incarnation in a more complete way. 
Paradoxically then, while accepting the immanentism of Stoic 
thought on space, Torrance is willing only to accept science as 
pointing noetically to the presence of God in creation and not 
sacramentally This important distinction, which lies at the heart of 
the revealed theology/natural theology dispute and which we 
consider to be an unnecessary dualism, has the effect of making 
places somewhere from which God is perceived noetically rather 
than somewhere in which God is found to dwell already. We will be 
developing this theme later in the chapter. 
This is neither to say that Torrance does not have a realist 
understanding of the presence of God nor to imply that his noetic 
understanding of the presence of God is not also ontological. 
However, the presence of God here, being located noetically, 
remains real but only in the mind of the thinker. It is in this sense a 
de-materialised real presence. Place is somewhere in which God 
dwells only by virtue of the noetic possibility of his indwelling. 
Where there is no noetic possibility there is no indwelling. 
Therefore, for Torrance, this makes human presence, and indeed 
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Judaeo-Christian presence both a precondition of and prior to the 
presence of God. 
5.2.5 Interim Conclusion 
In summary then, Torrance provides a system in which all 
knowledge is unified into a single interdependent whole. Such a 
system derives in part from the observation that physical objects are 
to be defined in a relational manner and not in the more traditional 
substantive fashion. Place therefore becomes a dynamic event in 
the single spatio-temporal realm, constantly changing and defined 
only inaccurately as a particular configuration of highly variable and 
interdependent relationships. The particularity of a place is 
therefore of primary importance. 
Torrance's system becomes theological because it is 
intelligible only when it is perceived in the light of the incarnation -
the key to understanding both God and the universe. However, 
Torrance's notion of the incarnation is highly static and non-
sacramental in the sense that it is made present in the mind of the 
believer and not in any other way. It is difficult for Torrance to allow 
for a qualitatively new future or for the high degree of fluidity which 
a relational ontology requires. This ontology demands a reduced 
sense of the substantive nature of being. It is necessary to retain an 
ontology which is substantive to the extent of acknowledging the 
independent existence of physically discrete objects but which is 
non-substantive in the sense that these objects exist in relationship 
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to other objects and that any description of the existence of an 
object without reference to its relations will be meaningless. 
A particular place, for example, has a real existence just as 
much as it has a name. However, what constitutes the place is a 
variety of relationships between physical objects, houses, trees, 
land, people and so on. Thus the place is, in one sense, the sum of 
these relationships. It has therefore a non-substantive existence. 
However, it is more than the sum total of these relationships for it 
can act as a single subject in a way which it cannot when 
understood purely as a set of interrelationships. It could therefore, 
be said to have a substantive existence. Nevertheless, this 
substantive existence is dependent upon the non-substantive for it 
can only be considered in this abstract substantive sense in a 
derivative and subsequent manner. Only as a relational nexus does 
a place have a substantive existence. Furthermore, the relational 
nexus is highly dynamic, it is constantly changing and doing so in a 
manner which makes such changes difficult to measure accurately 
or observe clearly Therefore such derivative substantive existence 
as a place can be said to have is necessarily only a partial and out-
dated summary of what that place is becoming. This does not make 
the substantive existence of place any less important except in so 
far as what constitutes 'more than the sum total of these 
relationships' is itself a highly fluid phenomenon. 
There can be no doubt that human beings tend to differentiate 
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between discrete substantive entities to a greater degree than is 
warranted. This is not only the legacy of ontological systems which 
encourage such a practice but it is a necessity. It is essential that 
human beings simplify their highly complex world. One way in 
which this is done is to impose a degree of discreteness upon 
phenomena in the world which they do not possess. 
For Torrance, God is made present by the mental activity of 
human beings who recognise the inherent rationality of the 
universe by reference to the incarnation. There is no element of 
symbol or sacrament in Torrance's notion of the presence of God 
which is unable to account for the immanence of God in any way 
which is prior to or independent of human beings. We prefer to 
argue however, that God is present by virtue of his creative activity 
and that the created world is a symbol of the God who made it. It 
therefore embodies the God to whom it points. As God is present in 
the world so he is present in this place, wherever this place may 
happen to be. A place becomes the location in which the presence 
of God is to be discovered. In the second part of this chapter we will 
consider the social organisation which human beings organise for 
themselves and offer a critique of a leading liberationist account of 
placedness. 
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5.3 PLACE AS A CONTEXT FOR A PARTICULAR 
THEOLOGY : THE WORK OF L. BOFF 
5.3.1 Introduction 
Places then, can be located in a four dimensional spatio-
temporal realm. It is the location and context of events. It can 
function as an active agent moulding the self-identity and the 
structure of a young society, and consequently it is not only the 
context for reality but part of reality itself. We assert that God, the 
creator of all things, must relate to place in some way. That is to say, 
that God must be present in places, or be made present in places 
by some mechanism. For Torrance, God is present through noetic 
possibility through the rationality of the created order, and 
supremely through incarnation - the event which gives meaning 
and rationality to all things. 
Leonardo Boff, a leading Roman Catholic Liberationist, 
shares much with Torrance but differs radically in his understanding 
of the nature of the presence of God in the world and in the 
importance he attaches to the particular. This theology introduces 
another way of understanding the possibility of a real presence of 
God in the world, and a genuinely particular and realist approach to 
the world. 
Boff shares with Torrance an integrated view of knowledge 
and of the centrality of the incarnation, but applies his incarnational 
theology in a very different way Torrance uses the incarnation to 
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show how the spatio-temporal realm is constituted and Boff uses it 
to incarnate secular thought and act(vity'^ By this we mean that 
Torrance is interested to show that the universe is a coherent and 
rational whole. He argues that it is only possible to do this if 
theology is allowed to take part in the scientific endeavour for only 
when the incarnation is placed at the pinnacle of the structure of 
knowledge does the rest of knowledge become intelligible and 
rational. Boff, by contrast, is not concerned with the rationality of 
knowledge but with the coherence of knowledge. That is to say, he 
is concerned not with knowledge itself but with the object of 
knowledge, namely the condition of human beings in the world. In 
his view, the incarnation does not so much complete knowledge by 
adding to it as complete it by being part of it. In other words, for Boff 
all knowledge incorporates the incarnation because the incarnation 
is present in all human activity, whereas for Torrance, the 
incarnation is present only at the pinnacle of the structure of 
knowledge and not immediately at all levels of the hierarchy 
The notion of integral liberation, which emerges out of 
Vatican II and the Medellin and Puebia documents, suggests that 
theology is related to all other academic disciplines and has a 
relevant interest in all aspects of life. In a commentary on the 
A similar process has occurred following Vatican II, in a variety of Roman 
Catholic liturgies which have been adapted to local, usually African pre-Christian 
rites, see for example: A. Barrett SPS, 'Incarnating the Church in Turkana', 
SpearheadSZ, 1978; and P. Tovey 'Inculturation: the Eucharist in Africa', 
Alcuin/Grove Liturgical Study?, 1988. Boff argues that inculturation can be seen 
as an attempt by a place at liberating itself from another place, see L. Boff & V. 
Elizondo, 'Theologies of the Third World", Concilium 199, 1988, L. Boff and V. 
Elizondogk (Ed). 
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Puebia Document in Salvation and Liberation Boff describes 
integral liberation as being concerned with all possible forms of 
liberation which might be conceived. It is maintained that any form 
of liberation must necessarily have a theological dimension. Vatican 
II, having broadened the notion of salvation to include not only 
traditional understandings of salvation history, but also more 
contemporary notions of anthropology and eschatology permits 
salvation to be defined as ". . . a process of liberation from situations 
that contradict God's salvlfic design."^" 
Boff adopts a conservative approach to the texts with which 
Gottwald deals but nevertheless stresses the need for theology and 
sociology to work together in considering the nature of Israel when 
it saw itself as the People of God.^' Therefore, in his view 
economics, sociology, anthropology, history, geography and so on 
must all have theological components because these disciplines 
are concerned with human beings. Furthermore, theology must also 
concern itself with economics, sociology and so on because it too is 
concerned with human beings. Place is therefore an important 
theological topic simply because it is an important topic. Places 
impinge upon human beings and, consequently, they are an 
appropriate subject of theological discourse. Making the content of 
these disciplines theological requires establishing the relevance of 
°^ L. & C. Boff, Salvation and Liberation: In Search of a Balance Between Faith 
and Politics, Trans. R. Barr, Orbis Books, Maryknoll, New York, 1985, p. 18. 
" See the use of Gottwald's study of the land allotment traditions of Judges in 
The Tribes of Yahweh, SCM, London, 1979, discussed at the end of Part One as 
an example of the plausibility of place acting as an agent. 
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discussion about God in the subject matter of these disciplines. We 
will see later that Boff maintains that God Is present in the world in a 
variety of ways which makes all discourse about human beings 
have a theological element and to be of interest to theology 
In his discussion of the sociological primacy of the people 
and the theological primacy of their self-awareness as the People of 
God, Boff makes few specific references to the territoriality of the 
People of God. His discussion of the covenant omits one of its 
primary elements - the land. The agency of the land is of great 
importance. Agency here means, as elsewhere that the land may 
act as a subject towards human beings. Boff does not have a well 
developed notion of the possibility of the land acting as agent in the 
way in which Gottwald suggests that the land acted in the formation 
of the settlement community of Israel. 
Vatican II has sought to reflect the particularity of the cultural 
context of the contemporary Christian and has adapted the term 
'People of God' to describe the world wide historical community of 
the faithful which, with its Old Testament reference, implies election 
and particularity. Boff summarises the teaching of Lumen Gentium 
in this way: 
For Vatican II the People of God only comes into 
existence when communities have a historical existence, 
the fruit of the incarnation of faith in the midst of the 
characteristics of each people. This is not a formal 
concept devoid of historical materiality It seeks to be a 
real and not a metaphorical designation of the Church; 
but for it to be a real designation there has to be the real 
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historical existence of a people which through its manner 
of organising itself in its Christian faith emerges as the 
People of God.'' 
5.3.2 Place and Particularity 
Boff's apparent lack of a territorial or spatial element to his 
incarnational theology is a common strand in much of his writing. 
His notion of the Kingdom is temporal not spatial. He writes 
The Kingdom is certainly the Christian Utopia that lies at 
the culmination of history. But it must be repeated that this 
Kingdom is found in the process of history wherever 
justice and fraternity are fostered and wherever the poor 
are respected and recognised as shapers of their own 
destiny All individuals, institutions and activities directed 
toward those ideals favoured by the historical Jesus are 
bearers of that Kingdom.'^ 
It is the "process of history" which concerns Boff and the "wherever" 
is the context within which "justice and fraternity are fostered" and 
"the poor are recognised as shapers of their own destiny". This 
appears to be a non-placed location of the Kingdom of God. The 
spatial context of integral liberation is of no consequence providing 
that liberation tending to justice is occurring. 
This impression is mistaken however, and it is mistaken for 
two reasons. Firstly, as we shall see later, Boff does refer to the land 
in addressing the image of the People of God as a model for 
understanding the church. Secondly however, it is mistaken 
because of Boff's use of language. For Boff, to be historical is to be 
L. Boff, 'A Theological Examination of the Terms "People of God" and 
"Popular Church"', in Concilium ^76, 1984, p. 93. 
Boff, Church, Charism and Power, SCM, London, ET 1985, p. 10 
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engaged in the ordinary realities of living. Place is not therefore a 
neutral backcloth it is a part of everyday life; it is historical. Place 
cannot therefore, be termed an independent sterile fact, but an 
event, like historical events, in that it is part of the warp and weft of 
all life, an integral element in the complex web of interrelationships 
which we have described above. 
In this way, Boff particularises and relativises place. It is 
particularised because each place is a unique phenomenon 
occurring at a unique time. This place, which is different to any other 
place, contributes to each unique event in the historical process; 
historical being understood as a spatio-temporal referent and not 
simply as a temporal term. In other words, each event is the coming 
together of a unique set of variables into a particular configuration. 
This coming together is a dynamic process and place is one of the 
variables. It is relativised because place is part of a web of 
interacting forces each element of which affects and is affected by 
the others. Each element therefore is constantly subject to change 
and any summary of what constitutes a particular element, place or 
time, must necessarily be provisional. 
His discussion here can be seen In terms of an intersection 
of horizontal 'events' in the spatio-temporal realm which involve a 
community with the vertical dimension of the incarnation which 
turns that community into the event of the People of God. Both 
Torrance and Boff are, in this sense, realists. However, as we shall 
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see below, discussion of this intersection reveals as much about the 
differences between them as it shows a degree of agreement. 
5.3.3 Place, Particularity and the Church 
We have seen above that Boff understands the Kingdom in 
terms of the presence of "activities directed towards ... ideals 
favoured by the historical Jesus". Apart from questions concerning 
the historical Jesus which do not concern us here, there is much in 
this statement about the nature and manner of God's self-revelation 
and presence. Traditional post-Trent Roman Catholic ecclesiology 
has understood the Church as "the guardian and conserver of 
revelation".'" Boff however, following the lead of Vatican II, and 
while not wishing to dismiss the notion of the institutional church, is 
anxious to redefine the manner in which the church is present in the 
world. 
By doing so, Boff changes the way in which God and the 
church are seen to be present but remains remarkably conservative 
in his understanding of the relationship between God and the 
church. That is to say, the indissoluble link between God and the 
church is preserved; where the church is, there is God and vice 
versa. What Boff introduces is the explicit suggestion that the church 
which is linked to God in this manner is not to be confused with the 
institutional Church which may, on occasion, be thwarting the 
realisation of liberation and thus standing in the way of the Kingdom 
^"A. Dulles, Models of the Church, Gill and MacMillan, Dublin, 2nd Ed. 1988, p. 
177. 
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of God. He suggests that 
In a theological sense, it can be said that the Church is 
the encounter of the community of the faithful, an 
encounter prompted by Christ and the Spirit to celebrate, 
deepen faith, and to discuss the questions of the 
community in the light of the Gospel. Church, in this 
primitive sense, is more an event that may take place 
beneath an oak tree, in the house of some coordinator, or 
within a church building, rather than an institution with all 
of its goods, services, laws, doctrines, ministries, and 
historical continuity* 
He is eager to affirm the particularity of the experience of the 
event and is in agreement with Torrance in his desire to show that 
the place of the intersection lies in the incarnation. But, as we have 
suggested, the manner in which Boff and Torrance understand the 
incarnation to be made manifest and perceived is very different. 
Neither understands the Kingdom of God to be attached to any 
particular place (in distinction to any other particular place) per se 
because places point to the Kingdom. It is the manner in which 
places point to the Kingdom which interests us and which separates 
Torrance and Boff. 
As we have seen, Torrance uses the incarnation to show how 
the spatio-temporal realm is constituted and, through the notion of 
noetic possibility, how human beings are linked in epistemological 
terms, to both the contingent reality of the spatio-temporal realm 
and to the self-presentation of divine reality By contrast, Boff is 
attempting to incarnate secular thought and activity by locating 
divine activity in events within the historical process of the spatio-
=^1. Boff, Church Charism and Power, SCM, London, ET 1985, p. 154-5. 
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temporal realm. He understands God, and therefore the church, to 
be present wherever "justice and fraternity are fostered" and "the 
poor are recognised as shapers of their own destiny". This does not 
depend upon an awareness of the presence of God in the midst of 
the activity wherein he dwells. Indeed God will be present in an act 
simply because of the nature of the act. This sacramental rather 
than noetic notion of the presence of God requires acts by human 
beings which recognise or make possible the presence of God. 
Here God is present in places where liberation occurs. 
Boff develops his theme in an analysis of the notion of the 
'People of God' - a concept which lies at the heart of post-Vatican II 
ecclesiology He suggests that the command to the Israelites to 
dwell as the People of God in a particular place, the promised land, 
was a command which gave identity value and meaning to the 
Israelite tribes. In the New Testament too, " . . . the new People of 
God was made up of the union and communion of a vast network of 
Christian communities spread throughout various peoples". 
Consequently for Boff, the People of God are not a fact but an 
event. In other words,"... they result from a process of communitary 
productive forces".^The People of God are therefore more of a 
social phenomenon than the institutional expression of a 
hierarchical Church. In Boff's view, the enthusiasm of Vatican II for 
the image of the People of God as a way of describing the Church 
^irBoff,' The Terms "People of God" and "Popular Church'", in ConcHium 
176, 1984, p. 91. 
" L. Boff,' The Terms "People of God" and "Popular Church"', in Concilium 
176, 1984, p. 93. 
Page 157 Place in Theological Perspective 
means that 
The model of the Church as a perfect society under the 
hegemony of the clergy leading to the pathology of 
clericalism, is giving way more and more to Church as a 
communications network structured round the 
participation of everyone, producing a true People of 
God.'' 
The event-fullness of the People of God means that the 
Church is not an absolute and objective institution but a contingent, 
subjective and evolving network of relationships. That is to say, in 
Boff's interpretation of the phrase, that the Church is located in 
particular places among particular people where the liberating work 
of God is seen and undertaken. It is therefore subjective in the 
sense that it is dependent upon the activity of people for its 
existence and it exists only where people are participating in the 
liberating work of God. It is not the universal institution of traditional 
Catholic ecclesiology which is, in its very being, the presence of 
God. Thus for Boff 
For the Church to become the People of God ... it must, 
primarily bring into focus ttiose characteristics that form 
a people: consciousness, community, and practices 
designed to enhance consciousness and the 
possibilities of participation and communion within the 
com m unity. 
This approach to the Church, born out of the insights of 
Vatican II and Boff's view of the interrelationship of theology with the 
social sciences is entirely consonant with his other theological 
^^L. Boff,' The Terms "People of God" and "Popular Church"', in Concilium 
176, 1984, p. 94. 
L. Boff,' The Terms "People of God" and "Popular Church"', in Concilium 
176, 1984, p. 93. 
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concerns. For Boff, the spatio-temporal particulanty of the 
incarnation is not to be seen as a qualitatively new act of God, but 
as a distinct but essentially similar expression of love towards his 
creation. 
... the eternal Son is at work within creation from its 
earliest moment, making creatures express their nature 
as sons and daughters. This Son is supremely at work in 
taking on the humanity of Jesus of Nazareth, in whom he 
communicates himself completely. The filial structure that 
pervades the whole of creation took on its most definite 
and supreme form in Jesus of Nazareth, because from all 
eternity he was planned and willed to be the vehicle for 
the full coming of the Son to his creation; this is the 
mystery of the incarnation.^" 
The incarnation is primarily the overflowing of the love of the Trinity 
beyond itself with creative activity which provides other beings with 
whom to be in open communion. The task of the Son, resulting from 
human sinfulness and seen most clearly in the spatio-temporality of 
the incarnation 
... consists in this immense process of liberation from the 
sin that hides the glory of the Father. So, as the Word 
goes on bringing in the Kingdom of life, liberty, 
reconciliation and peace, he redeems the sonship of all 
created beings, particularly of human beings in the 
position of captivity in which they now find themselves.^' 
Consequently, the Son is present in the world in a 
sacramental fashion as the mediator of liberation. It is not therefore, 
true to say that God is present in the world sacramentally per se , 
but only in the context of liberation, however broadly defined. In 
other words, human activity which furthers the liberation of human 
'°L. Boff, Trinity and Society, Burns and Gates, Tunbridge, ET 1988, p. 187. 
L. Boff, Trinity and Society Burns and Gates, Tunbridge, ET 1988, p. 188. 
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beings is, by virtue of the incarnation, divine activity, whereas 
activity which is neutral (if such can be said to exist) and that which 
contributes to the lack of freedom of particular human beings in 
particular places at particular times is simply human activity. Such 
human activity unrelated to and in opposition to the divine activity 
present in liberation processes, remains firmly human activity. It Is 
subject to the futility and sin of unredeemed and enslaved humanity. 
To put it another way, acts which further liberation are a sign of the 
presence of God. 
5.3.4 Physical Location and Particularity 
For Boff therefore, as for Torrance, God is not present in all 
places at all times, for a human activity is required to make the 
presence of God real in a particular place and at a particular time. 
For Torrance the particularity of the presence of God in the spatio-
temporal realm is a problem because all particularity is a problem. 
While beginning with the event located at particular spatio-temporal 
co-ordinates, Torrance moves quickly to the significance of 
particular events within the general, universal rationality of the 
universe. A similar movement from particular to general was seen in 
the application of phenomenologically derived data by geographers 
in chapter two. The incarnation is more significant for its function as 
the rationality behind the universe than for its uniqueness as an 
event at one particular time and place. Furthermore, the place and 
time of the presence of God are not central to Torrance's position for 
it is in the noetic act that God is present. 
Page 160 Place in Theological Perspective 
Boff is able to provide the theoretical tools for dealing with 
the particular nature of place. He wishes to begin with the People of 
God in a particular place with particular liberation promoting human 
actions. He also proposes an incarnationally based sacramental 
theology for understanding the presence of God at a particular 
instant of space-time. This presence is real, but as with Torrance, it 
is not a presence in place but a presence in human action. 
5.4 CONCLUSION 
Having shown how places operate in Part One we have seen 
in this chapter that it is possible to speak both of the relations 
between objects in non-substantive terms and to conceive of the 
presence of God in the world. Torrance argues that modern science 
requires us to hold that objects are related to one another in such a 
manner as to be defined by their relations. A relation is not an 
explanation of origins but a statement of being. Further, the location 
of all things is described by reference to the four dimensional 
spatio-temporal realm. All knowledge however, must be interpreted 
by the ultimate truth of the incarnation and the rigidity imposed by 
this way of locating theology is extended into the account of the way 
God relates to his creation. Having created and acted, supremely in 
the incarnation, it is only through a mental response to God's love 
that his presence in the world can be said to be realised. There is 
therefore, little sense of God being present in his creation in a way 
which is independent of human activity. 
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Boff recognises the power of the particularity of being located 
here as opposed to there. He has worked for the right to develop a 
theology which is particular to the place in which he finds himself 
and which consequently, is perceived by some to be a threat to the 
universality of the church. He locates theology within knowledge 
rather than at its pinnacle and this could be a picture of the way in 
which God is present in creation. However, beyond the 
development of a regional theology, Boff has little sense of the 
power of the land as a consciousness-shaping agent and tends to 
locate God only in the liberating activity of human beings. Ways in 
which places operate other than through social organisation and 
institutional forms are not given much attention. Consequently, 
chapter six is concerned to establish the ontology of place to which 
Torrance drew attention and to suggest that God is present in 
creation simply because he creates. 
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A RELATIONAL ONTOLOGY FOR THE THEOLOGY OF 
P L A C E 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this sixth chapter we will describe a relational ontology 
which can provide a framework for a theology of place. In the 
previous chapter we have seen both the development of relational 
ideas applied to theology and a substantively conceived theological 
system. In this chapter we will follow two different routes to a 
relational ontology which is non-substantive in nature. McFadyen, 
developing a Christian theory of social relations, applies an 
ontology based on speculation about the operation of the Trinity to 
human relations with other human beings. He uses a model of the 
individual as a relational being for whom the sense of self-identity 
and continuity the self, is a construct which enables the individual 
to make sense of the complex relations which constitute the locus of 
one's being. 
Moltmann, by contrast, argues for a non-substantive, 
relational theology of creation which, by implication, considers the 
relations between all created things. He has been commenting for 
some time on the shortcomings of many theological accounts of the 
created order He is unhappy that creation is often seen as 
completed and that created things are treated as objects. We will 
end the chapter with a critique of his theology of creation which 
seeks to be particular, relative and non-substantive. The language 
which McFadyen and Moltmann employ is not the same but the 
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principles used are closely related. 
In chapter five both Torrance and Boff conclude that the 
presence of God is dependent upon the activity of human beings. 
McFadyen devotes little time to relations between human beings 
and physical things or places but argues that human relations are 
made whole by being transformed by the presence of God. At the 
invitation of the individual and with the intention of transformation 
God becomes present and makes possible whole relations. 
Moltmann however suggests that God is present through his 
creative presence in what he has made and that the presence of an 
immanent God is the access point to the reality of a transcendent 
God. Here the presence of God is not dependent upon some form of 
human activity but is simply a given, a part of the way things are. 
We begin with a brief consideration of the work of Dussel, a 
South American writer who uses a genuinely relational ontology in 
an account of the presence of God in and through the operation of 
communities of people. He merges economy with essence and 
argues that to be a human being is to engage in relations with other 
human beings. The suggestion that there is a part of me which 
remains unaffected by my relationships or which is not perceived by 
a person with whom I relate is for Dussel a nonsensical suggestion. 
I exist in relation and it is through my relations that I not only have 
my being but that I am the way I am. A community is not formed or 
created by human beings in the sense that they choose to exist in 
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community for the choice to not exist in community does not exist. 
Human beings must group together and can only exist by relating to 
one another. 
6.2 DUSSEL: A NON-SUBSTANTIVE WAY FORWARD 
6.2.1 The Development of a Relational Ontology 
Dussel has taken more account than most of the need to 
establish a new ontology which recognises the mutual 
interdependence of all things. In the Introduction to Ethics and 
Community, he explains his methodology: "I shall proceed ... "from 
the simple to the complex" - that is, "from the abstract to the 
concrete".^ In an earlier book maintaining that "the only locus of 
revelation is history" he goes on to say that to perceive this 
revelation one must look to concrete, particular history because that 
is where God chooses to reveal himself. To miss this or to look for 
generalised timeless and placeless truths, Dussel maintains, would 
be to miss God.^ Despite the use of the term 'history' which is 
misleading in this context because it appears placeless, this is a 
particularist understanding of the way in which God reveals himself. 
Dussel sees the presence of God in the world in a way 
related to Boff. However, he pursues the consequences of this 
understanding more fully than Boff and proposes a dynamic 
understanding of human beings and communities and their 
' E. Dussel, Ethics and Community, 1986, Tr R. Barr, Burns and Gates, 
Tunbridge Wells, ET 1988, p. 2. 
^See E. Dussel, History and the Theology of Liberation, Orbis Books, 
Maryknoll, New York, ET 1976, p. 2. 
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relations with each other and with God. Dussel suggests for 
example that 
praxis or practice denotes any human act addressed to 
another human person; further, praxis denotes the very 
relationship of one person to another. Praxis is both act 
and relationship: "Those who believed lived as one." 
(Acts 2:44).^ 
Here Dussel combines action and relation. This has the effect of 
uniting intention, a mental act of an individual, with both the 
physical act of the individual, the intention enacted, and the result of 
the act upon someone else. In this way the two people involved are 
automatically in a relation. By virtue of the fact that action is 
occurring between two people they are inevitably in relation to one 
another. 
A further effect of the combination of action and intention is 
the conflation of economy and essence. What one is and what one 
does become linked in such a way that it becomes possible to see 
one when observing the other. In other words when one observes 
an act one is also observing the being which is generating the act. 
When Dussel adds "Strictly speaking one is a person only when 
one is in a relationship of praxis"," he is saying that part of what it is 
to be a human being involves acting towards other people. Acting 
towards other people is a constituent part of being a person. 
It is therefore impossible to conceive of a human being who 
^E. Dussel, Ethics and Community, ibid., p. 8 
" E. Dussel, Ethics and Community, ibid., p. 9. 
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is independent of other human beings. Consequently, a human 
being is a relational being. To posit the existence of a human being 
who is not relational in essence, as opposed to being in 
relationship with another human being, would be a contradiction. 
Being in a relationship has long been recognised as a 
characteristic of human activity. However, it has not been thought to 
be a feature of 'human being-ness' at an essential level. The 
implication of Dussel's position is that essence and economy 
cannot be distinguished because they are a single entity. In other 
words, actions arise out of what someone is and there is no 
distance between being and act. Therefore, to see the action which 
one takes is, to some degree, to see what one is. 
6.2.2 The Implications of a Relational Ontology for Places 
Dussel is saying that it is impossible to conceive of human 
beings existing in relation with other human beings at an 
ontological level. Because it is possible to conceive of human 
beings existing in this way, and only in this way then all things 
which act as agents upon human beings, things like history social 
organisation and physical objects can also be in relation with 
human beings. It is therefore possible to say that one's 'place" is a 
factor in determining what one is. Place here refers to any of the 
several understandings of place which have been discussed at 
length above. 
Dussel however, is unwilling to take account of things as well 
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simply does not refer to the action of inanimate objects on human 
being. His argument, applied to our illustrations of the agency of 
inanimate objects, suggests that things act as 'subjects' on the 
human essence and not upon an outer layer which protects 'what 
really is' from change and provisionality That is to say, what a 
human being is, is the point at which a complex variety of relations 
meet in a thinking and reasoning physical being. One of the most 
important sources for a set of relations is what constitutes the 
physical structure of a place, the social structure of a place and the 
complex cultural landscape of a place. The physical structure of the 
place contributes to the being of a particular human being. What a 
particular human being is, is in part a result of the relations between 
that human being and the place, which can act, therefore, in 
traditional language, as 'subject' towards what the human being is. 
One's place, therefore, is that set of interrelationships which 
are unique to a particular person and which constitute a particular 
person. These include one's social position; a relative position 
open to interpretation and change. Here, being is influenced by the 
nature of the relations of which one is a part, the people with whom 
there is a relation and - and here the complexity of this way of 
understanding ontology is revealed - the nature of the relations of 
these people and the people with whom they are in relation. The 
process of socialisation discussed in chapter four is not one of 
appropriated social constructions for this implies a distance 
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between the individual being socialised and those from whom he 
learns his world view. Such a distance does not exist, for the 
individual's being is changed by his relations; he does not acquire 
a world view which is added on to what he already is. 
They also include the structure of the place and the fact of the 
existence of the place. The subjectivity of these aspects of place 
has been illustrated in the appendix to Part One and can influence 
what a person is and be a very powerful influence in moulding 
group identity. Dussel chooses to refer only to human relations as 
constitutive of being but his argument holds nevertheless. It can be 
applied by analogy to all human relations even if they are with 
inanimate objects or with a 'world view' or cultural value. 
6.3 MCFADYEN: THE RELATIONAL NATURE OF HUMAN 
PERSONHOOD 
6.3.1 The Development of a Relational Ontology by Analogy 
McFadyen develops what he calls a "Christian theory of the 
individual in social relationships"^ He begins with observations 
about human behaviour and speculation about the nature of God. 
He argues that human beings are both dialogical and dialectical 
creatures in that a person is formed through social interaction and 
therefore is always in the process of being formed. He writes 
The communication may then be said to have informed 
the recipient, in so far as the recipient has been changed 
by V 
= A. McFadyen, The Call To Personhood, CUP, Cambridge, 1990. 
'A. McFadyen, op. cit., p. 7. 
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... we are what we are in ourselves only through relation 
to others.' 
In other words, as Dussel argues, a human being can only be 
conceived as a relational being, interacting with other human 
beings. 
He uses the interactive, interpenetrative relations by which 
the individual identities of the persons of the Trinity are achieved as 
a model for the relations of human beings. He argues that 
Being a person means existing in relation. Personal 
identity or discreteness is not asocial, but the form of 
punctuation which both separates and links one to 
others.* 
It is in the dialogical move towards the other that a person becomes 
an individual. To be an individual is to recognise that limits are 
placed on what one is, what one is able to do and what one will be. 
Only then is the individual able to see that it is in the relations with 
others that the individual is formed, and constantly reformed, and in 
the process of formation and reformation distinguished from those 
others with whom the individual is in relation. Only through dialogue 
can dialectic be achieved. 
In social relations the interactions between human beings, 
each operating as an agent upon the others, form what it is to be a 
particular human being. An individual enters into social relations 
with a being already formed by a history of social relations. 
'A. McFadyen, op. cit, p. 9. 
= A. McFadyen, op. cit, p. 28. 
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However, that identity is not fixed, it is fluid and dynamic and is open 
to reformation and recreation in new social relations. Therefore to 
be placed in a politically organised social environment is to be in an 
open nexus of relations between human beings in which all past 
relations and all present relations interact to reform the being and 
the self-identity of the individuals within the community. 
One's being here is not located internally in a discrete 'self 
which remains immune from the influence of events, people or 
places. Being is non-substantive in the sense that it is located in the 
relations which one has. What one is is located in the relations 
which extend from one's sense of self-identity to other things, to 
other people and to the past. The 'open nexus of relations' is where 
the being of any individual is to be found. 
6.3.2 The Operation of Relational Ontology: Self-identity and 
Identity-in-Relation 
It is however, a different matter to say that this is where I am 
to be found. '1' exist in two different senses. The first is my sense of 
self-identity This is what I am to myself. It is constantly changing 
because this 'self, which IVlcFadyen terms 'deep self, is a product 
of my reflections, conscious and sub-conscious, on what T am in 
the second sense. In this second sense '1' am the relations I have 
with other people, other things and with the past. What I am will not 
be constant because it is partly dependent upon the things with 
which I am relating. For example, one relates in a different way to 
Page 171 A Relational Ontology For the Theology of Place 
one's family and to one's employer. This is not only my choice but is 
something which I feel constrained to do and something which I 
cannot help but do. Therefore what I am in this second sense is also 
fluid and open to change. It is external and it is variable. This does 
not however, make it less important or any less 'me'. Externality 
does not lead to superficiality. McFadyen describes the distinction 
between deep 'self and local 'self like this: 
There is ... a continuity between deep 'self and local 
'self. This is a matter of continuity between public and 
private and between the particular appearance in a 
relation and the enduring identity which transcends 
particular relations.® 
'Self consistently appears in apostrophied form because for 
McFadyen 
There is no 'self in itself, but only as it is with and for 
others. ... Personal integrity must be understood in terms 
of public appearance in communication through which 
the form of one's commitment (...) to oneself and others 
materialises, is experienced and may henceforth be 
expected by others.'" 
Human beings are beings in relation but clearly some sense of 
personal identity exists. The 'self is a construct which has no 
material existence but which facilitates personal identity. It is 
through behaving as though I have a self that I am 'myself. This 
imaginary core makes it possible to speak of 'me'. It does this 
because it is 'experientially transcendent'. In other words, its 
existence cannot be verified by empirical observation because 
*A. McFadyen, op. cit., p. 154. 
'"A. McFadyen, op. cit, p. 154. 
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there is nothing substantive to observe. However, the organisational 
effects of the self can be observed empirically. For McFadyen, then, 
"Selfhood does not indicate a substance but an organisational 
process."" and "A 'self theory enables personal centredness"'^ 
This theory of an "experientially transcendent structure of 
organised and continuous identity" which is merely a construct and 
has no material existence appears to bear striking similarities with 
existential theories of the self. However, the difference here is that it 
is the self which is considered a construct in order to account for the 
reality of the relations between two human beings and to make it 
possible to locate being externally using a non-substantive 
ontology 
6.3.3 Physical Place in Relational Ontology 
McFadyen does not develop his argument to include a 
consideration of relations between human beings and inanimate 
things. He does not therefore, discuss the possibility or the nature of 
relations between human beings and physical locations. However, 
it is clear that the ontology which he uses to describe the nature of 
social relations may also be used to describe the nature of relations 
human beings have with inanimate objects. 
These objects, as we have seen, can act as agents and are 
able to influence what human beings will become. We have seen in 
A. McFadyen, op. cil, p. 100 
'^A. McFadyen, op. cit., p. 101. 
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the introduction to this thesis that where one lives will set limits 
upon what one can do and that this will, in turn, affect what one will 
be. A place can exist in exactly the same way as McFadyen 
describes the being of a human being. A place is necessarily in 
relation with other places, with the history of that and other places 
and with any living things which are a part of that place. Amongst 
such living things we may also number human beings. A place can 
be considered to have a variety of local 'selves' which are 
presented in relations and a deep 'self which is the 'spirit' of a 
place." 
When the language of 'self is applied to inanimate objects it 
needs to be remembered that the self is a construct which is used to 
account for the sense of self-identity and the perception of the 
identity of others and it does not refer to any materially real thing. 
Consequently although never reflective, a place can be said to 
have a 'self for it is both a unified entity and it can present itself in a 
variety of different ways in different relations. A particular place 
cannot present itself in an infinite variety of ways. It is limited by 
itself, its history, its geography its sociology and so on, that is to say, 
by its present relations. These prescribing limitations contribute to a 
sense of identity which can be termed deep 'self. However, as with 
human beings, a place will present itself in relations, indeed it will 
be itself in relations, but these relations will be different and will 
depend upon the nature of the relation and the nature of the things 
'^The notion of the 'spirit' of place has been widely discussed. See for 
example, the work of Pocock. 
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or person with whom the place is relating. The variety of local 
'selves' will not be infinite but their number will be considerable. 
6.3.4 The Place of God in Relational Ontology 
McFadyen then, provides us with an explanation of human 
relations which is able not only to explain social placing but which 
can also be used by analogy to explain the operation of 
geographical, physical places. For McFadyen, God is present in the 
transformation of human relations. God is a model for perfect 
relations which are seen in action in the being of the Trinity and in 
the obedience of the incarnate Word. 
Christ is therefore the place where divine address and 
undistorted human response coincide, the place where 
God's call and proper human response meet. Christ is 
therefore the enacting of the image in its fullness. Jesus is 
the human person properly for God and others, and 
therefore properly for Himself - both his relations and his 
identity are undistorted. To be fully in God's image, to 
make a right response to God and others, is therefore to 
be conformed to Christ." 
Here we not only see that it is in being "properly for God and others" 
that one becomes properly oneself, but also that God is present in 
the world by virtue of his historical incarnation and through the 
existence of properly constituted relations. 
Unlike Torrance's explanation, this is not a static notion of the 
incarnation, nor is it a notion which replaces the particularity of this 
relation or that relation by relations in general. Furthermore, it is not 
'"A. McFadyen, op. cit., p. 46-47. 
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a notion which locates the presence of God in human action and in 
human actions alone for the Spirit is present in relations. However, 
a human response appears to be necessary for the transformation 
of relations and it is in this transformation that the presence of God 
is made real. 
Christian faith, however, speaks not only of human 
incapacity, but of divine empowerment in these things. 
The Christian language of community and of redemption 
can only achieve its full meaning in the kingdom - the 
community where the true meaning of communal and 
personal life will be perfected and lived out in the 
structures of intersubjectivty and formal reciprocal co-
intention. This vision of community and Christian talk 
about it comes from the future, as does God's creative-
redemptive activity which calls us towards it. We may 
therefore be empowered by this future as it is made 
available to us primarily (but only primarily) through 
God's communication re-presented and mediated to us 
through the institutions of the Church. But appropriate 
response on our part remains necessary and, because 
the intention is of a dialogue partnership, whatever 
empowerment we may receive in the spirit of the future 
cannot take away our personal and collective 
responsibility for and towards 
God is present empowering the transformation of relations but the 
manner of his relation with human beings is through a call from the 
future. Furthermore, in order to actualise the presence of the 
kingdom through transformed dialogue a human response is 
inevitably required. 
The presence of God occurs here in two ways. It exists 
'vertically' between the individual and God in a transformed relation 
with God. The relation takes the form of a call from God to which the 
'=A. McFadyen, op. cit., p. 270. 
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individual responds. It also exists in transformed relations between 
individuals. Here the presence of God comes as a call to establish a 
transformed relation in which he is then present in so far as that 
relation foreshadows the nature of relations in the kingdom. With 
this ontology a call can constitute a 'real' presence but there is little 
sense of God dwelling on earth in the midst of a fallen world. He 
simply issues a call and empowers those who choose to respond to 
the call. By extending the ontology to include all things animate and 
inanimate and by arguing that God is present by the indwelling of 
the Spirit as creator it is possible to argue that God is present in 
places. Consequently human beings relate to God in and through 
their relations with places and with one another as well as directly 
with God as the transforming Other in the way that McFadyen 
describes. 
6.4 MOLTMANN: THE INDWELLING OF THE CREATOR 
GOO 
6.4.1 Introduction 
The German theologian Moltmann has, amongst other 
things, tried to show that traditional Protestant understandings of 
creation have had several problems inherent within them. In the 
final section of this chapter we will offer a critique of his analysis of 
these understandings in order to show that the 'natural created 
order' is not only an agent in relations with human beings but is 
also the locus of the presence of God. It will then be possible to 
argue that the relational ontology developed by McFadyen and 
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applied to the physical world can also be applied to relations with 
God who indwells those things which he has created. We must 
begin with a brief summary of traditional Protestant views of 
creation. 
6.4.2 The Establishment of the Ontology: A Theology of Creation 
6.4.2.1 Traditional Protestant Attitudes: Creation as Object 
Throughout this thesis we have maintained that it is important 
to understand that objects, animate and inanimate alike, relate to 
one another and that what these objects can be said to be is 
located in these relations. Much modern thought may be said to 
have its roots in a deistic Protestant tradition and does not find it 
easy to share such an understanding. The issue of place reveals 
the tension between this tradition and newer models of 
interdependence arising out of changes in scientific models. 
Places, we have argued, are where human beings meet with 
one another, with the physical world and with God. They are the 
context within which relations occur as well as being part of the 
complex web of relations themselves. Traditional Protestant 
doctrines of creation have often been in danger of becoming deistic 
rather than theistic. God is acknowledged as the creator of the 
universe who, having completed the act of creation then only deals 
directly with his people. Such involvement as there is in the world, 
which is often perceived as hostile, is frequently the 'supernatural' 
act of God revealing himself to his people in history. It is this 
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theology of creation which informs Torrance's view that God relates 
to his people through noetic possibility and not in sacramental 
presence. It may also be linked to the marked reluctance amongst 
theologians to talk of God relating to anything other than human 
beings. 
This has not actually been the case in Protestant theology as 
Brunner states: 
Now the recognition of a divine preservation of the world, 
as distinct from His creation, does not exclude the truth 
that God is still actively and creatively at work in a world 
which He has already created, and which He preserves.'* 
However, the Lutheran tradition contains an emphasis on God as 
distinct from his creation for he is seen to exert no creative energy 
following the completion of the act of creation.'^ Even Calvin's 
theology which allows for creation ex nihilo in and through time, 
E. Brunner, Dogmatics Vol. II: The Christian Doctrine of Creation and 
Redemption, Lutterworth Press, Lutterworth, 1952, p. 34. 
For example, Luther translates Romans 8 as "For we know that every creature 
groans and travails in pain, even til now." and makes little reference to the creation 
except to offer tacit support for a popular theory of the day: "that, in the first seven 
days when the world was created, the sun was much brighter than it is now, but that 
it became darker by fault of the sin of man who fell into sin on the seventh or sixth 
day; they say also that, in the world to come, it will be seven times brighter than it 
was then. This opinion cannot be proved from Scripture, though in a certain sense 
it can be sustained." Library of Christian Classics Vol. XV: Luther on Romans, ed. 
W. Pauck, SCM, London, 1961, p. 238-9. 
Page 179 A Relational Ontology For the Theology of Place 
tends only to deal with human beings. 18 
The dangers of understanding the creation as 'object' are to 
be seen in Brunner's unintentional isolation of the individual. 
The Christian statement on Creation is not a theory of the 
way in which the world came into being - whether once 
for all, or in continuous evolution - but it is an "existential" 
statement. In His revelation the Lord meets me, my Lord, 
as the Creator, as my Creator and the Creator of all 
things. 
Althaus takes this approach to its existential conclusion: 
The statement about the creation of the world is not 
theory - not a hypothesis to explain the world. It is 
personal, existential knowledge ... the assurance about 
the world as creation is based on God's encounter with 
me.^ 
The discussion in earlier chapters concerning the limitations of the 
idealist conception of subject and object is central to our argument 
here. A theological doctrine of the creation cannot reduce the 
understanding of belief in creation to the existential knowledge of 
an individual. To do this would be to suggest that the individual is 
" Creation clearly has a function for Calvin and that is to point man to God. 
"Undoubtedly were one to attempt to speak in due terms of the inestimable 
wisdom, power, justice and goodness of God, in the formation of the world, no 
grace or splendour of diction could equal the greatness of the subject. Still there 
can be no doubt that the Lord would have has constantly occupied with such holy 
meditation". "The other course, which has a closer relation to faith, remains to be 
considered - viz. that while we observe how God has destined all things for our 
good and salvation, we at the same time feel his power and grace, both in 
ourselves and in the great blessings which he has bestowed upon us; thence 
stirring up ourselves to confidence in him, to invocation, praise and love. Moreover, 
as I lately observed, the Lord himself, by the very order of creation, has 
demonstrated that he created all things for the sake of man." Institutes of the 
Christian Religion, J Calvin, trans. H. Beveridge, J . Clarke, London, 1962, I xiv 21 
and 22, p. 156, 157. 
" E . Brunner, op. cit, p. 35. 
'°P. Althaus quoted in J . Moltmann, God in Creation, SCM, London, ET 1985, 
p. 36. 
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an isolated entity who is more important than and independent of 
creation. By this we mean that, if we are to agree with Althaus we 
are forced to concede that the individual is more important than 
belief in creation for it is only in the existential knowledge of an 
individual that such a belief can be said to exist. Thus the individual 
must also be independent of creation for the status of creation as 
creation is consequent upon the content of the existential 
knowledge of the individual. A doctrine of creation must refer to the 
world in such a way as neither to elevate human subjectivity nor 
denigrate the subjectivity of the 'natural', that is to say, the non-
cognitive or non-human world. 
6.4.2.2 Contemporary Ecological Attitudes: Creation as 
Mutual Subject 
As we have seen in earlier chapters, it has been the 
tendency of Western thought for several centuries not only to 
denigrate the subjectivity of nature but to deny it altogether. Nature 
is perceived not as a subject acting in its own right upon other 
objects but simply as an object upon which human experiment and 
within which human discovery can take place. Ultimately, it was 
envisaged that mastery over the object 'nature' would be obtained. 
The increasingly popular observation that this goal is false 
coincided with the recognition that it is also illusory and that such 
mastery cannot be achieved. 
This popular observation is beginning to receive 
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philosophical and theological undergirding. Clark argues that 
My being and my welfare cannot be disentangled from 
the being and welfare of the created universe. The living 
world ... is like "the federation or community of 
interdependent organs and tissues that goes to make up 
[a physician's] patient".^' 
Clark's language makes it clear that he is affirming the subjectivity 
of both human beings and the created world for they each impinge 
upon the other. That is to say it is his view that human beings and 
the natural world both act as subjects upon each other, for each is 
partly formed by the other. A more thoroughgoing way of stating this 
is to say human beings and the natural world are in relation with 
one another and that the interdependency which is predicated by 
these relations is so fundamental as to be at the level of ontology. 
What I am is determined by my relations with human beings and 
with the natural world. 
His use of a medical illustration is significant. Moltmann also 
uses medical practice to illustrate how the "calamitous dichotomy 
between the subjectivity of human beings and the objective world of 
'mere things'"^ is a false way of viewing the universe. Moltmann 
comments that in a medical surgery the subject undertaking 
treatment confronts a subject undergoing treatment. In other words, 
"the hard and fast distinction between human being and nature 
cannot be applied to the human being himself."^ Moltmann argues 
S. Clark, 'Animals, Ecosystems and the Litjeral Ethic', Vol. 70, The Zionist, 
1987, p. 126. 
=^J. Moltmann, God in Creation, SCM, London, ET 1985, p. 35. 
" J . Moitmann, op. cit., p. 48. 
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here that the patient and the surgeon are in a relationship with one 
another in which each is dependent upon the other. It is often 
thought that the surgeon is a subject who operates upon an 
unconscious object, the patient. This is not the case for the patient 
has agreed to undergo treatment. The patient therefore enables the 
surgeon to act. Without the activity of the patient, functioning as a 
subject, the surgeon would not be able to operate. Furthermore, the 
patient allows himself to become an object in the hands of the 
doctor. Thus both parties function as subject and object at some 
stage in the lengthy relationship. Each is forced to allow the other to 
act as subject while he remains passive as object. 
Although Moltmann retains the misleading traditional 
language of subject and object he is making the same point as 
McFadyen: relations between human beings occur at the level of 
being and that being resides in the relations. However, Moltmann 
takes the debate an important step further with his observations that 
it is nature which is subject and the human being is a subjective 
sub-set of nature. This observation is not new. Clark refers to the 
pithy nineteenth century saying that 
If men spit upon the ground they spit upon themselves. 
Man did not weave the web of life, he is merely a strand 
of it. Whatever he does to the web he does to himself.^" 
It is of interest to us for two reasons. Firstly, it suggests that human 
beings and nature are related ontologically for each determines, in 
part, what the other is. This is a summary of the importance of place. 
="3. Clark, op cit, p. 126-7. 
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The being of persons is determined, in part, and probably in very 
large part, by the 'place' which they occupy. We have seen a 
number of ways in which one's place can be defined. We are 
suggesting, following McFadyen, that one's place, understood 
existentially socio-economically and geographically, is a 
fundamental statement about one's relations. Therefore 'being 
placed' is about one's location in 'the web of life' and not, as others 
might suggest, to do with decisions which a free individual night 
have made. 
Secondly, it is of interest to us because it affirms the 
importance of the particular over and against the general. If we are 
concerned with relations in a complex network then we will be 
concerned with particular relations between particular things. We 
have maintained throughout that places are particular, they are 
unique locations in time and space with a unique impact on each of 
the things upon which they impinge and with which they are related. 
To be placed is to be located at a particular point in time and space 
in the web of life. 
There are two elements to Moltmann's argument. Firstly, he 
relies heavily on Bloch's philosophy of nature in which, following 
Spinoza, human beings are understood to be part of nature, albeit 
an exceptional and unique part. He summarises Bloch thus 
In the human being she certainly concentrates all her 
energies into what Bloch poetically calls her 'supreme 
flowering'. But she none the less remains the subject, and 
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never becomes the object of the subject 'human being'." 
Secondly, he recognises the scientific observation that systems are 
open and are often unpredictable by their very nature. 
Consequently, it is not possible to conceive of a discrete entity, for 
all things in the universe are, to some degree, dependent upon all 
other things. From these observations Moltmann develops the 
notion of mutual subjectivity. 
To be placed is to be part of a very wide and complex 
network of relations which are dynamic by nature. This network is of 
such complexity and fluidity however, that it is impossible to 
understand precisely all the relations in which a person or thing is 
involved at any one time and place. To be placed therefore, is to be 
subject to a variety of forces which are not only beyond the control 
of the subject but are also, on occasion, beyond the consciousness 
of the subject, and which must remain so because of their 
complexity. Similarly however, all things function not only as the 
object of unknown influences but also as their subject, changing 
them in one way or another. 
Moltmann argues, with respect to his ecological agenda, that 
If the modern metaphysics of subjectivity is to be made 
responsible for the estranging objectification of nature, 
then the new self-interpretation of men and women must 
be founded aj^on a non-subjectivistic metaphysics. If the 
centralistic buildup of modern industries has a destructive 
effect on the environment, then the new interpretation of 
the world of human beings must provide the foundation • f c r 
a non-centralistic culture. The Cartesian 'subject' 
" J . Moltmann, op. cit, p. 43. 
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metaphysics was just as centralistic a theory about the 
world as the Aristotelian metaphysics of substance. Both 
can^^e done away with by means of a relational 
metaphysics, based on the mutual relativity of human 
beings and the world.^' 
If attention is restricted to the subject, it becomes difficult to account 
for the existence of the object. Indeed, it may even be impossible to 
do so, for the object can only be said to exist in so far as a subject 
interacts with it. In the sense then, that the existence of the object 
cannot be established, a Cartesian metaphysics is non-realist. As 
we have seen, Moltmann suggests replacing subjectivistic and 
centralistic metaphysics with a relational ontology which firstly, is 
realist and assumes the existence of the other and which secondly, 
is particular and recognises that being is established by particular 
and unique relations with particular and unique things at particular 
and unique times and places. 
6.4.2.3 Mutual Subjectivity The Objectivity Assessed 
Moltmann's notion of mutual subjectivity is a way of accounting for 
the existence of the other, and more importantly, of accounting for 
the subjectivity of the other - a suggestion which appears to be a 
contradiction. Because of the ambiguities of the language we might 
ask whether or not this is a truly relational metaphysics. The 
problem is this: if mutual subjectivity proceeds by two subjects 
agreeing at various times to forgo their right to function as a subject 
in the relationship in favour of the subjectivity of the other then there 
are a number of ways in which a proper relationship cannot be said 
^*J, Moltmann, op. cit, p. 50. 
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to exist. In such a relationship each subject continues to understand 
Itself as a subject, even though it knows that other things and 
people also function as subjects, that is to say, even though the 
metaphysics claims to be realist. Furthermore, it is implied that the 
subject is able to choose when to function not as the subject which 
it is, but as the object it is not. The objective state therefore, is only 
temporary, is not part of the subject's being in the same way that its 
subjectivity is, and is entered into in a deliberate and calculating 
manner, although not necessarily in its own interests. 
In a 'proper' relationship neither subject nor object will exist 
because each being will be dependent upon each other being and 
self-awareness will not imply consciousness of primacy. Many if not 
most of the effects of other things will be unconscious, involuntary or 
unavoidable. What something is, understood in terms of relational 
metaphysics, will largely be beyond its control. Our concern is this: 
the language of mutual subjectivity does not appear to permit the 
full range of implication which the adoption of a relational 
metaphysics requires. However, it is our view that this is a problem 
of language; the mistake is not in the metaphysics but in the 
traditional language used to describe it. 
Moltmann succeeds in the two most crucial areas. Firstly, he 
preserves the particularity of the existential interest in the subject. 
What is most important is the particular relation upon which 
attention is being focused. In chapter two we showed that existential 
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thinking, being derived from a Cartesian metaphysics has little 
sense of the reality of the other, but a high sense of the particularity 
of the existent subject. Here, Moltmann preserves the particularity of 
the subject by concerning himself with the nature of the relation 
which the subject has with the other. 
Secondly, he stresses the reality of the other, be it another 
person, inanimate objects, or God, for this other is also seen as a 
subject. The language of subjectivity preserves particularity while 
remaining intelligible within an idealist framework. For the reason 
explained above we find it unnecessary and misleading to retain 
this language. McFadyen speaks of a relational ontology which is 
not concerned with subjects and objects but with mutually 
interdependent and highly fluid beings in which being is located in 
relations. This remains particularist because what constitutes a 
being can only be described in terms of the particularities of that 
being. Any change of time or place, of relation or experience, brings 
a change of the being. It is also a realist understanding of being 
because the being of any thing is defined in terms of the things with 
which it is related. 
6.4.2.4 The Relation Between the Particular and the Universal 
If a being is defined in terms of its particularity, that is to say, 
in terms of the range of relations by which it is constituted at any 
particular time, then that being is also distinguished by its 
particularity. It is in its particularity that its uniqueness is located. 
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Certain relations are shared with other human beings. All solids 
share a manner of relating to other objects by virtue of their solidity. 
All the members of a particular species or a particular place will be 
likely to have similarities in certain relations. But such similarities or 
ways in which relations operate are not to be confused with an 
Aristotelian or Cartesian understanding of being in terms of 
properties which determine the variations of the individual from the 
norm. In such an ontology one's place in the web of relations is 
dependent upon and consequent upon the type of being which one 
is. It is a far less dynamic ontology in which change cannot be said 
to happen to what is really important but rather to the peripheral 
properties through which being is manifested. 
We wish to suggest that it is the particularity of any being 
which reveals similarity between the 'place' of any two beings. 
Commonality is discovered through the apparent juxtaposition of 
beings within the web of relations. It is thus consequent upon the 
particularity of being. It is not defined at the outset and modified by 
relatively trivial variations from the universally agreed norm. This 
ontology has the effect of making the discovery of universality 
secondary to the description of particularity. Previously, definitions 
of universality have been proposed which have left room for the 
observation of particularities which do not impinge upon the central 
definition of what something is. 
Consequently universality is located in particularity. It is only 
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because something is given particular attention that it can become 
in some sense universal. Thus Moltmann argues that the 
incarnation is only of universal significance because God became a 
man and not Man. To maintain that God became Man would be in 
accordance with dominant universalist philosophies. However, 
while it is a claim that the incarnation was to do with that which 
every human being shares, namely 'human being-ness', this is not 
what all human beings share. What is common to all human beings 
is the fact that all are particular human beings. It is the particularity 
of being which is universal and only in particularity can universality 
be found. 
5.4.3 The Presence of God in Creation 
The incarnation is of universal significance because God 
became a particular human being located at a particular point in the 
spatio-temporal realm. It is this that all human beings share. Thus, 
we are also able to maintain that God is present in particular place 
by virtue of the presence of the Spirit, the creative breath of life. It 
has been traditional to maintain that God is present in universal 
place if he is present in place at all. However, by analogy with the 
incarnation, it is clear that only by being present in a particular 
place can God be said to be present in all places. 
In a si.milar way, it is possible to locate the transcendence of 
God, who dwells in particular place (and thereby in all places) in the 
immanence of God. By virtue of God's indwelling presence one can 
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locate God's transcendent non-dwelling. Moltmann argues that 
immanence and transcendence are not different concepts but 
opposites separated only by an infinitely small boundary point. This 
boundary is simply the point at which what is immanent, that is seen 
and known, becomes transcendent, that is unseen and unknown, or 
that point at which what is transcendent become immanent. This 
boundary point must vary; it is unquantifiable and is consequently 
very difficult to locate. A statement of how it is that what is immanent 
contains its own transcendence, and therefore of how the 
immanence of God is, in itself, the presence of the transcendent 
God is beyond the scope of this thesis, but it is, nevertheless, the 
direction in which a properly particular, realist and relational 
theology of place points. 
The notion of the Shekinah describes the indwelling of God 
in a particular place. It expresses the truth that God is present in 
places, and in this way, dwells amongst people. The presence of 
God located precisely in the Ark of the Covenant and then in the 
Holy of Holies in the Temple, is an expression of universality 
through particularity. It is only because God dwells in one particular 
place that it is possible to say that he also dwells in all other places. 
It is because God is the creator of all things that he is present 
in all things and that, therefore, all things are in relation to God. In 
summarising his intention in writing God in Creation Moltmann 
writes that 
The trinitarian concept of mutual perichoresis is matched 
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by an ecological doctrine of creation: the triune God not 
only stands over against his creation but also at the same 
time enters into it through his eternal spirit, permeates all 
things and through his indwelling brings about the 
community of creation.^' 
This is very similar to McFadyen's understanding of the presence of 
God in the transformed relations between human beings except that 
it is a presence in all things and a presence which does not require 
the prior action of human beings. It is a presence which is 
unconditional and which is guaranteed by virtue of the creative 
activity of God and not by the re-creative activity of either God or 
human beings. 
This is a crucial difference and allows us to say that God is 
present in this place and therefore in all places by the indwelling of 
his spirit and that thereby to be in relationship with a place, however 
construed, is 
"J. Moltmann, History and the Triune God, SCM, London, ET1991, Trans. J. 
Bowden, p. 181. 
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to be in relation with God. 
6.5 CONCLUSION 
In conclusion we may say that the theology of place is an 
account of the relational nature of ontology - human and non-
human being is constituted by relations with other things. These 
relations are what being is. A major part of what constitutes an 
individual is, therefore, the relations which that individual has with 
the ways in which the individual can be said to be placed. It has 
traditionally been easier to speak of one's social place - one's 
location in society; but place must involve 'natural' creation as well 
as the 'human constructs' of social organisation. Human beings are 
placed in relations to other human beings but also in relation to the 
land, to the physical structure of the locality and to other living 
organisms, both plants and animals. Furthermore, human beings 
are located in cultural groups, societies and institutions which 
regulate behaviour and influence attitudes to social and physical 
placing. These groups are also influenced by their relation to the 
land. 
Page 193 A Relational Ontology For the Theology of Place 
CONCLUSION 
It is impossible to conceive of a human being who does not 
have relatives. All human beings must, by definition, have a father 
and a mother. To have parents is part of what it is to be a human 
being. There need not be a knowledge of who these people are but 
every human being must have had parents who existed at one time. 
Therefore all human beings are in relation with other human 
beings. At the very least every human being is in relation with his 
father or mother, that is, with the human beings who were involved 
in his conception and birth. Consequently one cannot be said to 
exist in isolation; a human being is not a discrete individual who 
acts with complete control and independence. Even a human being 
who survived from birth in complete isolation from other human 
beings would retain a relation with his parents. The absence of 
present relations would itself act as a powerful influence on the 
behaviour, thought processes and actions of the unfortunate 
individual. 
A human being is therefore in relation with some other 
human beings. This means that these other people place 
constraints on the behaviour and thoughts of the subject. These 
constraints exist because the family, friends and colleagues of an 
individual locate the individual in a series of complicated relations. 
There are relations with other human beings. These relations are 
organised into a social and political structure within which the 
individual is placed. The social placing which all human beings 
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experience as a constraining force both limiting and facilitating 
different thoughts and actions begins within the family and is then 
experienced within a variety of more complex institutional forms 
such as cultural, religious, political and class structures into which 
ail human beings are socialised. These constraints operate in the 
present and are also informed by the past. 
To be brought up within a family is to have one's self-identity 
formed partly by forces acting upon the self from outside the self. In 
other words, what one is, one's being, is partly a result of relations 
experienced. A family will introduce a variety of expectations, 
behavioural patterns and thought processes to the growing 
individual. These will be a result of the particular social location of 
the family, of the self-identity of the family, and of the cultural values 
which the family has adopted. Some of these influences will be 
mediated consciously and other subconsciously but all will be 
moulded by the past. Each of the influences is evolving through 
time in the identity of the family 
What is true of the family is also true of the social grouping 
within which the individual and her family is located. There are 
many sub-cultures in any society and many of these will act as 
agents on an individual. Some will act positively by resonating with 
what that individual is, others will act negatively, exerting an 
influence by exposing differences which the individual will wish to 
protect. There will be a complex series of interactions between the 
Page 195 Conclusion 
historical and present relations, between the familial and the wider 
social relations, and between the conscious and subconscious 
relations all of which also interact with each other. 
The result is that the individual is a highly complex being 
whose being is constantly reformed. Each new relationship brings 
about a modification, however slight, in the being of the individual. 
To be a human beings is to exist in relation with other human 
beings in a highly dynamic and fluid manner. 
However, human beings have a sense of self-identity and, in 
order to make sense of such a fluid 'self, create an internal 'deep 
self which functions as the locus of all the relations which 
comprises the individual. It is at this point that '1' can say that '1' am 
me even though '1' actually exist in a complex set of relations. The 
'deep self is the point at which these relations come into focus and 
self-identity is realised. This 'deep self is itself in relation with the 
'local selves' of the particular relations. It is how it is formed. 
Therefore, a change in any relation will also exert an influence on 
the 'deep self and this will find expression in the conscious or 
subconscious perception of self-identity. 
Hitherto we have been summarising the thesis by describing 
the relational ontology on which it is based within the context of the 
social placing which all human beings experience. However, 
human beings are also related to physical places. A place is a 
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geographical location and all human beings must, by definition, be 
placed geographically as well as socially. Just as any human being 
has a set of particular relations with other human beings so all 
human beings enjoy these relations in particular places. A place is 
not however, simply a backdrop against which human drama 
unfolds. It is part of the drama and acts as an agent just as 
powerfully as any human being or cultural norm does. To live in a 
place is to be constrained by it, by its history, by its geography and 
by its potential. 
All the social forces described above, families, cultures and 
so on are also located in places and they too are influenced by the 
place. A particular place is not just a location on a map, nor is it 
simply a cultural phenomenon with no relation to its physical form, 
rather it is a combination of the two. At a particular location there will 
be human beings whose nature is located in relations with history, 
other human beings, sub-cultures and institutional forms or social 
organisation, social values and the physical environment. Each of 
these will have partly informed all the other relations in which any 
human being is engaged. Indeed a place could also be said to 
have a variety of 'local selves' which are presented in relations to a 
variety of inanimate, animate and constructed phenomena. 
A small but influential set of relations which all human beings 
experience has not yet been mentioried. All human beings will 
construct a series of images of the world around them in order to 
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function within the complexity more adequately. These not only 
simplify the world but can also construct new experiences and 
emotions. The feeling of 'being at home' in a particular place, the 
feeling of nostalgia, is a constructed relation based on relations with 
particular and real places, with human beings and memories of 
experiences in the past. Such relations are immensely powerful 
and are often attached to geographical places as well as human 
relations. 
So far we have only been summarising an anthropology of 
place. It has been argued that, by continuous life-giving and life-
sustaining creative activity, God is present in the created order. God 
is present in all things and maintains the order of creation by being 
present in all things through the Spirit. It is the presence of the Spirit 
which ensures that all things are ordered, are in relation with one 
another and it is the life of the Spirit which makes things live. There 
has not been space in this thesis to give a theological explanation 
of this argument. It has been necessary simply to assert that, on the 
basis of the relational nature of the Trinity and of the life-giving 
nature of God, all things are not only made and sustained in 
creative life by God but are also in relation with him. Thus, to be is to 
be in relation and to be In relation is to be relation with God. 
Therefore, to be is to be in relation with God. 
Consequently to be placed is to be in relation primarily with 
God who made all things, who sustains all things and who keeps all 
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things ordered. This relation is of a similar nature to other relations 
in that it need not be recognised for it to exist and it occurs between 
two parties both of whom are capable of acting as agents. It is also, 
however, dissimilar from other relations in that it is the most 
fundamental of all possible relations and it occurs in two different 
ways. Not only are human beings in direct relation with God but 
also, by virtue of his presence in all things, to be in relation with any 
created thing is also to be in relation with God. It is through this 
series of relationships, as well as through a direct relation as a 
created human being, that human beings relate to God. 
To be placed is to be located in a wide variety of relations 
which, when taken together, constitute being. These relations are 
with the past, with constructed images of reality, with human beings, 
with institutions and cultural and class based value systems, with 
social and political organisations and hierarchies and with physical 
locations in time and space. But it is also to be placed in relations to 
God as mediated by all the other relations in which one is engaged. 
By being present in all things God is mediated to an individual 
through, or rather by being in, all the rich variety of relations which 
constitute the ontology of any particular individual. 
Therefore, to be is to be placed. Where one is placed, in all 
senses described, will partly determine what one is because what 
one is is a relation between one's 'self and one's fluid set of 
relations, it will also affect what one becomes. And God is to be 
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found in each of these relations. The issue of the theological 
account of place focuses the issue of ontology, but at the same time, 
it is not possible to account for being or social organisation or for 
the manner in which God is present in creation or makes himself 
known to human beings without also addressing the question of the 
theology of place. The observation that to be is to be placed in a 
physical location, in a social hierarchy and in a constructed world 
view and that God is present in all these relations is fundamental to 
all theological discussion. 
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